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ALLEGATIONS OF POLITICAL INTERFERENCE
WITH GOVERNMENT CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE

Monday, March 19, 2007

House of Representatives,

Committee on Oversight and

Government Reform,

Washington, D.C.

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## **Committee Hearings**

of the

## U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES



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The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in
Room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Henry A.
Waxman [chairman of the committee] presiding.

Present: Representatives Waxman, Watson, Yarmuth, Norton, Van Hollen, Welch, Shays, Souder, Cannon, and Issa.

Staff Present: Phil Schiliro, Chief of Staff; Phil
Barnett, Staff Director and Chief Counsel; Kristin Amerling,
General Counsel; Karen Lightfoot, Communications Director and
Senior Policy Advisor; Greg Dotson, Chief Environmental
Counsel; Alexandra Teitz, Senior Environmental Counsel; Jeff
Baran, Counsel; Early Green, Chief Clerk; Teresa Coufal,

21 Deputy Clerk; Matt Siegler, Special Assistant; Caren Auchman, 22 Press Assistant; Zhongrui "JR" Deng, Chief Information Officer; Rob Cobbs, Staff Assistant; David Marin, Minority 23 Staff Director; Larry Halloran, Minority Deputy Staff 24 25 Director; Jennifer Safavian, Minority Chief Counsel for 26 Oversight and Investigations; Keith Ausbrook, Minority 27 General Counsel; A. Brooke Bennett, Minority Counsel; Kristina Husar, Minority Professional Staff Member; Larry 28 Brady, Minority Senior Investigator and Policy Advisor; 29 30 Patrick Lyden, Minority Parliamentarian and Member Services Coordinator; Brian McNicoll, Minority Communications 31 32 Director; Benjamin Chance, Minority Clerk; and Ali Ahmad, 33 Minority Staff Assistant and Online Communications 34 Coordinator.

Chairman WAXMAN. Meeting of the committee will come to order. Today the committee continues its investigation into whether the nonpartisan work of climate change scientists was distorted by political interference from the Bush administration. Since our first hearing on January 30th, we have received over eight boxes of documents from the White House Council on Environmental Quality.

The document production is not yet complete, but some of the information the committee has already obtained is disturbing. It suggests that there may have been a concerted effort, directed by the White House, to mislead the public about the dangers of global climate change.

It is too early in this investigation to draw firm conclusions about the White House's conduct. But today's hearing will help us learn more about those efforts and provide guidance on whether further investigation is warranted.

There is a saying in Washington that personnel is policy. The White House appointed an oil industry lobbyist, not a scientist or climate change expert, as chief of staff at the Council on Environmental Quality.

We will hear from that former lobbyist, Phil Cooney, today. The documents we have received indicate he was able to exert tremendous influence on the direction of Federal climate change policy and science.

One of the key responsibilities given to Mr. Cooney and his staff at CEQ was the review of government publications about climate change.

Mr. Cooney and his staff made hundreds of separate edits to the government's strategic plan for climate change research. These changes injected doubt in place of certainty, minimized the dangers of climate change, and diminished the human role in causing the planet to warm.

Other key government reports, including an EPA report on the environment and an annual report to Congress on the changing planet were subject to similar edits and distortions.

In preparation for this hearing, the majority staff prepared a memorandum for members analyzing the changes made by Mr. Cooney and his staff to these government climate change reports. And I ask that this memorandum and the CEQ documents it cites be made part of the hearing record. I also ask that Mr. Cooney's deposition be made part of the hearing record as well.

[The information follows:]

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Chairman WAXMAN. Another facet of the White House campaign involved controlling what Federal scientists could say to the public and the media about their work. NASA scientist James Hansen is one of the Nation's most esteemed experts on climate change. George Deutsch is a young and inexperienced former NASA public affairs officer who was tasked with managing the public statements of Dr. Hansen and other NASA scientists. Today we will hear from both of them about their experiences.

There is even evidence in the documents we have obtained that the White House edited an op-ed written by former EPA Administrator Christine Todd Whitman to ensure that it followed the White House line about climate change.

Our goal in this investigation is to understand what role the White House actually played. It would be a serious abuse if senior White House officials deliberately tried to defuse calls for action by ensuring that the public heard a distorted message about the risks of climate change.

In addressing climate change, science should drive policy. The public and Congress need access to the best possible science to inform the policy debate about how to protect the planet from irreversible changes. If the administration turned its principle upside down with raw political pressure, it would put our country on a dangerous course. Today's hearing should bring us closer to

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106	understanding whether that is suspicion or fact.
107	I look forward to the testimony of the witnesses and
108	thank them for their cooperation. I want to recognize
109	members for opening statements and to recognize Mr. Issa
110	first.
ا 111	[Prepared statement of Mr. Waxman follows:]
112	****** TNSERT 1-1 *****

Mr. ISSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I also would 113 ask that the exhibits that go with Mr. Cooney's deposition be 114 115 entered into the record. 116 Chairman WAXMAN. Without objection, the documents that I requested and the documents you requested will be part of 117 118 the record. 119 [The information follows:] 120 \*\*\*\*\* COMMITTEE INSERT \*\*\*\*\*\*

Mr. ISSA. Thank you. And I also would like to ask that
the Supplemental Minority Memorandum be entered into the
record.

Chairman WAXMAN. Without objection.

[The information follows:]

Mr. ISSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am glad to have the opportunity to continue today with the committee's inquiry into political interference with science. As you know, this investigation began under Chairman Davis. And it is good to see that some projects have carried over to the new Congress.

I want to take a moment to point out the title of today's hearing is Political Interference with Science:

Global Warming. I am glad the Chairman has made clear from the onset that this investigation is related to process and not the substance of global change science.

Today we are not attempting to establish which scientific facts are correct or which policies are better. I commend you for this approach. As you know, this committee has done its job to conduct oversight in an independent and bipartisan way in the past, and I hope we will continue to in the future.

But even though this hearing isn't about substance, let me be clear from the beginning. Climate change is an important issue and deserves our level-headed attention.

I believe that climate change is happening. I believe global mean temperatures have increased over the past century, and I believe that carbon dioxide is a contributing factor.

It wasn't very long ago that scientists were unable to

make this statement with certainty because we simply didn't have a sufficient body of knowledge, and it is important to acknowledge that American ingenuity, know-how, and resources make up the foundation of the ever-expanding body of knowledge of climate change.

Climate change is too important an issue not to continue backing the research in the billions of dollars that we have done so on a bipartisan basis in the past.

And it is essential that policymakers have the absolute best available science to support policy decisions that will impact future generations of Americans and citizens around the world. But, again, we are looking at this as a process issue.

So let's turn to the allegation that the Bush administration has silenced scientists and rewritten the science.

Dr. Roger Pikey, Junior, testified at our last hearing that the Bush administration probably hasn't done itself any favors with the term "hypercontrolling strategies" for the management of information.

I would probably agree.

Yet it remains the prerogative of the Bush
administration--as with every administration before it and
likely after it--to establish policies to ensure that
whatever is coming out of Federal agencies is consistent and

177 | coordinated.

Submitting to those rules is in fact--is a fact of life every Federal employee enjoys or chafes at.

I am concerned that many scientists are increasingly engaging in political advocacy and that some issues of science have become increasingly partisan as some politicians sense that there is a political gain to be found on issues like stem cell, teaching evolution, and climate change. I hope we will keep our observations in mind during these hearings and the investigation into allegations of silencing and editing by the Bush administration and Mr. Cooney.

I look forward to this hearing and to our witnesses and especially I look forward to hearing from NASA scientist,, Dr. James Hansen.

Doctor Hansen, we recognize that you are the preeminent climate change scientist and one of the leading researchers on these issues. We value your contribution to science and the understanding of global climate change. I want to hear about your experiences with the politicalization of science.

However, I also plan to discuss with you your efforts to politicalize science.

Mr. Chairman I recognize that I have gone over my intended 5 minutes so I will put the rest of my opening statement in for the record because I see we have a lot of

202	Members here. I will yield back.	
203	[The information follows:]	
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Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you. Without objection, your statement and all the opening statements from members of the committee will be permitted to go into the record in their entirety.

I would recognize members if they feel that they want to make an oral presentation. Without objection, we will limit it to 3 minutes so we can get on to our panels.

Any member here--Mr. Yarmuth, do you have an opening statement?

Mr. YARMUTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just a brief one. I appreciate that we are renewing these hearings, because in the first hearing we had what we saw was evidence of a clear and disturbing trend in this administration, which is that in many instances commitment to ideology and philosophy and maybe even corporate interests always seems to trump truth.

And that is something that should disturb all of us, and I hope that this hearing brings us closer to understanding that we need, in all of our government operations, to have transparency and truth, and that those who would put these other interests ahead of the search for truth are doing this country a great disservice. So I thank you once again, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to hearing the witnesses.

Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you very much.

[The information follows:]

230 \*\*\*\*\*\* COMMITTEE INSERT \*\*\*\*\*\*

231	Chairman Waxman. Mr. Cannon, do you wish to make an
232	opening statement?
233	Mr. CANNON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I will submit my
234	statement for the record.
235	[The information follows:]
236	****** COMMITTEE INSERT ******

Chairman WAXMAN. Mr. Welch.

Mr. WELCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman for convening the hearing. The questions before the committee are clear. Are the American people entitled to the benefits of sound scientific research to solve the challenges before us? And is it acceptable for any administration—in this case the administration of George Bush—to alter scientific conclusions by allowing political appointees to edit and alter the independent conclusions of independent scientists?

We heard, Mr. Chairman, to our dismay 2 months ago, evidence that the Bush administration, through political appointees, have systematically and relentlessly interfered with independent scientific conclusions, altering them to conform with the political views of their supporters.

Dr. Griffo the Union of Concerned Scientists testified that at least 150 Federal climate scientists personally experienced at least one incident of political interference during the past 5 years and received reports of at least 435 specific incidents overall. That interference is unacceptable. That interference must end. While political interference in science may serve the interest of the American Petroleum Institute and others who peddle the notion that climate change is a political argument, not a scientific fact, it underestimates the American people. Politically motivated suppression of science is not only irresponsible,

but highlights a careless and reckless disregard for the public that we serve.

The country knows that the climate change is real, urgent, and requires immediate action. Science must be our friend to help us address global warming directly. Moreover, in facing directly the issue of climate change, we can have a pro-growth, pro-high-tech, pro-environment economy that will benefit all the people of this country.

The Bush administration attack on sound science is a loser's game. The job of this Congress and this committee is to restore the full confidence to our scientific community that we need and value their work. They are our partners in facing the problems that confront us. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The information follows:]

\*\*\*\*\*\* COMMITTEE INSERT \*\*\*\*\*\*

Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Welch. Mr. Souder, do you wish to make an opening comment? Mr. Souder? Okay, thanks. Ms. Watson.

Ms. WATSON. Thank you, very much, Mr. Chairman, for today's hearing. And while I am happy we are holding our second hearing of the year on this issue, I am appalled at the fact that the administration interfered with studies in key departments within our bureaucracy, one of which is NASA, who depends on accurate and concise scientific studies to protect the lives of our astronauts.

The administration announced in 2002 that reducing green house gas emissions and increasing spending on climate research to reduce emissions 18 percent by 2012 was a top priority. But their actions have not matched that pledge.

Funds have been redirected for these purposes to spend on nuclear power and other nonrenewable programs that do not reduce emissions. In addition, this allegation of political interference with the work of government scientists is an additional example of how this administration is not taking this threat of global warming seriously.

Global warming is occurring at a rapid pace today, and the consensus of the world's scientific community is that it will accelerate during the 21st century. Global warming and our related energy policies also raise national security concerns.

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303 One such concern is the prospect of international destabilization caused by the consequences of global warming, such as the loss of land area or the loss of water resources. Mr. Chairman, we must start again to create adequate climate change research and development that can help our world in the future. Political interference on this critical issue is unacceptable. And we are here today to investigate and resolve these allegations. Again, thank you for this hearing. Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you very much Ms. Watson. [The information follows:]

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316 Chairman WAXMAN. We are pleased to have three witnesses for our first panel, and I want to welcome them to our 317 hearing today. Philip Cooney was chief of staff of the White 318 319 House Council on Environmental Quality from 2001 until 2005. 320 Before that he worked at the American Petroleum Institute for 321 15 years. He is now a corporate issue manager at ExxonMobil. 322 Dr. James Hansen is the director of NASA's Goddard 323 Institute for Space Studies. He has held this position since 1981. Dr. Hansen is one of the Nation's most esteemed 324 325 climate scientists. 326 George Deutsch was a NASA public affairs officer until 327 February of 2006. We thank you for your presence. It is the practice of 328 this committee to ask all witnesses that appear before us to 329 330 take an oath. So if you would please rise and hold up your 331 right hand. 332 [Witnesses sworn.] 333 Chairman WAXMAN. The record will indicate that each of 334 the witnesses answered in the affirmative. 335 STATEMENTS OF PHILIP COONEY, FORMER CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE 336 WHITE HOUSE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY; JAMES HANSEN, 337 DIRECTOR, NASA GODDARD INSTITUTE FOR SPACE STUDIES; AND

GEORGE DEUTSCH, FORMER NASA PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICER

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Chairman WAXMAN. Mr. Coonsy, why don't we start with you. Your opening statement will be in the record in its entirety and we would like to ask you, if you would, to summarize it or present it to us in around 5 minutes.

## STATEMENT OF PHILIP A. COONEY

Mr. COONEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. Thank you for inviting me to appear before you today. I recognize the important work of this committee to ensure that our government is operating efficiently and properly in performing its valuable work on behalf of the American people.

I want to assure you of my full cooperation.

Today, more than anything else, I hope to convey to the committee that I held myself to a high standard of integrity in the performance of my duties in the administration.

I would like to highlight several points.

Point Number one, my reviews of Federal budgetary and research planning documents of climate change were guided by the President's stated strategy on research priorities as set forth in his June 11th, 2001 speech and chapter 3 of the Policy Book that accompanied it. I joined the White House staff 2 weeks later.

The President's policy itself was guided by a National Academy of Sciences report that his Cabinet-level Committee on Climate Change had specifically requested, entitled "Climate Change Science: An Analysis of Some Key Questions."

That report concluded--and I would like to emphasize this point, quote, making progress in reducing the large uncertainties in projections of future climate will require addressing a number of fundamental scientific questions relating to the buildup of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere and the behavior of the climate system.

The National Academy of Sciences report itemized those uncertainties and questions which later guided the administration's prioritization of federally sponsored research.

Let me be clear, as this committee addresses my reviews of specific climate change policy documents, that a number of my specific comments were verbatim quotations from the National Academy of Sciences report.

My second point is that the documents that I reviewed as part of a well-established interagency review process were not a platform for the presentation of original scientific research. Mr. Piltz, who clarified that he is not a scientist, described his role before this committee as that of, quote, an editor of summaries received from agencies as they related to budget and planning reports.

The White House Office of Management and Budget then subjected Mr. Piltz' drafts to formal interagency review and comment by many others, including multiple Federal agencies themselves and the relevant White House offices, including mine.

OMB's review was then subjected to a final review and approval by Dr. James Mahoney, who served as the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Oceans and Atmosphere, and was director of the Climate Change Science Program. Dr. Mahoney testified before Congress about this process in July 2005 and confirmed that he had the final word on the final content on all of these documents.

Dr. Mahoney's written responses to Senate questions describe that process and stated further that, quote, the edits by CEQ did not misstate any scientific fact. Moreover, many comments, including mine, were not incorporated in final reports.

The Council's role in these reviews and that of other White House offices was routine and well established.

The annual budget report, Our Changing Planet, was reviewed by my predecessors in the Clinton administration. That is because these were Federal research and policy and budget reports of the executive branch and not scientific research per se.

In fact, the transmittal letters to Congress for both

the strategic plan and the annual budget reports were signed by the Secretaries of Energy and Commerce and the director of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, reflecting their inherent policy nature.

To summarize, I had the authority and responsibility to make recommendations on the documents in question under an established interagency review process. I did so, using my best judgment, based on the administration's stated research priorities, as informed by the National Academy of Sciences. Of course I understand that my judgment and the administration's stated goals are properly open to review.

I want to make equally clear, however, that I participated in the established review processes in order to align executive branch reports with administration policies.

My third and final point is that within a month after my departure in June 2005, all three branches of our government considered climate change science in the course of their decision-making and acknowledged remaining uncertainties in our understanding.

There has been on an ongoing basis, active consideration both of the scientific certainties and uncertainties in decision-making on climate change at the highest levels of the Federal Government. For example on July 15, 2005, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld EPA's decision not to regulate carbon dioxide

under the Clean Air Act, relying in part on the same uncertainties noted in the National Academy of Sciences report that the administration had requested in June 2001.

My point is that the comments and recommendations that I offered in reviewing executive branch policy documents on climate change were consistent with the views and exploration of scientific knowledge that many others in all three branches of our government were undertaking.

My most important point is that I offered my comments in good faith reliance on what I understood to be authoritative and current views of the state of scientific knowledge, and for no other purpose.

Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before the committee. I look forward to your questions and helping the committee complete its important work.

Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you, Mr. Cooney.

Mr. COONEY. Thank you.

[Prepared statement of Mr. Cooney follows:]

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455 Chairman WAXMAN. Dr. Hansen.

STATEMENT OF JAMES E. HANSEN

Mr. HANSEN. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman Waxman, for inviting me to testify. I testify today as a private citizen. I have been at a NASA laboratory in New York since I arrived in 1967 as a 25-year-old post doc. And I hope that my observations of changes in the past 40 years are useful to your Committee on Oversight and Government Reform.

In my written statement, I describe a growth of political interference with climate change science. The problem has been worst in the current administration. But it will not be solved by an election. There needs to be reform.

We cannot count on a new administration to give up powers that have accreted. The growth in political interference coincides with a growth in power of the executive branch. It seems to me that this growth of power violates principles upon which our democracy is based, especially separation of powers and checks and balances.

I have no legal expertise but I would like to raise three questions:

Number one, when I testify to you as a government scientist, why does my testimony have to be reviewed, edited,

and changed by a bureaucrat in the White House before I can deliver it? Where does this requirement come from? Is not the public, who have paid for the research, are they not being cheated by this political control of scientific testimony?

Second question: Why are public affairs officers--offices, staffed by political appointees? Their job, nominally, should be to help scientists present results in a language that the public can understand.

They should not be forcing scientists to parrot propaganda. Indeed during the current administration, NASA scientific press releases have been sent to the White House for editing, as I discuss in my written testimony. If public affairs officers are left under the control of political appointees, it seems to me that inherently they become officers of propaganda.

Point number three, the primary way that the executive branch has interfered with climate science is via control of the purse strings. This is very, very effective.

Last February, a year ago, the executive branch slashed the earth science research and analysis budget. That is the budget that funds NASA earth science labs such as mine. They slashed it retroactively to the beginning of the fiscal year by about 20 percent. That is a going-out-of-business level of funding.

The budget is an extremely powerful way to interfere with science and bring scientists into line with political positions.

Some people have joked that at about the same time, the White House brought in a science fiction writer for advice on global warming. But this is not a joking matter.

We need more scientific data, not less.

And I am sorry that I don't have time to talk about the science, but if you give me 1 to 2 minutes, I would like to just summarize briefly.

The climate has great inertia because of the massive ocean and ice sheets. And it is hard to notice climate change because chaotic weather fluctuations are so large. But climate is beginning to change. And it has become clear that there is a dominance of positive feedbacks. For example as ice melts, as forests move pole-ward, these increase the global warming further. And the upshot of the inertia plus the positive feedbacks is that if we push the climate system hard enough, it can obtain a momentum. It can pass tipping points, such that climate change continues out of our control. That is a condition we do not want to leave for our children.

There are many actions we could take to avoid that, actions that would have other benefits, as I discuss in my written testimony. And these are, of course, my opinions as

527	a private citizen. Thank you.
528	Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you very much, Dr. Hansen.
529	[Prepared statement of James Hansen follows:]
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531 Chairman WAXMAN. Mr. Deutsch.

STATEMENT OF GEORGE C. DEUTSCH III

Mr. DEUTSCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My name is

Deutsch. I am 25 years old. I live in Nederland, Texas.

Until February of 06 I was a public affairs officer at NASA.

I would like to begin by thanking the committee, and specifically Chairman Waxman for allowing me the opportunity to testify. I believe most people would agree that NASA is a place of wonder and excitement. As a young man from a small southeast Texas town near the Johnson Space Center, I saw the opportunity to join the NASA family as a dream come true.

My path to NASA began around June of 2004 when I left
Texas A&M University, one course shy of graduating, to take a
position as an intern in President Bush's reelection campaign
and, later, the Inaugural Committee. After the Inauguration
I applied for a Presidential appointee position and was
offered jobs by NASA and the Department of Labor.

To the best of my recollection, I disclosed on various occasions the fact that I had not completed my degree.

I accepted an entry-level public affairs position at NASA at the age of 23 and after several months I became a public affairs officer in NASA's Science Mission Directorate,

SMD. There I worked in a team with two career civil servants. The most senior civil servant in the group functioned as our team leader. Collectively, it was our duty to facilitate communications between NASA and the public.

Not long after joining SMD, I became aware of Dr. James Hansen, a distinguished and internationally renowned climate scientist. I learned that Dr. Hansen disagreed with what I understood to be NASA's standard practices for responding to media requests. Among those practices were the public affairs officer should listen to interviews as they were being conducted, that superiors can do interviews in someone's stead, and that NASA employees should report interview requests to the Public Affairs Office.

It was my understanding that these practices all existed prior to my joining NASA and that I and other NASA employees were expected to follow them. The purpose of these guidelines was to encourage Agency coordination and accurate reporting. Sharing interview requests with NASA headquarters, for example, gives headquarters officials a better grasp of what is going on at NASA centers. These practices weren't unique to one individual or group. They were agencywide.

Dr. Hansen can certainly address these issues himself today, but as I understood it at that time, he found these practices to be cumbersome. This created a level of

frustration among my higher-ups at NASA who wanted to know about interviews before they happened.

I have addressed these issues in more detail in my written testimony, but here is one example. On or about December 14, 2005, the Los Angeles Times and ABC News contacted NASA to inquire if the Agency was going to release information addressing whether 2005 was the warmest year on record. In response, headquarters granted the Los Angeles Times an interview with Dr. Waleed Abdalati, a veteran NASA climate scientist. In that interview, Dr. Abdalati stated they could not confirm that 2005 was the warmest year on record. Yet on December 15th, Dr. Hansen appeared on ABC's Good Morning America program and submitted the letter to the Journal of Science, concluding that 2004 tied 1998 as the warmest year on record.

Senior NASA officials conveyed to me that they were unaware of the release of this information being coordinated with headquarters or peer-reviewed. That day NASA headquarters received a deluge of media inquiries on the matter, inquiries headquarters was ill-equipped to handle because no one had been briefed on Dr. Hansen's findings. The same senior NASA officials were, to say the least, upset by this procedural breach.

Press Secretary Dean Acosta asked me to document these events in a memo that was cosigned by a career civil servant

Dwayne Brown. Subsequently, several media reports accused national political appointees and others of censoring Dr. Hansen. I can only speak for myself. I never censored Dr. Hansen and I don't think anyone else at NASA did either.

In February of 2006, I learned that the New York Times was looking into whether the resume I submitted to NASA incorrectly stated that I had obtained a degree from Texas A&M University in 2003. I had created that resume sometime prior to 2003. At the time the resume was created, it would have been clear that I was referring to an anticipated degree. My mistake was that when it later came time to apply for jobs, I failed to update the resume to convey that I was one course shy of graduating. As I said, to the best of my recollection, I told the hiring officials I spoke to that I did not have my degree. But I recognize and take full responsibility for the fact that I should have updated the resume to better reflect this point. This was an honest mistake.

Rather than see the Agency continue to be tarnished in the media, I resigned in February 2006. Later that year I finished my only remaining class and received my Bachelor of Arts degree from Texas A&M University.

Since working at NASA, I have tried my hardest to continue to devote my life to public service. I have done work for a nonpartisan/nonprofit United Way agency in Texas

dealing with mental health issues, and I hope to launch a call-in mental health radio program in a local Texas radio station.

During my time at NASA, administrator Mike Griffin released a statement on scientific openness in which he said, quote, "It is not the job of public affairs officers to alter, filter, or adjust engineering or of scientific material produced by NASA's technical staff. To ensure the timely release of information there must be cooperation and coordination between our scientific and engineering community and our public affairs officers."

These two sentences capture my feelings exactly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would be happy to answer your questions.

[Prepared statement of George C. Deutsch follows:]

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Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Deutsch.

I will now proceed to questioning from the members of the

panel and two 10-minute rounds controlled by the Chair and
the Ranking Member. I will start off first.

Mr. Cooney, thank you very much for being here. I appreciate you have taken the time last week to sit with the committee staff in a deposition. And that deposition helped clear up a lot of points which will allow us to focus the major issues today.

It is clear from documents that the committee has received that you played a major role in reviewing and editing scientific reports about climate change. And I want to begin my questioning by asking about your qualifications for editing scientific reports. My understanding is that you are not a scientist, that you are a lawyer by training, with an undergraduate degree in politics and economics; is that correct?

Mr. COONEY. That is correct.

Chairman WAXMAN. And prior to your move to the White House in 2001, you worked for more than 15 years at the American Petroleum Institute; is that correct?

Mr. COONEY. That's correct.

Chairman WAXMAN. The American Petroleum Institute, or API, is the primary trade association for the the oil industry, isn't it? And they are essentially lobbyists for

669 the oil industry, aren't they?

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Mr. COONEY. That is a fair characterization, yes.

Chairman WAXMAN. My understanding is that your last position with the American Petroleum Institute was as team leader of the climate team. Climate change was a major issue for the Petroleum Institute and they were very concerned about this whole matter from an economic point of view.

While you were at the Petroleum Institute, the Petroleum Institute prepared an internal document entitled "Strategic Issues: Climate Change." and this is Exhibit H.

[The information follows:]

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Chairman WAXMAN. You have seen this document, haven't you, Mr. Cooney?

Mr. COONEY. Exhibit H?

Chairman WAXMAN. Yes.

Mr. COONEY. Yes. I saw this document last week during my deposition.

Chairman WAXMAN. This document was prepared during API's budget review while you were employed there. It discusses why climate change is important to API and the strategies API will use to combat governmental action to address global warming.

According to this document--and I quote--"Climate is at the center of industry's business interests. Policies limiting carbon emissions reduce petroleum product use. That is why it is API's highest priority issue and defined as strategic."

One of the key strategies used by the Petroleum Institute was to sow doubt about climate change science. Member companies and spokesmen for the Petroleum Institute regularly exaggerated the degrees of scientific uncertainty and downplayed the role of humans in causing climate change. What bothers me is that you seem to bring exactly the same approach inside the White House--and I want to ask you about that.

We received hundreds of edits that you and your staff at

the White House Council on Environmental Quality made to Federal climate change reports. And there seem to be consistent reports to these edits. They exaggerate uncertainties and downplay the contribution that human activities, like burning petroleum products, play in causing climate change.

So when I look at the role you played at the American Petroleum Institute and then the role you played at the White House, they seem virtually identical. In both places you were sowing doubt about the science on global warming.

I would like you to respond to those concerns. Do you have a comment about my observation? Do you think that I am being unfair to you?

Mr. COONEY. I do in some respects, Mr. Chairman. When you characterize the efforts of the American Petroleum Institute, we did have scientists who participated on our multidisciplinary team on climate. We also had economists and press people and lobbyists, of course. Our focus was lobbying on the Kyoto Protocol. But to the extent that our scientists participated in science, often they provided public comments in good faith.

For example, on the prior administration's national assessment, our economists and scientists submitted public comments for the record, trying to comment constructively and improve that process, and they had the background to do so,

the scientists and economists who were working on that.

You know, one thing that was brought to my attention in the deposition was the funding for Carnegie Mellon University. They had an esteemed program on studying, from what I understood--I wasn't very acquainted with it--but it was studying the connection between climate change and potential health impacts and funded MIT, I believe--

Chairman WAXMAN. You think I am being unfair to the Petroleum Institute in my characterization?

Mr. COONEY. I think we surely were opposed to the Kyoto Protocol, but I do think in many cases our scientists tried to participate responsibly in some of the public dialogue that was going on and to offer legitimate views that weren't merely about sowing uncertainty, as you have described.

Chairman WAXMAN. My staff released an analysis of hundreds of changes that you and your staff made to Federal scientific reports. Where the draft reports said that climate change will cause adverse impacts, you changed the text to say that these changes may occur.

Where the draft reports said that the climate change would damage the environment, you inserted the qualifier, "potentially."

Where the report described adverse economic effects, you modified the text to say that the economic effects could be positive or negative.

Mr. Cooney, aren't the edits you were making exactly the kinds of changes the Petroleum Institute itself would have made to these reports?

Mr. COONEY. Mr. Chairman, the comments that you described--and really these were recommendations on Federal reports, they weren't hard edits--they were offered within the the context of an interagency review process with a lot of people providing recommendations to Dr. Mahoney. But you know--

Chairman WAXMAN. Who is Dr. Mahoney?

Mr. COONEY. Dr. Mahoney was at the end of the process and he was the Assistant Secretary at Commerce for Oceans and Atmosphere and the Director of the administration's Climate Change Science Program Office that was ultimately responsible for the publication of the 10-year Strategic Plan and the "Our Changing Planet" report.

Chairman WAXMAN. So you were making recommendations to him?

Mr. COONEY. Within an established interagency process. And the comments that you are describing that I made, you know, my comments of a scientific nature were really derivative. And as I said in my testimony they relied on the major findings of the National Academy of Sciences, according to the report that it released for the President in June 2001. And it talked about many of the localized and

regionalized impacts of climate change being very poorly understood and of the inability of climate change models to project impacts at a localized and regional level. And so, for example, the reliance on that type of language would have led to my comments.

In the end, Dr. Mahoney didn't take many of my comments.

He rejected a number of my comments. And that is the nature of our process.

Chairman WAXMAN. Mr. Cooney, as I understand it, every time the National Academy of Sciences had certainty, you tried to delete that certainty or change it so that it was uncertain.

Mr. Hansen, you are one of the Nation's leading experts on climate change. What is your view of the changes made by Mr. Cooney and his staff at the White House? Are they consistent with the types of assertions that the oil companies and the Petroleum Institute were making about the lack of scientific certainty about climate change? Or were they simply trying to making sure that scientific edits confirmed what the National Academy of Sciences was saying?

Mr. HANSEN. I think that—I believe that these edits, the nature of these edits is a good part of the reason for why there is a substantial gap between the understanding of global warming by the relevant scientific community and the knowledge of the public and policymakers, because there has

806 been so much doubt cast on our understanding that they think 807 it is still completely up in the air. Chairman WAXMAN. You think the edits raised doubt where 808 809 there was a consensus? 810 Mr. HANSEN. Because they consistently are always of one 811 nature, and that is to raise doubt. 812 Of course there are many details about climate that remain to be understood. But that doesn't mean that we don't 813 814 have a broad understanding. 815 Chairman WAXMAN. In a 1998 document from the Petroleum 816 Institute that is called, quote, Global Climate Science 817 Communications Action Planning, end quote--which I would like 818 to make part of the record as Exhibit T--and without 819 objection. 820 [The information follows:]

\*\*\*\*\* COMMITTEE INSERT \*\*\*\*\*\*

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Chaiman WAXMAN. It says and I quote, "Victory will be achieved when average citizens understand uncertainties in climate science, recognition of uncertainties becomes part of the conventional wisdom, and media coverage reflects balance on climate science in recognition of the validity of viewpoints that challenge the current conventional wisdom," end quote.

So when I compare this Petroleum Institute document with your activities at the White House, Mr. Cooney, I find it is hard to see much of a distinction. The Petroleum Institute is defining victory as sowing doubt in the public about the certainty of climate change science, and that is what your edits to Federal climate change reports appear to do.

Mr. COONEY. Mr. Chairman, I will try to be concise and say if you look at chapter 3 of the policy book that the President issued on June 11, 2001, in conjunction with the speech he gave in the Rose Garden where he spoke at length about climate change science and the findings at the National Academy, there are at least 50 to 75 direct quotations from the National Academy report that he had requested.

And it was part of what he released on June 11th. And that was our foundational document for reviewing these budgetary reports. It had truly nothing to do with my prior employment at the American Petroleum Institute. When I came to the White House, my loyalties--my sole loyalties--were to

the President and his administration.

Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you very much. Let me just point out, while my time has expired, that the points where you raised uncertainty were the places where the National Academy of Sciences were fairly certain, and the other parts where they were uncertain I don't think that was affected. We will get into that more, I think, in the questioning.

Mr. COONEY. Mr. Chairman, may I offer one more thing? Chairman WAXMAN. Certainly.

Mr. COONEY. This document from 1998 from the American Petroleum Institute, I don't really recall the whole story except to say that I was not involved on the climate change issue at the time this document was prepared.

Chairman WAXMAN. Thanks. Well, that document was prepared--

Mr. COONEY. In 1998.

Chairman WAXMAN--to express the views of the Petroleum Institute as to what they wanted to do on climate change and that seemed to be consistent when you were there.

The National--the President's speech wasn't made--that you are citing as your blueprint--wasn't given while you were at the White House, but submit that that was guiding your policies at the White House.

Mr. COONEY. It was given 2 weeks before I joined the Council on Environmental Quality staff. And so it was the

roadmap that was established before I arrived.

Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you. Mr. Issa.

Mr. ISSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Boy, there is a lot to cover here today, and I hope I get through most of it.

Dr. Hansen, let me start with you, because we have been talking about something from the petroleum industry from 1998. But in 2000--you, I understand are the author, the proponent for the alternative scenario theory you argued that the rapid warming in recent decades was driven mainly by noncarbon dioxide greenhouse gases, basically the chlorofluoro carbons--methane, nitrous oxide and the like. Do you still hold that 2000--year 2000 view of global warming?

Mr. HANSEN. The data in the 2000 paper is very good data, very--we have an accurate knowledge of the forcings by different greenhouse gases. That is one part of the problem which is very well established. We know how much carbon dioxide has increased, how much nitrous oxide and methane chlorofluoro carbons have increased, and the sum of these non-CO2 gases provide forcing approximately the same as that by CO2.

Mr. ISSA. Okay. So in 2000 and today, you would say that more than half of global warming--but at that time you said that it was not CO2, but in fact these other gases. Now you would say it is 50/50--

Mr. HANSEN. No, I did not say it is not CO2. It is a very qualitative paper. If you look at it, the forcing by CO2 was then about 1.4 watts and the forcing by non-CO2 gases is comparable. And then there are other factors also--

Mr. ISSA. I appreciate that. And I will let you be the physicist and I will try to be the guy up here that is trying to muddle through a better understanding of both the science but, more importantly, the policy here.

Your quote at the time was that it had not been driven mainly by--it was driven mainly by noncarbon dioxide. So it was getting close to even at that point?

Mr. HANSEN. The--it is approximately the same, the CO2 forcing and the non-CO2 greenhouse gases. I think that what you may be referring to is the fact that I pointed out that the same burning of fossil fuels, that process produces not only carbon dioxide but aerosols, which are small particles in the atmosphere, and those are also cooling. So if you calculate the net effect of those, that reduces the net fossil fuel effect on a temporary basis. But the problem is these small particles have a lifetime of only 5 days, and we are attempting to clean those up because they are air pollution.

Mr. ISSA. Sure. I understand we can cool the environment if we blacken the sky, but that may not be the best way to cool the environment. I am with you on that,

922 | Doctor.

But I guess when I look back to some of these arguments going on within science--you don't call them arguments but debates--as late as 2000, you and other scholars were debating, you know, in various papers--you were debating the differences of what was causing what. And to a certain extent, you still are. Is that correct?

Mr. HANSEN. Oh, sure, that is always going on. Yes.

Mr. ISSA. So this isn't settled science.

Mr. HANSEN. There are many aspects of it which are settled and--

Mr. ISSA. What are those aspects that are totally settled? Name one aspect that is totally settled in the science.

Mr. HANSEN. The climate forcing, that which drives the climate change, many parts of that are quantitatively very well settled. And carbon dioxide is the largest forcing, and it is now the fastest growing forcing. And it is going to dominate the future global climate change. That has become very clear.

Mr. ISSA. And I appreciate that because I think that is an area that we should all focus on here a lot today because--Mr. Cooney, I am going to go to you for a second.

Prior to coming to the White House, you worked for the American Petroleum Industry. We have established that. You

947 were in your role, among other things, an attorney; is that 948 correct?

- 949 Mr. COONEY. Earlier in my career there, yes.
- 950 Mr. ISSA. So your client was the Institute.
- 951 Mr. COONEY. Yes. The members of the Institute.
- 952 Mr. ISSA. When you came on as--among your other 953 attributes you are an attorney--your client became who when 954 you came to work in Washington for this administration? Who
- 955 | was your client?
- 956 Mr. COONEY. The President.
- 957 Mr. ISSA. So, very different loyalties between
- 958 petroleum and the President, right?
- 959 Mr. COONEY. Yes.
- 960 Mr. ISSA. So when the President talks about
- 961 switchgrass, when he puts forward budgets that include
- 962 | billions of dollars for various areas of climate study,
- 963 including roughly a billion dollars for the area that Dr.
- 964 Hansen is most thoroughly involved in, that is your client,
- 965 right?
- 966 Mr. COONEY. Absolutely, yes.
- 967 Mr. ISSA. When the President includes in each of his
- 968 speeches the need to get unhooked or get rid of the addiction
- 969 to petroleum, that is your client, right?
- 970 Mr. COONEY. Correct.
- 971 Mr. ISSA. And you represent that client and

would--wouldn't have a conflict there?

Mr. COONEY. My sole loyalty was to the President and advancing the policies of his administration.

Mr. ISSA. I don't see a conflict there. I must tell you that I came from an industry where I produced car alarms, and I have no loyalty to the car alarms nor animosity to the car thieves that exist in Washington today. I have moved on.

And that will be quoted, I am sure.

Dr. Hansen, you have been quoted, speaking of quotes, and correct me if I'm a little off on this, but the way the quote is here it says, "Debating a contrarian leaves the impression that there is still an argument among theorists that science is still uncertain," end quote.

You have said that many times, plus or minus a few words.

Mr. HANSEN. Yes.

Mr. ISSA. Does that mean that your opinion among scientists--because this talks about contrarians, not Mr. Cooney, because he wasn't the decisionmaker, as has been shown by the fact that when it bubbled up to somebody with "doctor" in front of their name, most of it got ignored--among scientists, you appeared to believe that the debate about this--any aspect of science being settled, that you think is settled, has a chilling effect on people's understanding. You said so in your opening remarks here

today. Is that--you said that the American people were not--were confused by these contrarian opinions. I guess we would be talking about Senator Jimmy Inhofe who says there isn't global warming. You say it is settled science; is that correct?

Mr. HANSEN. I wouldn't state it the way that you just did.

Mr. ISSA. Please rephrase.

Mr. HANSEN. What I refer to is the fact that very often the media, sometimes with pressure from special interests, will present balance. And balance means we have one person describing the science and one person who disputes it, even in cases where the science is 99 percent certain.

And both of them speak in a technical language which to the public often sounds like they are, you know, technical scientists, and they don't understand the language. And so it looks like a 50/50 thing, even when it is not.

Mr. ISSA. Okay. Well, you know, having been somebody that is still befuddled about whether Pluto is a planet or not, I share that layman's understanding.

But it appears as though you have become an advocate for limiting that debate to coming up with consensus that certain things are settled, such as CO2 is a major cause of global warming and no one should be able to dispute that.

Mr. HANSEN. No, that is not true at all. What I am an

advocate for is the scientific method. And with the scientific method you present--you look at all sides of a story equally, without prejudice.

Now, what we have in the case of some of these contrarians is simply making negative statements without--without presenting--you know, they act more like lawyers than like scientists. They present all the evidence they can think of for one side of the story, rather than acting like scientists. And that is why I say it is a mistake to get involved with professional contrarians, because they are to confuse the public that is basically--

Mr. ISSA. I appreciate that. Last July 20th, you pulled out of a hearing and it was one in which there was a peer involved. And my understanding from quotes you made at the time was that, one, you were infirmed, but you said you would get out of your sick bed if they were serious about the science.

Mr. HANSEN. Yes, if they want to speak about science seriously, that is a different story. But if they just want to do the contrarian story just for the sake of publicity, then I don't see much point in that.

Mr. ISSA. So today you are on a panel with no contrarians, so that is okay.

Mr. HANSEN. Today we are talking about government reform, and I think that some is needed in this case.

Mr. ISSA. Okay. Well, my time is nearly ended, but Mr.

- 1048 Deutsch--is my time over?
- 1049 Chairman WAXMAN. Yes.
- 1050 Mr. ISSA. Let me ask one final thing. You are very
- 1051 young. You were 22 years old and plus or minus 3 credits of
- 1052 being a college graduate. Do you think you may have ruffled
- 1053 Dr. Hansen's feathers simply because you were young and
- 1054 inexperienced?
- 1055 Mr. DEUTSCH. Apparently I did.
- 1056 Mr. ISSA. Perhaps not skilled in the ways of public
- 1057 affairs.
- 1058 Mr. DEUTSCH. I can't speak for Dr. Hansen, but I very
- 1059 | well may have.
- 1060 Mr. ISSA. I will hold for the second round. Thank you,
- 1061 Mr. Chairman.
- 1062 Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you, Mr. Issa. Mr. Welch.
- 1063 Mr. WELCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
- 1064 Mr. Cooney, you indicated in your statement that your
- 1065 loyalty was to the President who appointed you, correct?
- 1066 Mr. COONEY. Correct.
- 1067 Mr. WELCH. You also indicated that your responsibility
- 1068 | was to align executive branch reports with administration
- 1069 policy, correct?
- 1070 Mr. COONEY. Correct.
- 1071 Mr. WELCH. And the administration had a pretty clear

1072 energy policy during the time of the ongoing energy crisis, 1073 which included recovery in the search for new oil and 1074 petroleum products, correct? 1075 Mr. COONEY. It included that. There were many other 1076 elements. 1077 Mr. WELCH. Well, it included supporting drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife Reserve, correct? 1078 1079 Mr. COONEY. It did. It included extended--1080 Mr. WELCH. It included drilling offshore, correct? 1081 Mr. COONEY. I don't recall. 1082 Mr. WELCH. It included maintaining royalty relief for the oil companies for the recovery of gulf oil, even as the 1083 1084 price of oil increased over \$60 a barrel? 1085 I don't recall that that was an element of Mr. COONEY. 1086 the National Energy Policy in the spring of 2001--1087 Chairman WAXMAN. It included tax breaks that Congress 1088 gave the oil industry at time when they had \$125 billion in 1089 profits, correct? 1090 Mr. COONEY. Congressman, I can say that later in my 1091 years in the administration, we opposed oil and tax--excuse 1092 me, tax incentives for oil and gas exploration for the oil 1093 industry--Mr. WELCH. Let's get real. Let's get real. ANWR, 1094 1095 offshore drilling, tax breaks, all advocated publicly, 1096 aggressively, by the Bush administration, passed by a

Republican Congress; yes or no?

Mr. COONEY. That was an element-
Mr. CANNON. Would the two of you yield? When you're

talking about tax breaks, you're talking about tax breaks

that have been in law for a long time, or since then? I'm

wondering.

1103 RPTS THOMAS 1104 DCMN MAGMER 1105 [11:00 a.m.] 1106 Mr. WELCH. You will have your chance, my good friend. 1107 Mr. COONEY. There were many elements of the policy: the promotion of nuclear energy, the increase of fuel 1108 1109 economy, standards for light trucks, a mandate for renewable fuels and the sale of transportation fuels for ethanol which 1110 1111 was enacted in 2005. There were many elements to the policy 1112 that were not necessarily to the advantage of the oil and gas 1113 industry, which were administered policies. 1114 Mr. WELCH. Did that policy of the Bush administration -- and you supported the President in his 1115 1116 policies -- include promoting drilling in ANWR? 1117 Mr. COONEY. Yes, Congressman. Mr. WELCH. Well, did it include support breaks that 1118 1119 were passed by Congress to the oil industry? 1120 Mr. COONEY. I don't recall that being an element. 1121 Mr. WELCH. Let's ask a few specific questions here. You reviewed the CEQ, and this document is the strategic 1122 plan for the Climate Change Science Program which was issued 1123 1124 in 2003. The committee has multiple drafts. You've seen 1125 them. You have been asked about them in your deposition; 1126 and, in fact, at your deposition, you acknowledged that this was edited at least five times, on October 28, 2002; May 30, 1127

2003; June 2, 2003; June 16, 2003; and once before the final version was released. Is that correct? Yes or no?

Mr. COONEY. That sounds correct.

Mr. WELCH. And when we examined your edits, we found a large number of changes that very clearly had the effect of emphasizing or exaggerating the level of uncertainty surrounding global warming science. In your first round of edits, there were 47 edits that introduced additional uncertainty; in the second round, you made 28 edits that made global warming seem less certain, and in your third round of edits, you made 106 changes that introduced additional uncertainty. That is a total of 181 edits. I want to ask you about these edits.

Take a look at Exhibit C. You are ready for this.

When the draft arrived on your desk, lines 40 to 42 read, quote, recent warming has been linked to longer growing seasons, grass species decline, changes in aquatic diversity, in coral bleaching. You inserted the words "indicated as potentially" introducing a greater level of uncertainty into that report. Right or wrong?

Mr. COONEY. Right. I inserted those words.

Mr. WELCH. And I assume that you referred to some scientific report for introducing this change that contradicted the report of the scientists.

Mr. COONEY. This is not a report of the scientists.

1153 Mr. WELCH. Here's a simple question. You made a 1154 change. You had a basis for the change. My question is 1155 this: What was the basis of your change? 1156 Mr. COONEY. It was the National Academy of Science's 1157 June, 2001, report. Mr. WELCH. And tell us specifically, in that report you 1158 1159 are now referring to, where the National Academy said 1160 "potentially." Mr. COONEY. Well, the National Academy identified the 1161 1162 uncertainties associated with regional outcomes of climate 1163 change as one of the fundamental scientific questions that 1164 remained and needed to be studied. 1165 Mr. WELCH. My question is simple. It's an important 1166 question. You made a change. You overruled the written 1167 report of a scientist in your department. 1168 Mr. COONEY. I didn't overrule it. 1169 Mr. WELCH. Where specifically can you find support to 1170 authorize the important scientific conclusion on the issue of 1171 climate change? Mr. COONEY. On page 19 of the report it states, on a 1172 1173 regional scale and in the longer term, there is much more 1174 uncertainty. At page 21 of the National Academy of Sciences 1175 report, it says, "Whereas all models project global warming 1176 and global increases in precipitation, the sign of 1177 precipitation varies among models for regions. The range of

1178 model sensitivities and the challenge of projecting signs of 1179 precipitation changes for regions represents a substantial 1180 limitation in assessing climate impacts" Mr. WELCH. Dr. Hansen, does this make the slightest bit 1181 1182 of sense? 1183 Mr. HANSEN. I think the connection between warming and 1184 longer growing seasons is very straightforward, and I don't 1185 see the need for this sort of qualification. 1186 Mr. WELCH. Thank you. 1187 Please turn to Exhibit D, Mr. Cooney. 1188 When you received the June 5, 2003, draft, page 294 1189 read, "Climate modeling capabilities have improved 1190 dramatically and can be expected to continue to do so. As a 1191 result, scientists are now able to model earth system 1192 processes in the coupling of those processes on a regional 1193 and global scale with increasing precision and reliability." 1194 The CEQ completely, completely deleted these sentences, 1195 right? 1196 Mr. COONEY. At which line? I am sorry, Congressman. 1197 Mr. WELCH. Page 294. 1198 Mr. COONEY. Yes, Congressman. All right. Did you refer to some scientific 1199 Mr. WELCH. 1200 evidence upon which you would delete the scientific conclusions that were presented by scientists? 1201 1202 Mr. COONEY. I did, Congressman. At page 16 of the

National Academy of Sciences report, it says, however, climate models are imperfect. Their simulation skill is limited by uncertainties in their formulation, the limited size of their calculation and their difficulty of interpreting their answers of the exhibit with almost as much complexity as in nature.

Most importantly, at the end of the National Academy of Sciences report, it says that a major limitation of model forecasts for use around the word is the paucity of data available to evaluate the ability of coupled models to simulate important aspects of climate change. In addition, the observing system available today is a composite of observations that neither provide the information nor the continuity and data to support measurements of climate variability. Therefore, above all, it is essential to ensure the existence of long-term observing systems that provides a more definitive observational foundation to evaluate decadal and century scale variability and change.

Mr. WELCH. You heard Dr. Hansen just a moment ago when he said that said that scientists are different than lawyers?

Mr. COONEY. Yes.

Mr. WELCH. Lawyers find every single possible nuance to create doubt and uncertainty.

Here's the question, all right? What you deleted was a straightforward statement that said climate modeling

capabilities have improved dramatically. You have now just read a statement that says they are not perfect and you have now edited that report to undercut the conclusion on climate warming that was reached by our scientists. Yes or no?

Mr. COONEY. No, Congressman, I didn't edit the report.

I made recommendations within an established interagency review process, and I believed at the time that I made them that I had a foundation for my comments based in the National Academy of Scientists.

I am not being lawyerly. I am being--

Mr. WELCH. But you did have a foundation, and it was admirable loyalty to the person who had appointed you to a political position.

Here's one of the questions I have as I listen to this. Whether you call it a recommendation or an edit, we will let the people of America decide that. You describe candidly that your job was to align executive reports to administration policy. Administration's policy was pro-oil, pro-drilling, pro-API. It created--as the API report said, its goal was to create uncertainty about the basis of global warming.

How is what the Petroleum Institute was doing--and these edits were encouraging--any different than the work of the so-called scientists during the whole tobacco debate when they were selling doubt about whether there was any link

1253 between tobacco and lung cancer?

1254 Mr. COONEY. Congressman, I would say that the most 1255 material development was that the President's climate change 1256 committee -- Cabinet-level committee itself requested our 1257 latest knowledge, the most current knowledge on the state of 1258 what we know about climate change of the National Academy of 1259 Sciences. That report was delivered to the Cabinet in early 1260 June, 2001, and became the explicit basis for President 1261 Bush's stated policies in June, 2001.

Chairman WAXMAN. The gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. WELCH. Thank you.

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Chairman WAXMAN. Mr. Issa.

Mr. ISSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Cooney, I'll ask you the obvious question. In retrospect, do you think it would have been better if a scientist had been in your position doing these edits or maybe a librarian who had not worked at the Petroleum Institute?

Mr. COONEY. Congressman, this--all of this, the review of these reports, the process for the report, is really controlled by the Global Change Research Act of 1990. It calls for the Council on Environmental Quality to be represented on an interagency committee--

Mr. ISSA. I understand.

1277 Mr. COONEY. --with high-ranking individuals.

Mr. ISSA. I am just asking, in retrospect, would a librarian from East McKeesport been a better choice so that we would not be talking about past profession?

Mr. COONEY. Perhaps.

Mr. ISSA. Well, hopefully, in the future, Members of Congress will not come from individual States with their political bent having served in the legislatures either. But I am not holding my breath on that.

Dr. Hansen, I have a question for you.

We've been focusing up until now on specifics of a report and a handful of edits that were mostly not accepted. Do you feel that you are able to express in a clear way to the public the real dangers of climate change? Yes or no? Keep it as simple as you can.

Mr. HANSEN. I wish it were a simple yes or no.

Mr. ISSA. How about if we do this, since it is not that simple. I did a little quick looking at the stories from January 1st, 2006, until today. Would you believe I found 1,400 statements in publications distinctly different that you've done in that period that are available on Google? That doesn't surprise you?

Mr. HANSEN. No, it doesn't surprise me.

Mr. ISSA. Does it surprise you that you're only 40 or so-out of that 1,464, you're only about 40 or so behind Dr. Hale from the shuttle program? And you're only--the two of

you together it takes to get up to the administrator of NASA. 1303 1304 So would you say that more or less a major story each and 1305 every day times two is reasonable access to the media? 1306 Mr. HANSEN. Sure. That is, but this is a story that 1307 needs access to the media. 1308 Mr. ISSA. I don't disagree with you. But, you know, in 1309 January of 2006, you delivered 15 major media interviews; and 1310 in your testimony, or, actually, in some of the other material related, you said this was a month after Mr. Deutsch 1311 and the administration stifled your ability to speak. So I 1312 1313 guess one of the questions is, when do you have time for 1314 research? 1315 Mr. HANSEN. Well, my wife will tell you that -- about 80 or 90 hours a week. It takes a lot of time. 1316 If you're going to spend some time trying to communicate with the public, it 1317 1318 does take away from your research time. 1319 Mr. ISSA. But 15 major media events in 1 month, and 1320 that was the month after the administration put the hammer 1321 down. 1322 Mr. HANSEN. Sure. That is the reason why. As soon as that became public knowledge, than the media came running. 1323 1324 Mr. ISSA. But did the administration stop you from 1325 doing those 15 major media events? 1326 Mr. HANSEN. No. The NASA Administrator came out with a very strong statement. To his credit, he said that we were, 1327

1328 in fact, allowed to speak to the public.

Mr. ISSA. Okay. So, notwithstanding the President, the American Petroleum Institute, Mr. Cooney, the fact is, during this administration, with people such as the NASA Director, you have had significant access--as a matter of fact, you're one of the most easily Googleable human beings on the face of the earth. So the message is getting out, would you say?

Mr. HANSEN. The message is getting out, but there remains a gap in the public understanding of where our knowledge of global climate change is.

Mr. ISSA. Going back to that, this 2000 report, I noted that in 2000 it was called the Alternative Scenario. Now the only reason you call it the Alternative Scenario was you were outside the mainstream, to a certain extent, at least.

Mr. HANSEN. No. Alternative was alternative to business as usual. That's what it means. Business as usual has continued an increase in emissions year after year by larger and larger fossil fuels.

Mr. ISSA. Isn't it true that in 2000 the groups, including the Union of Concerned Scientists, criticized you soundly for publishing the Alternative Scenario--

Mr. HANSEN. Yeah, there was--

Mr. ISSA.--because it would confuse the public?

Mr. HANSEN. Because I focused on some of the contributions of the non-CO2.

Mr. ISSA. You were providing ammunition for the deniers, weren't you?

Mr. HANSEN. No, I was providing science.

Mr. ISSA. Dr. Hansen, when you provide an alternative to what somebody else is doing and add to that body of debate, you are providing alternatives and moving the debate when someone else puts a limiting word, it appears; and I have already written off Mr. Cooney as not a scientist, but I am trying to understand if--in 2000, you did something very, very important, which is you said you have got all of those non-CO2 things that we have been looking at and they have certain effects and CO2 has certain amounts and here is how we are going to look at it, and you got denounced for it, but you don't consider that a problem, even though they said you were confusing part of the public because it was unsettled.

Mr. HANSEN. Pardon?

1369 Mr. ISSA. You were confusing the public as an unsettled 1370 science in 2000; is that right?

1371 Mr. HANSEN. Could you repeat that?

Mr. ISSA. The Union of Concerned Scientists found that
you were confusing the public in 2000 by putting forward this
Alternative Scenario.

Mr. HANSEN. Well, you would have to ask them. I don't think it was confusing the public.

1377 Mr. ISSA. Dr. Hansen, you know--look, I would like to

be with you because you are one of the preeminent scientists, but, in 2000, you were still looking to add to the body, as I am sure you are today--

Mr. HANSEN. Sure we are. We always are.

Mr. ISSA. --of science because, until we have all of the body, we won't have all of the potential solutions for the problems.

Mr. HANSEN. That doesn't mean we don't know anything.

Mr. ISSA. Of course. I am not saying that. My opening statement said you are pushing on an open door. I agree with you on CO2, I agree with you on the greenhouse gas, and I agree with you on the need to change that.

In the last Congress, we had a number of scientists in my subcommittee, and we were able to get what we think was a pretty good assessment. It is about \$350 trillion if we are going to get to zero emissions today. And if research—and do the science. That price goes down, depending on how much time we have.

The concern that I have is I want your science to tell us as accurately on a daily, weekly, monthly basis how much time we have. Because we know we can't spend \$350 trillion to solve this problem, but we know we can't wait forever to solve it. So, in between, we are trying to figure out how to apply efficiently the dollars not to collapse our society and to in fact get to a zero greenhouse gas/also CO2 emissions.

1403 Isn't that a common goal that you share with this President 1404 who stated that he wants to get to, in fact, a stable environment and a cleaner one than we have today? 1405 1406 Mr. HANSEN. If you would look at my written testimony, you will see that I have some terrific recommendations. 1407 1408 problem is that our policy now is not going in that 1409 direction. We are continuing to increase our emissions. But 1410 it is clear that we have got to decrease. 1411 Mr. ISSA. I agree. We are doing it. 1412 Mr. HANSEN. The sooner we start on it, the less expensive it will be. In fact, it may be economically 1413 1414 beneficial. Mr. ISSA. How much are we spending on sequestration of 1415 1416 C02? 1417 Mr. HANSEN. We are spending quite a lot on clean coal. Mr. ISSA. Is that a step in the right direction as an 1418 1419 interim to reduce the emissions? 1420 Mr. HANSEN. Sequestration is an important issue, which 1421 it should be. Mr. ISSA. Secondly, what are we spending on nuclear? 1422 1423 Mr. HANSEN. We are spending a lot. 1424 Mr. ISSA. Is that important to disposable--1425 Mr. HANSEN. Those are important, but there are 1426 renewables in energy efficiency which have tremendous 1427 potential in this. We are spending chicken feed.

1428 Mr. ISSA. Dr. Hansen, that's chicken feed. How much 1429 would you spend? 1430 Mr. HANSEN. It is not up to me to determine how much we should spend. 1431 1432 Mr. ISSA. How much, if it is up to you to determine--1433 Mr. HANSEN. And, again, this is my opinion as a private 1434 citizen. It is not --1435 Mr. ISSA. Dr. Hansen, I understand the disclaimer, but 1436 we didn't call you here as a private citizen. You said it 1437 was chicken feed. I am following up on that. If 4, 5, 6, 8, 1438 10 billion dollars in various pockets of the Federal 1439 Government is chicken feed, what do we need to spend in 1440 dollars to move this along? Somewhere between \$10 billion 1441 and \$350 trillion? Give me a number of an annual amount we 1442 should spend. 1443 Mr. HANSEN. It should be at least comparable to what we 1444 are spending on nuclear -- we are subsidizing fossil fuels and 1445 nuclear a lot. We should be spending a lot more on 1446 renewables and energy efficiency. We have tremendous 1447 potential in energy efficiency. 1448 Mr. ISSA. So if nuclear-1449 Mr. HANSEN. I don't think we are overspending on the 1450 other research. It is very important. 1451 Mr. ISSA. That is a fair answer. Am I running out of time again? 1452

1453 Chairman WAXMAN. Yup. 1454 Mr. ISSA. Thanks, Dr. Hansen. 1455 Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you, Mr. Issa. 1456 Ms. Watson. 1457 Ms. WATSON. Dr. Hansen, as one of the eminent climate 1458 researchers, I want to thank you for being here today. 1459 I don't know the process, but, as I am looking at the 1460 exhibits that have been passed out to us, when you present an 1461 empirical report is it usual or unusual to have whole lines 1462 deleted by someone who is not a scientist? 1463 Mr. HANSEN. Well, I would hope it would be unusual. 1464 Ms. WATSON. All right. It is my understanding that in 1465 late 2002 a NASA public affairs official warned that there would be dire consequences if you continued to do press 1466 1467 interviews about the threat of global warming. Can you tell 1468 me if this is accurate and, if so, what happened? 1469 Mr. HANSEN. Well, it is accurate in the sense that was 1470 relayed to me. It was an oral threat that was made to the public affairs person in New York and relayed to me. And as 1471 1472 I described in my testimony today, I think--I don't know if 1473 they were--can be directly related to it, but the consequences for our budget were pretty dire. 1474 1475 Ms. WATSON. So you worked at NASA for over 30 years, as I understand, and under several administrations, and was that 1476 kind of explicit threat unusual? 1477

Mr. HANSEN. Yeah. It is unusual that they will make such an explicit threat. But, as I again mentioned in my opening remarks, the mechanisms for keeping government scientists in line with policy are pretty powerful, and they don't need to make an explicit threat.

Ms. WATSON. I had a confrontation with somebody from the Department of Commerce when we were in Qatar at the International Conference on Trade, and he made a statement about delusionary and mythical global warming. I talked to him about it afterwards. He was quite curt and rude, and he is no longer with the Department. He is no longer alive. But I found that very--in terms of myself as a policymaker, very insulting.

In December of 2005, National Public Radio wanted to interview you about global warming science; and this is, of course, your area of expertise, as I understand. I am very impressed with your resume. But NASA didn't want you to talk to NPR, and they wanted Colleen Hartman to do the interview instead. She was the Deputy Associate Administrator at NASA and one of your superiors. Do you think there would be a difference between what you could offer in an interview on global warming and what she could offer?

Mr. HANSEN. Well, sure, given our experiences. I mean,
I have--

Mr. SHAYS. Let me request that you speak closer to the

1503 | mike.

Mr. HANSEN. I have been doing research on that topic for several decades now, and they explicitly indicated that they wanted to talk about the climate science research that I discussed at the AGU meeting that December.

Ms. WATSON. Were you allowed to do the interview?

Mr. HANSEN. No, I was not allowed to do it because
headquarters indicated they preferred that I not be allowed
to speak to NPR because it was described as the most liberal
media outlet in the country.

Ms. WATSON. Do you think the administration was afraid of having you talk to the press about climate change in your opinion as a private citizen?

Mr. HANSEN. They were reluctant for whatever reasons.

Ms. WATSON. It seems from this hearing that there was an attempt to quiet you. I experienced that myself from someone from this administration, and I don't know how you skew empirical evidence as a scientist. I would feel that there should be a report coming from the editors.

If Mr. Cooney, a non-lawyer--Mr. Cooney, if you were to review this, I would think that, rather than changing words and editing, that you would write a dissenting report, a challenge to the findings of Dr. Hansen, rather than suggesting lines be deleted if you could not find a scientific base to do so.

1528 Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.

1529 Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you, Ms. Watson.

Mr. COONEY. Congresswoman, I did not comment on any of Dr. Hansen's work. In fact, the record before the committee shows that I had suggested that he be invited to interagency committees to brief us on the latest science. So I did not directly review his work.

Ms. WATSON. Thank you.

Chairman WAXMAN. Mr. Cannon.

Mr. CANNON. Thank you.

Mr. Cooney, would you mind expanding on what you just said? My understanding is you have been a big promoter of Dr. Hansen in many ways; is that not the case?

Mr. COONEY. I think that is true. In the materials that went up to the committee, you will find in one of the boxes in the past couple of weeks that I had sent an e-mail to Dr. Mahoney who, of course, ran the Climate Change Science Program. It is a one-liner, and you'll find it in the materials. I said, how about if we get Dr. Hansen to brief the Deputy Secretary level committee that met every 2 months on climate change policy, science, technology, mitigation, international negotiations.

But I have always been of the view that Dr. Hansen is very eminent. In fact, Dr. Mahoney did not take me up on my suggestion; and we, at the White House, therefore invited Dr.

Hansen to come and provide a briefing when I was there. I attended that briefing, and we appreciated his update. In fact, we were influenced by a lot of what he had to say about the potential of near-term mitigation from methane, which is a potent greenhouse gas.

As a consequence and in reliance on Dr. Hansen, to a large extent, the administration, the President announced in July of 2004 the methane-to-markets partnership under which a number of developed and developing countries tackled methane emissions.

Mr. CANNON. Methane is one of those greenhouse gasses that we can do something about. Does it bother you that there is a tendency to be alarmist about the possible causes—and, Dr. Hansen, I would like you to address this as well—the possible causes or the possible effect on the massive inertia, I think you called it, Dr. Hansen, that these feedback mechanisms might cause? There is a tendency to focus on those dramatic potential effects but not so much focus on what we can do to actually solve the probability containing things like methane.

Mr. COONEY. Well, I think that, as Congressman Issa has said, we have a time period within which to act, and we want to act timely, and we want to act cost effectively, and we want to calibrate our actions to emerging technologies.

So, to be concise, you want to get at the low-hanging

fruit; and Dr. Hansen told us that the low-hanging fruit was methane emissions. EPA has a tremendous program on methane emissions, a voluntary program, where actually in the United States methane emissions is the one greenhouse gas that has been reduced since 1990. My recollection is that we were about 5 percent below the 1990 level in methane emissions because we are capturing methane from coal mines, we are capturing it from oil and gas systems, and we are capturing it form landfills and using it for energy. So EPA's successful program was something that we could take international and help the developing countries embrace as well.

Mr. CANNON. I see Dr. Hansen nodding.

Let me just say, I have one of the biggest pig farms in my district. And, actually, it didn't smell as bad as you might have expected, but they are now making more money off of capturing the methane than they are off the 1,500,000 pigs or so per year that they produce and sell.

Mr. Shays is saying I've got to be kidding. The fact is, in a very difficult market, they are not making money from the pigs. They are making money on the methane.

So these are the kinds of things--I see Mr. Hansen nodding. You are not reflected in the record as smiling and nodding, Mr. Hansen. It is true there are some things--

Mr. HANSEN. This is a success story, and the

administration should be given credit for it.

Mr. CANNON. I just want to say that I would give Mr. Capuano the microphone any day to be talking about being anti-energy or pro-oil or pro-drilling or pro-tax cuts. Because the people that pay these costs are the poor in America way disproportionately; and in an environment where there tends to be an increasing disparity between rich and poor, I want to be on the side of people getting what they need in terms of energy.

I notice, Dr. Hansen, you are very positive about some of these alternatives like methane control on the one hand, like nuclear on the other hand. And, again, the record should show that Mr. Hansen is nodding; and, also, what you are suggesting, we go from chicken feed to more money to alternatives. There are great potentials there and that—in fact, let me give you some time to talk, instead of just nodding, Dr. Hansen.

Your sense is that we have this--and if I can characterize you--a massive inertia in our oceans and ice caps and that forces, feedback forces, have a tendency, over time, to maybe be dramatic. Your concern is to draw people's attention to the potential problem. Don't you think in that regard that finding options for what we can do today to improve the way we affect the atmosphere is important?

Mr. HANSEN. Absolutely. That's the bottom line, and we

need to begin to take those actions now. Because if we stay 1628 1629 on business as usual another decade, it will be very 1630 difficult to avoid the inertia taking over and carrying us to 1631 climate changes that we would rather not have. 1632 Mr. CANNON. How much time do I have left? 1633 Chairman WAXMAN. None. 1634 Mr. CANNON. Mr. Deutsch, I am very impressed by you. 1635 It sounds to me like you have got your resume out there. You had it prepared in anticipation of graduation. If somebody 1636 1637 ever raised that as a question in your career, I would be 1638 happy to be a recommender for you to straighten them out. 1639 Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 1640 Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you. You want to hire him? 1641 Mr. Yarmuth. 1642 Mr. YARMUTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Cooney, you stated that--and we have repeated it a 1643 number of times -- that your primary obligation is to promote 1644 1645 the policies of the administration; is that correct? 1646 Mr. COONEY. Essentially correct. 1647 Mr. YARMUTH. Essentially, that you are a spin doctor, 1648 is that a fair characterization of what you did? 1649 Mr. COONEY. No, I don't think that's fair. 1650 Mr. YARMUTH. I had to get that in anyway. It sounds to 1651 me like a spin doctor. 1652 You said that you were only making recommendations.

you made recommendations to Mr. Mahoney. Is it fair to say that, once you got these documents and passed them on, it had left the realm of science and entered the political process?

Mr. COONEY. Congressman, the documents were inherently of a policy nature. They related to budgets. They related to research priorities. They were not a platform for the presentation of original scientific research. These were

documents called for under the Global Change Research Act.

They were sent to 75 people to review under an established process at the Office of Management and Budget, and I was one of 75 who reviewed it, and it came to my office. I did my reviews. You send it back to OMB. OMB would synthesize the comments and, in all likelihood, give them to Dr. Mahoney for a final reconciliation because he was the head of the program.

Mr. YARMUTH. Are you saying you had no more influence on what was in the final report than the other 75? You were in the White House. None of the other 75 in the White House--

Mr. COONEY. The Office of Science and Technology Policy staff participated, the Council of Economic Advisors. The Office of Management and Budget itself reviewed these budgetary policy research reports. A host of people in the White House reviewed them. But all of the agencies reviewed these documents themselves because they affected their

budgets and everyone wanted to be comfortable with what was expressed.

Mr. YARMUTH. But you made recommendations; and, according to staff's count, something like 181 of the edits that you made appeared in the final report. Are you saying that you didn't have any disproportionate influence?

Mr. COONEY. I was an active participant. There is no denying that. But if you look at these documents, they were multiple hundreds of pages, and I don't think it is unfair to say that 99 percent of the pages had no comments on them.

Where I had a comment, I would make it. But I think it is a fair characterization to say that 99 percent of the drafts that came through I had no comment, no recommendation to make.

Mr. YARMUTH. Let's talk about--you have said on numerous occasions today that you used, as the basis for your editing, the National Academy of Sciences and the National Resource Council documentation; and, in fact, in chapter one of the draft, where it talks about the issue--called the issues for science and society, on the page you did have a footnote and one statement about human activities causing--whether human activities cause climate change or global warming.

The NRC elaborated on this point. C-A, next page. And, in fact, there was a section called, from their report, this

1703 is the NRC, the effect of human activities, which talks about how the effect of human activities cannot be unequivocally 1704 1705 established; is that correct? So, in fact, you did that 1706 there. 1707 Now, if we can, would you turn to Exhibit A and--because both in your testimony today and in your deposition, you 1708 1709 talked about this being your guiding document. Will you read 1710 the first sentence of the National Academy Report aloud, 1711 please? 1712 Mr. COONEY. Greenhouse gasses are accumulating in the 1713 earth's atmosphere as a result of human activities causing 1714 surface air temperatures and subsurface ocean temperatures to 1715 rise. 1716 Mr. YARMUTH. Thank you. 1717 Now turn to Exhibit B, and this exhibit is your handwritten edits to the EPA report. 1718 1719 Now on page 3, beginning on line 24, you have deleted a 1720 sentence from the EPA text. Will you please read that 1721 sentence aloud? Mr. COONEY. I am looking at line 24 on which page? 1722

1723 Mr. YARMUTH. Page 3.

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Mr. COONEY. The NRC concluded that the greenhouse gasses are accumulating in the atmosphere as a result of human activities, causing surface air temperatures and subsurface temperatures to rise.

Mr. YARMUTH. Now you replaced this verbatim quote from 1728 1729 the National Academy of Science with your own sentence. This sentence reads, "Some activities among greenhouse gasses and 1730 1731 other substances directly or indirectly may affect the 1732 balance of incoming and outgoing radiation, thereby potentially affecting climate on regional and global scales." 1733 1734 That sentence does not appear in the Academy's report. 1735 So you deleted a direct quote from the Academy's report, which you say is what you relied upon, and replaced it with a 1736 1737 sentence that appears designed to obfuscate the simple 1738 reality that human activities are warming the planet. 1739 did you make the change, and why did you not rely on the NRC 1740 report in that situation? 1741 Mr. COONEY. Congressman, I recall this document did 1742 have a number of drafts, and I do recall the viewing 1743 documents that recommended the insertion of a more full quote, the one that you had referenced before from page 17 1744 1745 about the linkage between observed warming in the 20th 1746 century and human activities not being unequivocally 1747 established because the range of natural variability climate 1748 was not sufficiently known. 1749 In this case, I don't recognize the source of the 1750 comment that I am inserting here on this draft. I don't know

that it is not in the National Academy of Science's report.

I just can't say that it is.

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As I said, in most cases, nearly all cases, my comments were derivative and in reliance on the National Academy of Science's report; and this may be a quote from that report.

But my concern there was that—in prior drafts, you will see my concern there was that EPA was, in its draft, was not being sufficiently expansive on the question of the connection between human activities and observed warming. It wasn't using the full benefit of what the National Academy had said, and I wanted a broad quote because it's an important question.

The quote on page 17 has the caption The Effect of Human Activities; and it is there where the National Academy is purporting to speak very specifically, not from the summary which is what this sentence is from but very specifically about the linkage between observed warming and human activities. I thought that it was more complete to refer to that quote, and you will find that I did recommend the insertion of that quote in a number of other drafts.

Mr. YARMUTH. And more supportive of the administration's policies.

Mr. COONEY. Well, Congressman, again, if you look at chapter 3 of the policy book that the President himself released on June 11th, 2 weeks before I got there, the President has 50 quotes from the National Academy of Science's report where he prescribes what his research

1778 priorities are going to be.

1779 Chairman WAXMAN. The gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. Souder.

1781 Mr. SOUDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Hansen, a lot of people believe that money can influence science. In fact, Mr. Cooney was more or less smeared for his past ties to the Petroleum Institute. You received a quarter million dollars from the Heinz Foundation in 2001. Why shouldn't we believe that influenced your support for John Kerry for President in 2004?

Mr. HANSEN. The award--the Heinz Environment Award is an award that is named for John Heinz, a Republican Senator from Pennsylvania.

Mr. SOUDER. Whose wife is married to John Kerry.

Mr. HANSEN. Yes, that is right.

There is no--as far as I know, there is no political connection to this award. It is an environmental award, and it is not--and you know it is--

Mr. SOUDER. I understand the point you are making. It is not from Theresa Heinz directly or from John Kerry directly. But the point is that when you smear individuals based on associations or indirect associations is what has historically been called McCarthyism and what was done to the first witness on this panel.

Let me ask you a more precise question.

You have been said publicly multiple times that you were a consultant on Al Gore's movie An Inconvenient Truth. You said that Al Gore has a better understanding of the science of global warming than any politician that you have met. Given your close ties to former Vice President Gore, how do you feel about this statement: He said it's appropriate to have an overrepresentation of factual presentations on how dangerous it is as a predicate for opening up the audience to listen to what solutions are and how it is to be helpful. Do you feel it is okay for politicians to exaggerate the impact of global warming? Mr. HANSEN. No, we don't need to exaggerate. The reality is serious enough. There is no need for exaggeration. Mr. SOUDER. I also want to express my concerns that you didn't submit your testimony. You were told, we understand, on February 15th that this hearing was coming. I know you are a busy person. Our committee rules, which are increasingly being violated, were told that you had 2

increasingly being violated, were told that you had 2
business days. Our staff was willing to stay in over the
weekend, and yet we didn't receive the testimony until Sunday
night. It doesn't matter, because there is nothing new in

1825 your testimony. But, as a courtesy, it is helpful for us for

1826 hearings to prepare.

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I am more upset that the chairman has not allowed our

Republican witness to speak until the third panel. On a hearing on censorship, on a hearing of lack of debate, our witness was denied on the first panel where we could have debated this. I believe it makes a mockery of a hearing on censorship to censor the Republican witness.

Now, ironically, Dr. Spencer, who was at NASA for 15 years, who was awarded the Meteorological Society Special Award for developing a global precise record of the earth's temperature from operational polar orbiting satellites, fundamentally advancing our ability to monitor climate--that is the quote from the award--who receives NASA's exceptional achievement medal, has views differing from Dr. Hansen.

He also says, Dr. Spencer, "well aware that any interaction between scientists and the press was to be coordinated through NASA management and public affairs, end quote. And he resigned from NASA under the Clinton administration because of limits on what he could and could not say as a NASA employee because he felt he was being restricted by the Clinton administration.

Now, Dr. Hansen, based on your definitions of censorship, silencing and political interference, whatever you want to call it, that you allege to have occurred under the Bush administration, was Dr. Spencer also being censored by the Clinton administration trying to filter his statements through NASA when he disagreed with the Clinton

1853 | administration?

Mr. HANSEN. I don't have any knowledge of that. I don't know if he was prevented from speaking to reporters the way that I was. You would have to ask him about that.

Mr. SOUDER. The major point with this--well, I would like to ask, because it would be an interesting comparison, but the majority prohibited us from having him on this panel, not a contrarian, but, in fact, a well-known researcher who was at NASA for many years and has received numerous awards for that.

I think it is appalling that we can't have a discussion and a comparison. We can have allegations—and that's why people think sometimes these things are show hearings. We have can have allegations against one administration, but when the press is here and when there is coverage on one but not on the other, in my opinion, it is a set-up, it is appalling, and we have been deteriorating in our process here.

I am very, very disappointed, particularly the questions, to say would--if you altered something from that is a legitimate debate--from a--to put slight--more vague in and say that is what the Petroleum Institute would want you to do would be similar to saying--and a socialist would rather have you not do that that way or a person who's anti-capitalist would rather have you not have it that way,

it's an over-simplification. And I just am appalled at the process here and very disappointed.

I yield back.

Chairman WAXMAN. The only thing I can say to the gentleman is that we do have the witness that the Republicans requested here today to testify. We, unfortunately, can't have everybody testify all at once. We have to take them one at a time. But, on this first panel, we have two appointees under the Republican administration sitting on either side of Dr. Hansen.

The odd thing is that Dr. Hansen is one of the world's most esteemed scientists on global warming, and the two people at the table with him wanted to change his comments or stop him from speaking. It is odd, when you look at their qualifications, how little qualifications they have for imposing their views on science over what Dr. Hansen was doing as a government employee.

Mr. SOUDER. As you know, just a few months ago I was a chairman. I do not recall you or the Democrats being willing to accept my definition of who the Democrat witnesses should be.

Chairman WAXMAN. Well, I would point out to the gentleman that there were times when you would even deny our witnesses. We have your witness here, and we are going to hear from that witness on the third panel. I am looking

forward to hearing what he has to say. I will be here. I think that other members will be here as well.

Mr. ISSA. Mr. Chairman, we do--

Mr. SOUDER. Mr. Chairman, I just want to say for the record, you know, that I never did that in my subcommittee, that I have never deprived Democrats of the witnesses on the panel. It may have happened at full committee.

Chairman WAXMAN. I am being informed that it was at the full committee and not at your subcommittee that we were denied witnesses.

At any rate, we don't believe in denying witnesses; and we do have your witnesses here.

Mr. ISSA. I want to thank you that, after your three witnesses, that our witness will get up in the third panel.

Let's just say let's go forward from here, and I am sure what we did to you will never happen back to us and vice versa.

Chairman WAXMAN. I don't think Mr. Cooney, Mr. Deutsch, and Mr. Connaughton are my three witnesses, but they are witnesses that are appropriately here because they worked for this administration and we want to hear from them why we have this odd situation where nonscientists, even--how old were you at the time, Mr. Deutsch?

Mr. DEUTSCH. Twenty-three, twenty-four.

1926 Chairman WAXMAN. And you were telling Mr. Hansen's 1927 staff that he couldn't go out and make public statements.

1928 Mr. DEUTSCH. I wouldn't go that far. I did relay 1929 information from my higher-ups from NASA about particular 1930 instances. 1931 Chairman WAXMAN. Particular instances. 1932 Mr. DEUTSCH. Sure. Particular interviews. Chairman WAXMAN. That he would not be able to do. 1933 1934 Mr. DEUTSCH. You are speaking to one interview in 1935 particular, and that is NPR, and we offered them three very 1936 qualified guests. 1937 Chairman WAXMAN. Well, we'll get into that with other 1938 members. 1939 The time now is yielded to the gentlelady from the District of Columbia, Ms. Norton. 1940 1941 Ms. NORTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 1942 I am interested in trying to get at the atmosphere that 1943 has created what would normally be a pretty pristine, 1944 straightforward atmosphere in the scientific agency. I want 1945 to congratulate Mr. Deutsch because, despite his tender years 1946 and perhaps his education, he was able to speak 1947 authoritatively as the spokesman on occasion for the agency. 1948 One of those statements, I would like to ask you about. 1949 It relates to an e-mail to a NASA contractor of October 1950 the 17th. I am going to read part of it. You wanted him to 1951 add the word "theory" to Big Bang. I don't have any problem 1952 with that. We talk about evolution as a theory, although I

am astounded by the lack of understanding about what the word "scientific" theory means.

In any case, I don't think anybody would have any problem with that. But you went on to offer further opinions, and I am giving you what you said in that e-mail now.

"it is not NASA's place nor should it be to make a declaration such as this about the existence of the universe that discounts intelligent design by the Creator.

"The other half of the argument that is notably absent from any of these three portal submissions, this is more than a science issue. It is a religious issue. I would hate to think that young people would only be getting one-half of this debate from NASA."

Mr. Deutsch, you then were relaying the notion that, in order to talk about the Big Bang theory, NASA would give or say words--either say words or give some deference to intelligent design.

Mr. DEUTSCH. No, ma'am. It is important to note this e-mail was between me and Mr.--

Ms. NORTON. Excuse me?

Mr. DEUTSCH. I only sent this e-mail to Flint. It was not a statement on national policy or anything like that. It was simply--the bulk of that is my personal opinion, my personal religious views. These I understood Mr. Wild to

1978 share. He is a Christian, and so am I, and we had talked 1979 about that.

Ms. NORTON. I said, it is not NASA's place, nor should it be. So if it was your own religious views, why did you cite NASA's place?

Mr. DEUTSCH. Well, again--

Ms. NORTON. A friend of yours. Is this person that you are e-mailing to a friend of yours?

Mr. DEUTSCH. Yes, ma'am. I'd agree with you that it was--work e-mail is a silly place to put this. I agree with you wholeheartedly. But if you go down to the bottom of the e-mail, you will read the sentence, "Please edit these stories to reflect that the Big Bang is but theory on how the universe began. That is the only change I really want."

And you will see that that is all I was really asking for, that the word "theory" be added to Big Bang, because that was the AP style guidelines of 2005.

Ms. NORTON. This perhaps explains why when you--this kind of personal opinion lurking somewhere, even on e-mails, in correspondence, official correspondence between a representative and a contractor, may explain what you mean when you apparently allege that there was a cultural war in NASA.

You were interviewed last February on a Texas A&M radio program; and apparently referring to the scientists at NASA,

you said, "This is an agenda. It is a culture war agenda. 2003 They are out to get Republicans. They're out to get 2004 2005 Christians. They're out to get people who are helping Bush. 2006 Anybody they perceive as not sharing their agenda, they're 2007 out to get." who are you referring to? Mr. DEUTSCH. Well, Ms. Norton, I have got to say, as 2008 2009 you may imagine, I was very emotional, very upset, very 2010 distraught about the way things went down. Ms. NORTON. Do you still believe that? 2011 2012 Mr. DEUTSCH. I wouldn't go that far today. No. 2013 think that I, frankly, said a lot of that stuff out of anger. 2014 It was just an emotional time for me, and I wouldn't say all 2015 of those things today. 2016 Ms. NORTON. Were you sitting next to Dr. Hansen 2017 there--and I am going to allow you to--since you say that is 2018 the kind of thing you would not say today, you said, at the 2019 same time, he wants to demean the President, he wants to demean the administration, create a false impression the 2020 2021 administration is watering down science and lying to the 2022 public, and that is patently false. And Dr. Hansen is 2023 sitting beside you now. Would you like to say anything to 2024 him about such words that were spoken? 2025 Mr. ISSA. Regular order. I don't believe that our 2026 rules call for a dialogue between witnesses.

Chairman WAXMAN. The gentleman's order is not well

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taken. It is the gentlelady's time.

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2029 Ms. NORTON. I am simply asking, in light of the 2030 fact -- and I ask the question only because I want to give Mr. 2031 Deutsch the opportunity, and he said words like this were 2032 uttered as a matter when he was highly emotional. 2033 words also were uttered in this case naming renowned 2034 scientists at NASA. I am not asking you to apologize to him. 2035 But rather than simply reading this statement and saying did 2036 you say this, because I know you said it, I am asking you, 2037 having said something like this in light of your prior 2038 statement that these kinds of statements were made as an 2039 emotional manner, in light of that, what would you like to 2040 say to Dr. Hansen that you happen to be sitting beside him 2041 right now? 2042 Mr. DEUTSCH. I think we all agree that he's been 2043 critical of the administration. But, beyond that, I would 2044 just restate that I wouldn't necessarily make those 2045 statements -- comments today, no, ma'am. 2046 Ms. NORTON. I appreciate that answer. 2047 I yield back my time.

Chairman WAXMAN. Before you yield it back, may I ask, how was he critical of the administration?

Mr. DEUTSCH. I believe the things--you start with the allegations of censorship and -- you know, starting with that I think is a good place.

Chairman WAXMAN. So Dr. Hansen is being critical of the administration by not being pleased with your telling people in his office that he can't go and speak certain places. Is that being unfair to the administration?

Mr. DEUTSCH. He just made several allegations about censorship by political appointees, allegations I don't agree with him on. So I think it is fair to say that is being critical of the administration, sir.

Chairman WAXMAN. Well, if we look at some of the changes Mr. Cooney proposed, they were changes in substance of what the scientists were recommending be in these global warming climate change positions. And, Dr. Hansen, I think your criticism is they were substantive changes; is that correct?

Mr. HANSEN. Yes, that is right.

Chairman WAXMAN. Now if there's substantive changes coming from a political appointee who used to be at the American Petroleum Institute and raises the question in his mind, and I think anybody's mind, Democrat and Republican, that maybe somebody who is not a scientist, who is a lawyer, who used to work for the Petroleum Institute, who is a political appointee is trying to superimpose his views.

Now you, on the other hand, were a public affairs representative at the age of 23; and you were telling Dr. Hansen's staff to tell him that the higher-ups didn't want

2078 him to be on National Public Radio; isn't that true? 2079 Mr. DEUTSCH. That is fair. 2080 Chairman WAXMAN. Isn't that interference? 2081 Mr. DEUTSCH. No, I wouldn't go as far to say it was 2082 interference. We had taken that request. I took it to the 2083 ninth floor and discussed it with the higher-ups. They 2084 thought it over and said, hey, you know, we've got three 2085 other qualified people, Dr. Colleen Hartman, who was 2086 mentioned, Dr. Mary Cleave and Dr. Jack Kaye; and those three 2087 were offered. 2088 Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you very much. 2089 Mr. Shays, do you want your time now or do you want--2090 Mr. SHAYS. How many more members do you have on your 2091 side? 2092 Okay. I am going to take it now.

2093 | RPTS CALHOUN

2094 DCMN ROSEN

2095 [11:56 a.m.]

Mr. SHAYS. I weep that this administration didn't seize this issue and claim it as its own, and this issue being climate changes for real, and mankind has had an impact on it. Are we thinking what this administration could have done about this issue? So I just want to be on record as saying that.

I think there are two inconvenient truths in this world right now, one that unfortunately too many of my Republicans don't want to deal with, and that's what Al Gore talks about, and the other is what others have talked about, about the Islamist threat that too many of my Democratic colleagues don't want to deal with or are in denial. That's what I believe. It's my view.

Having said this, when I listen to these hearings, I get drawn into believing that there are setups here and there are misimpressions galore, and some of them frankly, Mr. Cooney, are the result of having someone with your background and your position. You instantly lose credibility. Not your fault. It's your background. I might have thought twice about taking on that assignment because of that.

But when we had Mr. Piltz here last week, or 2 weeks ago, he was talking as if scientists--his reports were being

2118 changed, as if he was a scientist. I still read in the 2119 newspaper that he's a scientist. He's not a scientist. He's 2120 not a scientist. 2121 Dr. Hansen, you're a scientist. Now let me ask you about the Academy's report in 2001; not what you believe, not 2122 2123 what you're convinced of, not what you think the science 2124 says, did the National Academy report from 2001 say 2125 conclusively that global warming was for real, case closed?

Mr. HANSEN. I would say yes. By the way, I was an author, one of the authors of that report.

Mr. SHAYS. You're saying yes to what?

Mr. HANSEN. Global warming is real.

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Mr. SHAYS. The report in 2001 said that? Not now.

2131 Mr. HANSEN. Sure. We knew that global warming was real 2132 in 2001, absolutely.

Mr. SHAYS. You knew it was real. So what did the report say that I could turn to or you could turn to me and say case closed, issued decided?

Mr. HANSEN. We had a sentence which was just referred to, it said: Greenhouse gasses are accumulating in the atmosphere as a result of human activity, causing surface air temperatures and sub surface ocean temperatures to rise.

It is a very straightforward sentence. It connects cause and effect, increasing greenhouse gasses, increasing global temperature. That's a very strong statement.

Mr. SHAYS. Nothing that says this issue has been 2143 2144 decided, there's no question about it, and we need to deal 2145 with it. 2146 Mr. HANSEN. The report certainly concludes that we need 2147 to deal with it, yes. There are always aspects of the problem which we need to work on more, but this is a very 2148 2149 strong statement. 2150 Mr. SHAYS. It's funny, it doesn't strike me as what I 2151 would think is a strong statement. What would strike me as a 2152 strong statement is to say the issue has been decided, there 2153 is no doubt in our minds, this is the issue, it's caused by 2154 humans, and we need to get on with it. When I hear that 2155 statement, it's saying an issue as of fact as if it's, in my 2156 judgment, part of the problem, but not all of the problem. 2157 I am left with the belief that climate change, there's 2158 no debate anymore, and people would say it in a much more 2159 definitive way. 2160 Mr. Cooney, how would you respond to my question? 2161 Mr. COONEY. Congressman Shays. 2162 Mr. SHAYS. I want you to talk close to the mike. Both 2163 of you are not speaking as loud as I would like. 2164 Mr. COONEY. Congressman, I would refer to you the 2165 quotation on page 17 which is entitled: The effect of human activities. 2166 Mr. SHAYS. Is this in the 2001? 2167

Mr. COONEY. The June 2001 National Academy Report, and it speaks to the connection to human activities and it says: "because of the large and still uncertain level of natural variability inherent in the climate record and the uncertainties and the time histories of the various forcing agents, particularly aerosols, a causal linkage between the buildup of greenhouse gasses in the atmosphere and the observed climate changes during the 20th Century cannot be unequivocally established."

It goes on to say that --

Mr. SHAYS. Dr. Hansen, is that just designed to confuse people like me or is that designed by--sounds like an Alan Greenspan statement.

Mr. COONEY. Congressman, I had it before me, and I did it at my desk when I was at the White House, it talked about major uncertainties with respect to clouds, aerosols, the natural carbon cycle, the natural water cycle, the difference between temperature record at the surface and in the troposphere that was measured by satellites.

It talked about the lack of a global integrated observation system. A lot of the southern hemisphere was not really routinely observed in a climate sense in a long-term sense in manners and using methodologies that are consistent with the way climate is measured--

Mr. SHAYS. How do you respond to that, Dr. Hansen?

Mr. HANSEN. If you pick out individual phrases or sentences and compare them, you need to really look at the entire report. It was a report which made a very strong statement. The White House had asked for a clarification because they were uncertain as to whether they should accept the IPCC document. There were some people who were questioning the validity, the accuracy of the IPCC report.

I believe that was a primary reason for requesting the National Academy to look at the problem. They came out with quite a clear statement.

Mr. SHAYS. My time has run out. Let me just ask Mr. Cooney just to finish his comment.

Mr. COONEY. Congressman, at page 22 of the report, on the IPCC report, when it spoke to it, it said: Climate projections will always be far from perfect. Confidence limits, probabilistic information with their bases should always be considered. Without them, the IPCC summary for policy makers could give an impression that the science of global warming is settled, even though many uncertainties still remain.

That is language from the National Academy Of Sciences.

Mr. SHAYS. I'll conclude. Dr. Hansen, I'm not a scientist, but when I hear that I am not left with a report that says no, debate is over.

Mr. HANSEN. No, depends on what you mean by debate is

2218 over. The fact that greenhouse gasses are increasing and the world is getting warmer and there is a causal connection 2219 2220 between them, that debate is over. 2221 Chairman WAXMAN. The gentleman's time has expired. 2222 Mr. Van Hollen. 2223 Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all 2224 for your testimony here today. Mr. Deutsch, I'd like to 2225 follow up a little bit on the questions that were asked of 2226 you earlier. As I understand, you were a public affairs 2227 officer at NASA. 2228 Mr. DEUTSCH. Yes, sir. 2229 Mr. VAN HOLLEN. And when you arrived at NASA did you 2230 have any expertise in the area of global climate change? 2231 Mr. DEUTSCH. No, sir. 2232 Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Would you agree that the American 2233 people should have the benefit of the best scientific views within the government with respect to climate change? 2234 2235 Mr. DEUTSCH. Sure. 2236 Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Who ultimately paid your salary there, 2237 our salaries, everyone's salaries in public service? 2238 Mr. DEUTSCH. That would be the taxpayers, sir. 2239 Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Would you agree that given that big 2240 investment that they make in our scientific investigation 2241 that again should have the very best giving them their 2242 opinions on this issue?

2243 Mr. DEUTSCH. Sure.

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2244 Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Now I want to look at this issue of sort of the political apparatus sort of governing who can say 2245 2246 what with respect to the science on global climate change and 2247 I want to look through this lens of this NPR interview which 2248 you mentioned before. We have a couple e-mails with respect 2249 to the back and forth in the political apparatus with respect 2250 to how that decision was made. I don't know if we're going 2251 to put them on the screens or you have copies of them in 2252 front of you.

If you could make sure that the witness has copies of these e-mails from you.

An e-mail request came in from NPR to Dr. Hansen's office, is that right?

Mr. DEUTSCH. Yes, yes. Then they sent it to us.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. As you said today in your testimony, you then discussed that request for an interview with the, quote, 9th floor, as you describe it in this e-mail of December 8th. It's on the second page of your packet at the top. We discussed it on the 9th floor.

And it was decided that we would like you to handle this interview; you, referring to Colleen, right?

Mr. DEUTSCH. Yes, sir. Colleen and also Ms. Cleave and Mr. Kaye were all considered.

2267 Mr. VAN HOLLEN. My question is was who was it that you

discussed this with on the 9th floor and made the decision it 2268 2269 would not be Dr. Hansen? 2270 Mr. DEUTSCH. Specifically that would be Press Secretary 2271 Dean Acosta. 2272 Mr. VAN HOLLEN. So the 9th floor was the press 2273 secretary. 2274 Mr. DEUTSCH. That 9th floor, that's sort of NASA slang 2275 for senior leadership at headquarters; they're all on the 9th 2276 floor. The head of public affairs as well. 2277 Mr. VAN HOLLEN. But you meant him specifically in this 2278 e-mail? 2279 Mr. DEUTSCH. Yes. Yes, sir. 2280 Mr. VAN HOLLEN. There's another e-mail on the next page that talks about our main concern is "hitting our messages 2281 and not getting dragged down into any discussions we 2282 2283 shouldn't get into." 2284 What were you worried that Dr. Hansen was going to get into with respect to the science of global climate change? 2285 2286 Mr. DEUTSCH. I wasn't worried about anything. Dr. Hansen would say about the science of global climate change. 2287 2288 We had some media practices that we'd been using up to this 2289 time that I think even Dr. Hansen would tell you he didn't always follow, and so I think that that was a concern that 2290 2291 the 9th floor had.

It wasn't his immediate -- if you go up

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Mr. VAN HOLLEN.

to the e-mail above that, it says when asked how you're going to describe to Dr. Hansen, why he shouldn't be doing this interview, according to Costa they say right here: Tell them your boss wants to do.

His boss was Colleen, right? They didn't ask to do this. In other words, Costa said go ask them to do it.

Isn't that the way it happened?

Mr. DEUTSCH. Yes, sir.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. So it wasn't that his bosses wanted to do it, it was the top press people said we don't want Dr.

2303 | Hansen to do this interview, isn't that right?

Mr. DEUTSCH. It was just Dean who said that and again that was because we'd had some practices that he had not always been following as far as reporting the interviews et cetera, and those were some of his frustrations he relayed to me. We did have a practice known as the right of first refusal in which the senior people could do these interviews.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Right. But the decision was made at the top by the press people that he wouldn't be doing that, isn't that right?

Mr. DEUTSCH. In this one case, yes, sir.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. In fact, one looks like Mary and Colleen are not sure they even want to do it. The point is you made a decision at the top press level that you didn't want Dr. Hansen so be giving this interview because you were

2318 concerned about hitting your message and you were concerned 2319 Dr. Hansen wasn't going to hit your message, isn't that 2320 right? 2321 Mr. DEUTSCH. I can't speak for the former press 2322 secretary, you'd have to ask him about that. But that was 2323 what was relayed to me, sir. 2324 Mr. VAN HOLLEN. It's your words here, hitting your 2325 message. Isn't that right? 2326 Mr. DEUTSCH. Yes, sir. Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Isn't this the definition of political 2327 2328 minding of an expert. In other words, were any of the people 2329 you were offering up more of an expert on global climate 2330 change than Dr. Hansen? 2331 Mr. DEUTSCH. I don't know as far as their level of 2332 expertise. I know the head of NASA's science mission 2333 directorate and the second in line are some pretty good 2334 people to get offered an interview with, I would say. 2335 Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Dr. Hansen, is there anybody else at 2336 NASA, or any of these other individuals they were proposing for the interview, people who had more expertise in the 2337 2338 science of global climate change than you? 2339 Mr. HANSEN. Well, I'm not going to denigrate anyone. 2340 Mr. VAN HOLLEN. I'm not asking you to denigrate, I'm 2341 talking about in terms of experience. 2342 Mr. HANSEN. In terms of experience, no.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. As you look at these e-mails and based on your concerns at the time, doesn't this appear to be a perfect example of exactly the concern that you have raised, which is political interference in the ability of scientists who are paid for by funds from taxpayers to be able to present a factual account of global climate change.

Mr. HANSEN. Absolutely. The thing is, this is, however, a very rare case of where you have got it on paper. It's going on all the time, but most of the people doing that are more experienced than George was, and they won't make the mistake of putting the thing on paper like that.

I pointed out, for example, that press releases were going to the White House, science press release were going to the White House for editing. But the process, they're careful not to have memos like this that describe the process.

It's very unfortunate. We developed this politicalization of science. As I mentioned in my opening comments, public affairs offices should be staffed by professionals, not by political appointees, otherwise they become offices of propaganda.

Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you, Mr. Van Hollen. Your time has expired.

Mr. Issa.

2367 Mr. ISSA. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Following up--

Chairman WAXMAN. We're proceeding with the second round.

Mr. ISSA. Mr. Deutsch, maybe I'll start with you. You couldn't seem to come up with an answer to that question of related to anything in the way of disliking the Bush administration or being political for Dr. Hansen. Are you aware that Dr. Hansen has called the Bush press office the office of propaganda, or, it seems more, and I quote: It seems more like Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union than the United States.

Are those the kinds of comments you might have been referring to when you were frustrated. Were you aware of those comments?

Mr. DEUTSCH. Yes, sir, we were aware of those comments, and those are unfortunate.

Mr. ISSA. I appreciate your candor. I'm sorry you didn't come up with those in real-time, because I think that does go to the question of your youthful indiscretions in perhaps, in how you handled the senior scientist. I think you have owned up to maybe not being up to the job.

Dr. Hansen, are those kind of comments appropriate for somebody who's been on the Federal payroll, who's had your science paid for for 3 decades? Are those appropriate things to say about the Bush administration?

Mr. HANSEN. I think that it was -- that was in reference

to the fact that scientists were being asked to not speak to reporters, to report before--to tell reporters I can't speak to you, I have to get permission, and I have to get someone on the phone with me to listen in on the conversation.

That's getting to seem a lot like the old Soviet Union to me.

Mr. ISSA. The reference to Nazi Germany because they want to have somebody who's able to say that the doctor did or didn't say this to a reporter when it later comes out in print, is that Nazi Germany? Nazi Germany, I think, is a pretty strong statement, wouldn't you say?

Mr. HANSEN. I was referring to the constraints on speaking to the media.

Mr. ISSA. Dr. Hansen--

Mr. HANSEN. It violates the constitution, freedom of speech.

Mr. ISSA. Dr. Hansen, first of all, when you work for somebody, the question of when you will speak on behalf of that entity is not a constitutional question, as you and I both know. You were not being asked by public broadcasting because you happened to be a smart guy with a good suit, you were being asked because of your position at NASA.

Now I come back to this again --

Mr. HANSEN. I don't believe that's the case.

Mr. ISSA. You have over 1,400 opportunities that you have availed yourself to, and yet you call it being stifled.

2418 I'm thrilled--

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Mr. HANSEN. Those cases occurred after the NASA

administrator stepped forward and said I should be allowed to

speak, not before. If you look at some of those memos, you

will find that they were intent on me not speaking.

Mr. ISSA. Dr. Hansen, you're saying if I went back to 2424 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, that I would find dramatically less 2425 quotes from you?

2426 Mr. HANSEN. In many cases--

2427 Mr. ISSA. Please. Just would I find dramatically less, 2428 yes or no.

2429 Mr. HANSEN. You would find less. I don't know how you 2430 define dramatically.

Mr. ISSA. 1,400 quotes. Would I find that you were only allowed to speak once, twice, five times, 50 times?

Mr. HANSEN. I'm an American and I exercise my right of free speech. If public affairs people tell me I can't do that and I know that they're violating the constitution, I ignore them.

Mr. ISSA. Dr. Hansen, isn't it true that when you speak, you're speaking on Federal paid time, when you travel, you're being paid by the Federal Government to travel. Isn't that true.

2441 Mr. HANSEN. Not always.

2442 Mr. ISSA. Isn't it normally true?

2443 Mr. HANSEN. Normally it is, yes.

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Mr. ISSA. So your employer, and your employer happens to be the American taxpayer, but they're sending you at government expense to these speaking engagements.

Mr. HANSEN. That's exactly the point. I should be able, for the sake of the taxpayers, I should be able to--they should be availed of my expertise. I shouldn't be required to parrot some company line. I should give the best information I have.

Mr. ISSA. Dr. Hansen, it's very clear that you do say what you believe each time you speak.

Let me--do you want to put that up on the board, the demo.

Dr. Hansen, you speak, and you speak everywhere regularly, and you speak on the Federal dollar. I guess my question is do you think that, in fact, the thousands of scientists all over NASA should have that same right to travel places and speak.

Before you answer that let me ask a question because I appreciate public broadcasting, but it every speaking engagement the one that should be appropriately having Dr. Hansen on it. Isn't it true that when you're speaking to the general public often somebody who's a perfectly good speaker, knows a lot less about the science would be equally good to answer the basic questions of climate change?

2468 Mr. HANSEN. Sure. I welcome that I accept only a very small fraction of the invitations. It's impossible. 2469 2470 would rather do science. That's always been my preference. 2471 Mr. ISSA. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, if I could just 2472 close here. 2473 Dr. Hansen, I appreciate the science you do, I 2474 appreciate the work you have done for a very long time and I 2475 hope you continue doing it. I would only say that I hope 2476 that the \$250,000 you took from the Heinz Foundation, the 2477 campaigning you did for Senator Kerry for his presidential 2478 race, doesn't influence your chafing at this administration 2479 any differently than it might for the next administration and 2480 that your effort to get more dollars for climate change is 2481 done in a constructive fashion under the rest of this administration and the next. 2482 2483 I yield back. 2484 Chairman WAXMAN. I think the gentleman is smearing Dr. 2485 Hansen. 2486 Mr. ISSA. Are you moving 2487 Chairman WAXMAN. I think you're smearing Dr. Hansen's 2488 reputation when you allege that he's an activist Democrat and 2489 got that award, the Heinz Award because he's a Democrat. 2490 Mr. ISSA. Mr. Chairman, are you making a motion? 2491 Chairman WAXMAN. I'm not making a motion, I'm making a 2492 comment.

2493 Mr. ISSA. Are you recognizing yourself? 2494 Chairman WAXMAN. Well, I will recognize you. 2495 you're smearing him. Do you want to comment on that? 2496 Mr. ISSA. Yes, Mr. Chairman. 2497 Chairman WAXMAN. I think you're being unfair to him. Mr. ISSA. Mr. Chairman, I hope that this gentleman's 2498 2499 political activism which is well defined is not, in fact, 2500 affecting his ability to recognize that this Congress, on a 2501 bipartisan basis, has funded a great deal of the research, 2502 with over 1,400 appearances in that year, and I have no doubt 2503 nearly the same for each of the previous years, that Dr. 2504 Hansen, in fact, in his effort to get more money for climate 2505 change, which I commend, would recognize that in every 2506 administration, he's going to have the same chafing and that 2507 it not be chafing more at the Bush administration, which he clearly dislikes. 2508 2509 You don't compare the Bush administration to Nazi 2510 Germany, and I'm sure the chairman would agree, that you do 2511 not compare anyone to Nazi Germany unless you have real 2512 problems beyond just disagreement on policy. 2513 Mr. HANSEN. Could I correct his statement and comment on them? First of all, I am not a Democrat, I'm a registered 2514 2515 Independent. Mr. ISSA. The chairman called you a Democrat, not me. 2516 2517 Mr. HANSEN. Secondly, the time when I said I was going

to vote for John Kerry, I actually said I would prefer to vote for John McCain but he's not on the ballot, and then I explained the reason that I would vote for John Kerry was because of my concern about climate change and the fact that it was not being addressed by the Bush administration. And I thought that Kerry would do a better job with that. It had nothing to do with politics. In fact, I have often said my favorite politician was John Heinz, who was a Republican and who gave equal weight to economic considerations and environmental considerations, and it was a great tragedy when he lost his life in a small plane crash.

The Nazi Germany thing was completely with regard to--had nothing to do with President Bush; it was the constraints on scientists, their ability to speak to the public and to the media. And when you tell scientists that they can't speak, they've got to hang up on the reporter and report this and allow the right of first refusal so someone else can speak for you, it doesn't ring true. It's not the American way. And it was not constitutional.

Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you, both of you. Let me take my time here.

Dr. Hansen, have you had any examples of people working in the public relations office within this administration that wanted to help you further as leading scientist in this global warming the field the opportunity to talk about the

2543 | issue?

Mr. HANSEN. Well, you know, there actually are lots of opportunities to speak to the public, and the hard thing is to keep enough time to do science.

Chairman WAXMAN. You didn't think Mr. Deutsch any time was trying to help you get your views out.

Mr. HANSEN. No, they didn't.

Chairman WAXMAN. Let me go on to other things in the time I have. Mr. Cooney, I guess what we're trying to figure is whether what drove the policy and is driving the policy of this administration on global warming and climate change is the science or whether it's something called the politically correct science. And as I look at the edits that you proposed, I think there were--

Mr. CANNON. Mr. Chairman, may I ask.

Chairman WAXMAN. The gentleman is out of order.

Mr. CANNON. Mr. Chairman, did you recognize yourself for additional 5 minutes before the rest of the panel has the chance to question for 5 minutes.

Chairman WAXMAN. No, I did not. I recognized Mr. Issa first for the second round.

Chairman WAXMAN. You proposed 181 edits to the strategic plan, 113 edits to the other global warming reports, there are 3 reports. I guess what I am trying to find out is whether all of your proposed edits moved in one

2568 direction, which was to increase uncertainty in global 2569 warming science. Would that be a fair statement or an unfair 2570 statement? 2571 Mr. COONEY. I think the fair statement would be that my comments were aligned with the findings of the National 2572 2573 Academy of Sciences in June 2001 as emphasized by the 2574 President in his policy book in chapter 3 on June 11th, 2001. 2575 Chairman WAXMAN. Mr. Cooney, you had a senior position 2576 at the White House, but there were officials at the White 2577 House who were more senior to you. Your immediate boss was James Connaughton, chairman of the White House Council on 2578 2579 Environmental Quality. Was Mr. Connaughton aware of role in 2580 proposed edits for climate change reports? 2581 Mr. COONEY. He knew that they were reviewing reports as 2582 they came in ordinarily from OMB for review. 2583 Chairman WAXMAN. Did he personally review your edits? 2584 Mr. COONEY. No, not most. 2585 Mr. ISSA. Mr. Chairman, his boss is behind him and 2586 available. 2587 Chairman WAXMAN. Excuse me, I have the time. I didn't 2588 interrupt you. I waited until you finished and then I 2589 interrupted you. 2590 Did you discuss the edits with him? 2591 Mr. COONEY. No, not ordinarily. 2592 Chairman WAXMAN. Did he give you any instructions about

how any of these three documents should be edited? 2594 Mr. COONEY. No. He understood that my objective was to align these communications with the administration's stated 2595 2596 policy. Chairman WAXMAN. And the administration's stated policy 2597 was different than what the scientists were saying in those 2598 2599 documents. Mr. COONEY. It wasn't even scientists who were saying 2600 2601 it in these documents. It could have been budget people from 2602 the agencies who were just drafting up reports, what they wanted to see in next year's budget. The material was not a 2603 2604 platform for the presentation of original scientific 2605 research. These were budgeting and --2606 Chairman WAXMAN. These were statements of science that 2607 you changed, recommended changes. 2608 Mr. COONEY. Well, they came from Mr. Pills himself, who 2609 was an editor who said he received summaries from agencies. 2610 Chairman WAXMAN. Sounds like yours. Mr. COONEY. It's not clear they derived to scientists 2611 2612 about what I reviewed. 2613 Chairman WAXMAN. Let me go on. Were other officials in 2614 the White House besides Mr. Connaughton and others on the CEQ 2615 staff with whom you discussed climate changes, in other 2616 words, were there other people in the White House, not just 2617 people at the CEQ?

2618 Mr. COONEY. Absolutely. 2619 Chairman WAXMAN. Who were the other people at the White 2620 House outside of CEQ that you discussed this with? 2621 Mr. COONEY. It really depends upon the issue, but the Office of Science and Technology Policy obviously led by Dr. 2622 2623 Marburger; Kathy Olsen was the Senate-confirmed director for 2624 science, and she had a leadership role. 2625 Chairman WAXMAN. How about Andrew Card? Did you ever 2626 have a conversation with Andrew Card about it? 2627 Mr. COONEY. I did not. 2628 Chairman WAXMAN. How about Karl Rove? 2629 Mr. COONEY. I did not. Chairman WAXMAN. Kevin O'Donovan? Do you know who he 2630 2631 is? 2632 Mr. COONEY. Yes. He was a staff person in the Office 2633 of the Vice President, and he and I would speak on occasion. He had the portfolio for energy and natural resource and 2634 environment issues, as I understood it. 2635 2636 Chairman WAXMAN. What did you talk to him about? 2637 Mr. COONEY. He was a colleague in the White House. 2638 was a colleague and we would talk occasionally as a lot of us 2639 would talk occasionally, pick up the phone, talk about 2640 different things. We were all going to a lot of the same 2641 meetings in some cases. Chairman WAXMAN. So you had numerous conversations with 2642

2643 him?

2644 Mr. COONEY. Sure. As I did with people in OSTP, OMB,

the Council of Economic Advisors. All of the White House offices, really. The domestic policy council.

Chairman WAXMAN. When you talked to Mr. O'Donovan, were they in the Vice President's office or your office?

Mr. COONEY. We usually spoke by phone, really. Our offices are on Lafayette Square in townhouses and his offices obviously in the Eisenhower executive office building.

Chairman WAXMAN. Did the Vice President's office, Mr. O'Donovan or anyone else give you any directions as to what they thought you ought to be doing?

Mr. COONEY. No, not directions. We would compare notes. We would consult as colleagues, but I didn't receive direction from them. It was really, if you look at how internal White House documents are approved, for example, the Office of the Vice President reviews it independently, CEQ, OMB, the Council of Economic Advisors, the Office of Science and Technology Policy, each office independently reviews communications, and so we had an independent role for review, they had an independent role.

Chairman WAXMAN. Did they ever suggest to you that there may be some value in highlighting the uncertainty of some of these global climate change issues?

Mr. COONEY. I don't recall specific conversations. We

would talk about matters that were pending. The development of the 10-year strategic plan obviously was occurring in the spring of 2003. They were a reviewing office. We would have had conversations. But I don't remember specifically what was said.

- 2673 Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you. Mr. Cannon.
- Mr. ISSA. Mr. Chairman, I would ask unanimous consent that Mr. Cannon have 10 minutes. It would sort of balance the time.
- 2677 Chairman WAXMAN. I don't know that it would balance the 2678 time. But let's do it. There are more Democrats here.
- 2679 Mr. ISSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
- 2680 Chairman WAXMAN. Unless anybody is going to ask for 10
  2681 minutes for someone else. Mr. Shays might say he's entitled
  2682 to more time.
- 2683 Mr. SHAYS. What is my member suggesting?
- Chairman WAXMAN. Mr. Souder might think he should have
  more time. I think they're complaining that I spoke too much
  without the timer on. Isn't that right?
- 2687 Mr. ISSA. Mr. Chairman--
- 2688 Chairman WAXMAN. When I reacted to what I thought was a 2689 bit of a smear.
- 2690 Mr. ISSA. I was just talking about your 5 minutes you 2691 spoke at random, really about 8.
- 2692 Chairman WAXMAN. I think I have been fair. I have let

some members run over and I think I've tried to be as fair as possible. I don't interrupt people while there's an answer being given.

Mr. ISSA. I appreciate that.

Chairman WAXMAN. The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes. Mr. Cannon.

Mr. CANNON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. By the way, I appreciate the fairness. This really has to be about getting information and understanding and not so much wrangling.

Dr. Hansen, in the process here, I'm learning to understand you, I think, a little better, and I actually think you're very straightforward. Mr. Cooney obviously thinks very highly of you and your science.

You indicated here you prefer Senator McCain for president, would have preferred him in 2001. You supported Kerry because of his positions, I believe you indicated, on the environment. But the guy you would really most like to support is Senator Heinz. Seems to me the most important thing in your political life is how people are dealing with this threat to the world that might derive--

Mr. HANSEN. That was one of the two factors. The other one that I pointed out is obviously in spades today and that is the need for campaign finance reform. Senator McCain has made efforts at that, and they haven't, as you know, been fully successful. I think we really need to solve that

2718 problem and then we'll have a lot easier time.

Mr. CANNON. That one might be more difficult to solve
than global warming. That said, you talked about the
government being evil or you talked about Nazi Germany, which
I take it you view as meaning that this what you later
described as constraints on scientists speaking, I take it
you view that constraint as evil.

Mr. HANSEN. Yes. You know, you have heard of our first amendment. This is the United States and we do have freedom of speech here.

Mr. CANNON. Of course, Mr. Issa has pointed out that you have a lot of opportunity to speak, the question is where the burden of your duty with the government should constrain and go through a process as opposed to what you do in the rest of your life.

Now, what I understand here is that your greatest concern here is you don't want constrained the ability of scientists to help bridge--I think you referred to bridging the gap of understanding by the public of how great the threat of climate change is.

Mr. HANSEN. Right.

Mr. CANNON. That's not equivocal on your part.

Mr. HANSEN. As I mentioned, I think the public is not yet fully informed about the dangers.

2742 Mr. CANNON. Any attempt to interfere with your ability

2743 to tell the public about that is evil and would be 2744 represented by a Nazi Germany-type approach. 2745 Mr. HANSEN. No. I was referring to the constraints on 2746 free speech. 2747 Mr. CANNON. That's right, but the free speech you're 2748 most concerned about, indicated by your politics and by your 2749 other statements, is about climate change. 2750 Mr. HANSEN. There's no politics. 2751 Mr. CANNON. You talked about Mr. McCain and Mr. Kerry 2752 and Mr. Heinz all being attractive. Let me finish my 2753 question because I want you to respond. You support those 2754 people largely because of their position on climate change, 2755 with the exception of Mr. McCain who you support also because of his views on funding of politics. Isn't it true that the 2756 most motivating factor here is the science of climate change? 2757 2758 Mr. HANSEN. No, no. I have the same rights as all 2759 Americans. 2760 Mr. CANNON. We're not talking about your rights, we're 2761 talking about what you're characterizing as evil. 2762 Mr. HANSEN. I was characterizing as evil the

2763 constraints on free speech. That's all.

> On all free speech or just on free speech Mr. CANNON. related to climate change and you?

Mr. HANSEN. Any free speech.

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2767 Mr. CANNON. In other words, what I want to know, you

view people on the other side of the climate change argument as evil?

- 2770 Mr. HANSEN. No, no I have never said that.
- 2771 Mr. CANNON. You did call those people Nazi Germany.
- 2772 Mr. HANSEN. You have taken out of context a statement 2773 about the constraints on free speech. It had nothing to do 2774 with personalities.
- 2775 Mr. CANNON. But it had everything to do with debate.
- 2776 Mr. HANSEN. Of any particular people.
- Mr. CANNON. It had everything to do with the debate on global warming and you've got people today characterizing Mr. Cooney a bad person because he was hired by API before he
- 2780 went to the CEQ.
- 2781 Mr. HANSEN. Did I characterize him?
- Mr. CANNON. No, you have people in this town doing that.
- 2784 Mr. HANSEN. Then you should ask them about that.
- Mr. CANNON. No, we're not bantying words here. The
  question is, are you mostly concerned about climate change
  and your ability to talk about that, and you characterize as
  people on the other side of the argument as evil because
- 2789 they're confusing the issue as you said earlier.
- 2790 Mr. HANSEN. I have never done that. I don't know where 2791 you get this.
- 2792 Mr. CANNON. I think I'm quoting you pretty much

2793 directly.

2794 Mr. HANSEN. I didn't characterize anybody as evil.

Mr. CANNON. I used the characterization of evil, you used the characterization of Nazi Germany, which most Americans view as equivalent to evil in our society.

Mr. HANSEN. I was referring to the constraints on free speech, not to a person.

Mr. CANNON. The constraints on free speech, not what?

Mr. HANSEN. I was referring to the constraints on free speech, not to a person.

Mr. CANNON. Except that you're blaming the constraints as coming from this administration by way of policy. In fairness, you characterized this as a developing issue over a series of administrations, not just this one, in your earlier statements. But you were characterizing this administration as being like Nazi Germany, and those reflected a view that what is going on is evil. Now you're trying to narrow that evil to the constraints on speech, not to your constraint on speech about climate change.

Mr. HANSEN. I was referring to constraints of free speech of government scientists, which is not confined; not confined to me. I referred specifically to some of my colleagues and in other agencies likes NOAA and EPA.

Mr. CANNON. How about other issues other than climate change?

Mr. HANSEN. I don't have--yeah, in fact, I have been 2818 told about National Institutes of Health scientists who have 2819 felt very constrained on their ability to speak freely. 2820 2821 think this is dangerous in our politics. 2822 Mr. CANNON. If the chairman would just indulge me. We 2823 pay--we tax people, we take money out of the pockets of 2824 Americans and we give it to scientists, and we ought to, at least, direct where that science goes. The difference 2825 2826 between directing where our science goes and what we search 2827 and free speech is not a simple thing and is subject to 2828 direction by policy. 2829 Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. Chairman WAXMAN. Mr. Yarmuth. 2830 Mr. YARMUTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Cooney, are 2831 2832 you familiar with a memo that you sent to Kevin O'Donovan of the vice president's office of April 23rd, 2003. I'll try to 2833 2834 remind you, the subject the Soon and Baliunas paper on global 2835 climate change. 2836 Mr. TUOHEY. Excuse me, Mr. Chairman. We've not seen 2837 the memo. We would like to see a copy of it before any 2838 answers are given. We were assured we would receive all 2839 documents before questions were advanced. Can we see it,

Chairman WAXMAN. Could you identify yourself.

Excuse me, Mr. Chairman. As the chairman--

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please?

Mr. BOLING.

2843 Mr. BOLING. Yes. I'm Edward Boling, deputy general 2844 counsel for the Council of Environmental Quality. I would simply notify the chairman that the document in question as 2845 2846 referenced in Chairman Connaughton's February 9th 2007 letter 2847 to this committee reciting executive privilege -- Executive 2848 Office of the President, excuse me, correct myself, 2849 sensitivities with regard to that document. It is an 2850 internal document from the council on environmental quality 2851 to the Office of the Vice President. 2852 Chairman WAXMAN. This is a document that was requested by this committee, isn't that correct? 2853 2854 Mr. BOLING. Yes, Your Honor. It is one--yes, Mr. 2855 Chairman. 2856 Chairman WAXMAN. You can call me Mr. Chairman. 2857 Mr. BOLING. It is one of--not my usual court of practice. It is one of the documents referenced in the 2858 2859 chairman's request of CEQ on February--2860 Chairman WAXMAN. So this document is being withheld 2861 based on executive privilege, is that what you're asserting? 2862 Mr. BOLING. Mr. Chairman, with all due respect, the document has not been provided to the committee. We have not 2863 2864 made any affirmative decision with regard to its withholding. 2865 However, it is subject of our ongoing efforts to accommodate 2866 this committee's needs, and it has been shown to committee 2867 staff as part of that accommodation and its status is part of

our ongoing discussions of its status and whether we would provide it to the committee as part of this rolling document production.

Chairman WAXMAN. I thank you for that clarification.

We don't have a document to show you, Mr. Cooney, but the gentleman is recognized to pursue whatever questions he wants to pursue.

Mr. YARMUTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will proceed to read excerpts of this. This, again, is a memo from you to Kevin O'Donovan of the Vice President's office: The recent paper of Soon-Baliunas contradicts a dogmatic view held by many in the climate science community that the past century was the warmest in the past millennium and signals of human-induced global warming.

Then you say: We plan to begin to refer to this study in administration communications on the science of global climate change. In fact, CEQ just inserted a reference to it in the final draft chapter on global climate contained in EPA's first state of the environment report.

Then you go on to say: It represents an opening to potentially invigorate debate on the actual climate history of the past 1,000 years.

The Soon-Baliunas paper is a public document, is that correct?

Mr. COONEY. Yes, Congressman.

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Mr. YARMUTH. It was funded by the API, is that correct?

Mr. COONEY. It was funded by NASA, NOAA, the Air Force,
and I understood 5 percent funded by the American Petroleum
Institute.

Mr. YARMUTH. So API was a partial funder of this report which you have inserted into--you said you have inserted into this report that we are discussing to invigorate the debate.

Let me continue to discuss the EPA's report on the environment and have you, if you will, turn to exhibit F. Would you say that your role--you have already said earlier that your role was to advance the administration's policies. That was your sole role.

But in terms of handling information and making the edits that you have made, how would you characterize--would you characterize that you were, and forgive me for using this term, trying to reflect a fair and balanced perspective on what the science on climate change is?

Mr. COONEY. I would say that's exactly what my objective was, to be fair and balanced.

Mr. YARMUTH. Thank you. This document, exhibit F, is the EPA's staff report to Christine Todd Whitman. On page 2 of this document it says: The text--these are after your recommended suggestions, edits--the text no longer accurately represents scientific consensus on climate change. A few examples are conclusions of the NRC are discarded, multiple

studies indicate recent warming is unusual, the thousand year temperature record is deleted, and emphasis is given to a recent limited analysis, I think there is a word missing, that supports the administration's message. Natural variability is used to mass scientific consensus that most of the increase is likely due to human activity.

Then it goes on to say: Numerous technical details incongruous with the rest of the report on the environment make the section confusing and seem more uncertain rather than presenting balanced conclusions about what scientists do and do not know.

Are you concerned at all that careers professionals at EPA thought that edits actually were so biased that incorporating them would make the report scientifically inaccurate?

Mr. COONEY. Congressman, the memorandum refers to comments not only provided by CEQ but provided also by the Office of Science and Technical Policy, the Office of Management and Budget, the Department of Energy, the Council of Economic Advisors. A lot of offices had concern with not only the way EPA was characterizing climate change in a 4-page summary, we were also concerned, I think, at the same time that the 10-year strategic plan was being developed and there had been a 1,300 person workshop in December of 2002 at which scientists from 40 countries came and commented on the

10-year strategic plan.

We thought that that was a fuller--Dr. Marburger has spoken to this publicly, and you would get his statement from OSTP, he's the director, but he thought, I think, and he has said in the aftermath that a fuller exposition of the science of climate change was in the 10-year strategic plan and in the end the state of the environment report referred people to the 10-year strategic plan, which was several hundred pages. It was a much more complete exposition of climate change than the 4-page summary that went back and forth between EPA and reviewing agencies.

Mr. YARMUTH. I'll concede that you were only partially culpable for these changes that EPA criticized, but my question was aren't you concerned that the EPA professional staff thought that this report as edited by you and others portrayed a scientifically inaccurate perspective on climate change.

Mr. COONEY. I would say a few things; I'll answer your question, of course, first. Yes, I am disappointed, and it is a concern to me. Secondly though, we had at the Council on Environmental Quality a detailee from EPA who was handling the coordination of this state of the environment report. His name was Allen Hecht. And he was coordinating comments from throughout the Federal Government and within the CEQ and other White House offices, and he was really the interface

between our office and a lot of the commenting offices and the Agency itself.

So we had an EPA detailee in our offices at the White House coordinating the development of this report. And I would just say that that the development of this report was not really smooth. There were very many--a number of iterations and a lot--I think a lot of people felt that EPA was not sufficiently responsive in the commenting, interagency commenting process to the comments that it was receiving, and it was not just our office, as you made clear.

Mr. YARMUTH. Well, I think, in concluding my time, the important point to make is we're dealing with a process here and whether or not the process used by this administration resulted in information that was useful to the public and was honest and accurate and fair and balanced, and in this particular case, the process resulted in a document which the administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency said was not useful and therefore deleted it, therefore the process apparently, at least my conclusion, the process was fatally flawed in that it ended up producing something that was not useful.

Chairman WAXMAN. The gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. Souder.

Mr. SOUDER. I thank the chairman. Once again, I want to point out that the only Republican witness is isolated and

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sentenced to the third panel of the wilderness, who actually controlled similar questions of whether you can speak out when your policies disagree with administration with the people who are elected, not unelected, and showed that there are differences within this agency is isolated to the third panel. He disagrees on science, he disagrees and would point out this isn't unique to this administration, but apparently in a hearing where we're debating whether one side has been silenced, it's okay to haul out two Republican witnesses to hound and one who has said he supports Kerry and Gore, did support apparently a dead Republican, and one who he might have voted for if he had actually been on the ballot, but in fact, praised Al Gore, praised John Kerry for whatever reasons. That's okay. We can discriminate, but on a hearing where there's discrimination.

I would like to point out on this Nazi comparison that Dr. Hansen said that part of this, quote, is staffed by political appointees from the Bush administration; they tried to stop me from doing so. I was not happy with that and I ignored the restrictions.

How do you think Nazi Germany would have reacted to that? Would you admit that that statement was an overreaction at a time of emotion?

Mr. HANSEN. Well, I thought --

Mr. SOUDER. Nazi Germany did not allow--

Mr. HANSEN. After making the statement, I did regret the Nazi Germany, so in my revision of that document, which was published, I changed it to the old Soviet Union because of the connotations that come with it.

Mr. SOUDER. Do you think Stalin would have let you ignore those restrictions and not go to a concentration camp?

This is ridiculous that you are working--could we put up the video of the picture of him speaking.

Part of our concern here is that the challenge here when you have an elected administration where whether you like it or not, there is a still a scientific debate, whether that scientific debate is sometimes funded by organizations that have concerns about one side is another matter.

Could you read what it says under your name there on the television? Can you see that?

Mr. HANSEN. Yeah, it has the organization that I work for, NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies. I can't read the last word.

Mr. SOUDER. Basically, in your introductions, and when you travel you're always a public citizen, just like we are. I must say, and I want to say this for the record, I have some concerns with the lack of clearance of this administration for documents to an oversight committee, and I'm upset that a question was asked without that document, but I believe the administration should be more forthcoming.

I also believe we need to give more flexibility for people to speak. But I also believe there are times when any elected administration has a right to choose and to say there are policy differences, and they don't have to uniformly allow everyone to speak in every case.

Now if there's a pattern of misrepresentation and it was always silence and you didn't have 1,500 chances to do so, it would have been a different challenge, or if, in fact, you'd have followed orders, or in fact, you'd gone to a concentration camp or silenced to Siberia, which you're not.

C-SPAN and other are agencies are not exactly like Siberia, they are not like a concentration camp. This isn't Nazi

Germany, it's not the Soviet Union. That I do think there are debates and there needs to be some caution with that, but I think your overstatements are there.

Furthermore, we have this challenge of Rick Piltz who's not a scientist who testified in front of this committee and he admits his group is an advocacy group addressing the challenge of global climate change, meaning their ideological. It's very hard to separate this issue from people who have a vested interest in one side or another. And while it's clear global warming is occurring, I mean Indiana used to be covered with glaciers, and it's clear it's probably growing at an accelerating rate and humans are challenging and adding to that, I don't think anybody is

disputing those, but the particular policy conclusions on how it's done have incredible political overtones. What are we going to do, just shift to China?

How we do it and how precise that science is does have political consequences, and therefore the elected officials do have some rights with which to show some of that debate.

Do you want to respond, Dr. Hansen?

Mr. HANSEN. Sure. I have no problem with that. I do not specify policy or attempt to do that. I do try to make clear the science that's relevant to policy. What our administrator has said is that—and it's impossible in this topic to discuss the topic without having some relevance to policy, but I simply make clear that if it does touch on policy as my personal opinion, I'm not representing the government in that case.

Mr. SOUDER. How would you separate that?

Mr. HANSEN. Pardon?

Mr. SOUDER. How can you possibly separate your personal views on a subject where your professional responsibility is this very subject?

Mr. HANSEN. No, I make clear that--some of the implications of global warming, it has implications for policy. And, for example, one of the things that people need to understand is that about a quarter of the carbon dioxide that we put in the air is going to stay there forever. I

mean more than 500 years.

And what that means is we cannot burn all of the fossil fuels without producing a radically different planet, which none of us would like to see, I think, without ice in the Arctic and with much higher sea levels and things.

These things relate to policy because you're going to have to do something about it, and there are different things you can do, you can capture the CO2 and sequester it. There are different ways to treat this. That's up to the public and policy makers to decide that, but I need to make clear to them that there are such constraints and they're going to have to start to think about that real soon.

Chairman WAXMAN. The gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. SOUDER. Thank the chairman for your indulgence.

Chairman WAXMAN. Mr. Welch.

Mr. WELCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Cooney, I would like to ask you about some evidence that the White House edited an op ed piece written by then EPA administrator Christine Todd Whitman to ensure that it followed the White House line on climate change.

In July 2002, there was an ongoing debate about the Kyoto protocols, as you remember. EPA Administrator Whitman wrote a piece for Time Magazine about the Bush administration's record on global warming, defending it more or less.

My understanding is that the CEQ did play an active role in reviewing and editing administrator Whitman's op ed. For example, on July 15th, 2002 Sam Thurstrom of the White House Council on Environmental Quality distributed a revised version of the administrator's piece that contained several significant edits. I will direct you to exhibit L.

According to that document Tom Gibson an associate administrator at EPA wrote to Mr. Thurstrom, this is in response to the proposed language to be used by Secretary Whitman: I can't use the 5 million out of work figure for Kyoto. It is based on the EIA report that assumed that no trading would be allowed to implement the Kyoto protocol. It also is the high end of numbers that were expressed as a range.

So it's pretty clear that in effect, the high level EPA administrator was telling CEQ there was simply no basis to assert that 5 million American jobs would be lost. Of course that was the heart of the administration pushback on Kyoto. This figure is taken directly--Mr. Thurstrom responded that that figure, the 5 million was taken directly from the President's 2/14 speech and Jim Connaughton's Senate testimony last week.

Using merely an abstract dollar figure may not be as compelling. My understanding, Mr. Cooney, is you were copied on the e-mail, and when you saw the e-mail, did you tell Mr.

Thurstrom that Administrator Whitman's piece should be not required to include an assertion that her own staff regarded as baseless, namely this 5 million job loss figure?

Mr. COONEY. Congressman, I don't recall whether I said anything to Mr. Thurstrom or not. I do recall seeing e-mails over the weekend where Mr. Gibson responded to Mr. Thurstrom and I think was persuaded by what he had written, and I can't remember his exact words but they continue in their e-mail exchange.

Mr. WELCH. Take a look at exhibit M. In that e-mail Mr. Gibson from EPA says that administrator Whitman had made her own edits and struck the reference to the 5 million lost jobs. And if you turn to exhibit N, this e-mail sent 4 and 1/2 later by Mr. Thurstrom, he put the 5 million lost jobs figure back in the draft.

Now what they offered as evidence or support for this was A, the President said it. I assume you don't believe that if the President says something that is not true, that makes it true because he's President.

Mr. COONEY. I don't believe that.

Mr. WELCH. It appears that your staff kept insisting on the inclusion of an erroneous statement about the economic consequences over the strenuous objection of the EPA.

Mr. COONEY. Strenuous is your words. E-mails tell half a story often. People pick up the phone and call each other.

They go back and forth, pick up the phone, they'll solve 3168 3169 things. I don't recall how this was solved. 3170 remember it being directly involved in how it was solved. Mr. WELCH. I would agree e-mails tell half the story. 3171 What I think tells the rest of the story here, its very clear 3172 3173 there was no solid basis for this 5 million job figure. 3174 Mr. COONEY. It was from the energy information 3175 administration 1998 study on the impacts of the Kyoto 3176 protocol on the United States. 3177 Mr. WELCH. Then you had more current information by 3178 your own staff that raised substantial questions about the 3179 legitimacy of that figure. 3180 Mr. COONEY. Mr. Gibson questioned the figure, but the figure comes from the independent statistical agency of the 3181 3182 Department of Energy, the energy information administration. It is independent, it's not politically driven, and it came 3183 out with a study in 1998 documenting --3184 3185 Mr. WELCH. Did that study assume that there would be 3186 trade as was the case under the Kyoto protocols, yes or no. 3187 Mr. COONEY. I don't recall. Mr. Gibson says that it 3188 did not assume trading, but I don't recall. I just don't have the depth in the study to recall. 3189 3190 Mr. WELCH. In failing to assume trading, which was inherent in the Kyoto protocol, was it not without any 3191 foundation for the conclusion it was pushing? 3192

Mr. COONEY. I understand Mr. Gibson's comment essentially as you're saying, is that the Kyoto protocol had in a written form flexibility mechanisms that might bring down the costs of complying with Kyoto. There is a record now about those flexibility mechanisms, and many of them have not proved efficient at bringing down costs.

Mr. WELCH. Here's where it is frustrating on this side of the table, and it gets back to what my colleague had spoken about before. The American people are entitled to the benefit of the clearest science available, correct?

Mr. COONEY. And economics, from the energy information administration, which is independent.

Chairman WAXMAN. The gentleman's time has expired. Do you want to conclude? Go ahead and conclude.

Mr. WELCH. Well, the conclusion here, Mr. Chairman, is that the science that we were getting was pretty good until it was altered by folks in the press operation that were changing it for political considerations.

Mr. COONEY. The editorial was really about climate change policy, in its whole sense, the President's commitment to reduce greenhouse gas emissions intensity by 18 percent. The predominant, if you look at the Time Magazine op ed by Administrator Whitman, it was not really focused on science so much as it was on mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions.

Chairman WAXMAN. Mr. Shays.

Mr. SEAYS. Thank you. Dr. Hansen, I think that we won't have a world to live in if we continue our neglectful ways, and so I don't disagree one bit with what you believe and how you're expressing it, I just want to state that. Frankly, I don't even know if I would have called you to come before this hearing, but you're here and so I'm going to deal with what you say because I find it puzzling and I find your answers candidly inconsistent. It's not "I got you," I'm just trying to understand.

When Mr. Issa asked you a question you didn't want to say the imagery to Hitler's Germany was inappropriate, with Mr. Souder you did, and now you're saying it's only the Soviet Union.

We have a young man who made a mistake and he said you know, I made a mistake and let me get on with my life. What puzzles me is that you don't even want to admit a mistake when you make them, and you seem to stand up waving the constitution as if somehow you have no restraints at all.

I'm an American, I can say anything I want.

I'd like to just ask you about that. The old media policy rules were drafted in 1987. Under section 1213-103A instructs that all headquarters news releases be issued by the Office of Public Affairs media service division, section 1213 also requires that press releases originating with field installations that is have national significance be

3243 coordinated with the associate administrator for public 3244 affairs. That was done in 1987. 3245 Are you saying that that's a policy that shouldn't have existed in 1987, shouldn't have existed in 1992, shouldn't 3246 3247 exist in 1998, shouldn't exist in 2002; shouldn't exist? 3248 Mr. HANSEN. I haven't said anything about public affairs press releases. They are handling the public affairs 3249 3250 press releases. 3251 Mr. SHAYS. Would you agree that makes sense, that you 3252 have that? 3253 Mr. HANSEN. Sure. 3254 Mr. SHAYS. That means your right to speak out is 3255 restrained?

3256	RPTS BINGHAM
3257	DCMN BURRELL
3258	Mr. SHAYS. It does. You can't speak out any time you
3259	want. Would you at least acknowledge that.
3260	Mr. HANSEN. Sure. But do you think that these
3261	Mr. SHAYS. Hold on. There are certain times when you
3262	can speak out and there are other times you can't speak out,
3263	correct?
3264	Mr. HANSEN. Probably that is true.
3265	Mr. SHAYS. Not probably. It is true. How many people
3266	do you have working at your institute?
3267	Mr. HANSEN. What do you mean?
3268	Mr. SHAYS. How many people do you have working at your
3269	institute?
3270	Mr. HANSEN. Approximately 120.
3271	Mr. SHAYS. And you are the Director.
3272	Mr. HANSEN. Yes.
3273	Mr. SHAYS. Do you sometimes edit what they do? Do you
3274	sometimes question what they say? Do you?
3275	Mr. HANSEN. Sure that is a scientist's job
3276	Mr. SHAYS. That is a scientist's job.
3277	Mr. HANSEN. That is the scientific way, but not
3278	Mr. SHAYS. Does your staff have the right any time they
3279	want to just say whatever they want about things related to
3280	their work? You know, I just want to say something.

3281 Mr. HANSEN. Within the--3282 Mr. SHAYS. Before you answer, I want to say to you that 3283 this is not a game. You are under oath. I want an honest 3284 answer. 3285 Mr. HANSEN. I have been giving you honest answers, and 3286 within constraints of what is reasonable, people--I don't try 3287 to change what somebody is saying. 3288 Mr. SHAYS. I didn't ask that question. Do they have 3289 the right to say anything they want any time they want about 3290 issues relating to the institute? 3291 Mr. HANSEN. I have never constrained anyone in that--3292 Mr. SHAYS. Do they have the right to? So any employee 3293 from this point on can speak out, and if anyone comes to me, 3294 let me say this to you because you are saying this under 3295 oath -- if any of your employees say to you they wanted to say something but you said you shouldn't do it or you can't do 3296 3297 it, you are under oath saying you have never restrained 3298 anything from saying that? 3299 Mr. HANSEN. I have never restrained anybody. 3300 Mr. SHAYS. Let me ask you this. If somebody wanted to 3301 issue a release saying that global warming is getting worse 3302 and worse and they work for you, could they say that is so? 3303 The answer is yes or no. 3304 Mr. HANSEN. Scientists, sure. They can say anything

3305

they can support.

3306 Mr. SHAMS. If someone said that based on my scientific 3307 work at this institute, I believe that global warming is not getting worse an issue, speak to someone at their desk at 3308 3309 your office, they are allowed to do that? Mr. HANSEN. Sure, absolutely. 3310 Mr. SHAYS. Okay. So, you have no policy whatsoever? 3311 3312 Mr. HANSEN. No constraints on scientific statements. 3313 Mr. SHAYS. Do you think it is logical for a department 3314 before you issue a release, to have to submit a release -- so 3315 let's go back to the first point we had. 3316 You said, in other words, the rules. There are rules. 3317 There are rules that you seem to agree with drafted in 1987. Mr. HANSEN. Yes, but those rules don't include, for 3318 example, that they should go to the White House for editing. 3319 3320 Chairman WAXMAN. Gentleman's time has expired. Do you 3321 want to conclude, Mr. Shays? 3322 Mr. SHAYS. I would like more time. 3323 Chairman WAXMAN. Wouldn't we all? 3324 Mr. SHAYS. Pardon me? In other words, we can't develop 3325 the idea, so it is pointless to go on. 3326 Chairman WAXMAN. Well, that concludes the questioning 3327 of this first panel and we thank you very much for being here. And we look forward to further conversations on these 3328 issues. 3329 3330 I would like to now call forward Mr. James Connaughton,

Chairman of the White House Council on Environmental Quality. 3331 3332 I want to welcome you to our hearing. Is it Connaughton 3333 or Connaughton? 3334 Mr. CONNAUGHTON. It is Connaughton. I appreciate that, 3335 Mr. Chairman. It is the Irish. 3336 Chairman WAXMAN. Okay. We welcome you to our hearing 3337 today. Your prepared statement will be in the record in its 3338 entirety. We would like to ask you if you would to try to 3339 limit your oral presentation to around 5 minutes. We will 3340 have some leniency on that. It is the policy of this 3341 committee to swear in all witnesses, so I would like to ask 3342 you to rise and hold up your right hand. 3343 [Witness sworn.] 3344 Chairman WAXMAN. The record will indicate that the 3345 witness answered in the affirmative. 3346 Mr. Connaughton--Connaughton--3347 Mr. CONNAUGHTON. Connaughton. 3348 Chairman WAXMAN. Forgive me. You can call me Waxman. 3349 Please go ahead with your oral presentation.

STATEMENT OF JAMES L. CONNAUGHTON, CHAIRMAN, WHITE HOUSE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY

Mr. CONNAUGHTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Members of the committee. It is a pleasure to be back before you yet again after many appearances. I would notice that Jack Marburger, the President's Science Adviser, was also interested in being part of this discussion as he is the senior scientist overseeing Federal Government policy, and I am sure he would look forward to working with the committee as we go forward, as you continue this inquiry.

Over the last 6 years this administration has relied on the advice of scientists from 13 government agencies, from the National Academies of Science and, in developing our 10-year strategic plan that you heard about today, from scientists from 36 countries. Now all of this is in an effort to guide Federal climate change science, technology research and policy making.

As you heard earlier, of particular importance to this hearing is in fact the 2001 National Academy of Sciences report on climate science commissioned by President Bush. That report sets the foundation for what we knew about the climate science at that time and what we still needed to know.

The questions before this committee are not new, including those involving CEQ's role in reviewing documents. With respect to the 2003 climate change science program's 10-year strategic plan, which I am showing you here is about 200 pages long, Dr. James Mahoney, who is a PhD scientist and the top official overseeing that program, informed the Congress several times years ago that he was responsible ultimately for the final content of this report.

To the best of Dr. Mahoney's knowledge quote, no errors were contained in the two reports, end quote. Dr. Mahoney further affirmed that edits proposed--affirmed that, quote, edits proposed by CEQ did not misstate any specific scientific fact, end quote. Following that, the National Academies of Sciences wrote the plan, quote, articulates a guiding vision, is appropriately ambitious and is broad in its scope.

Now with respect to the 2003 climate budget summary, also discussed today, and that's called Our Changing Planet--that is about 120 pages--most of the edits recommended by CEQ were actually accepted or changed somewhat by the science program officials responsible for the document. Only three were not, and CEQ would have no objection to the fact that they weren't included. Now as to the early two-page drafts on climate in the 2003 draft report on the environment, this one is more than 600 pages long. I

don't have the technical appendices here. The relative few agency comments of interest to some on this committee were actually of no import because the EPA Administrator decided to replace the passage with a reference directing the public to the two much more substantial reports above that came out at the same time. That is these two reports. These are huge, hundreds of pages with the entire scientific community in consensus on the content of these reports.

Now in any event, in my detailed--in my written testimony when you look at the actual comments being proposed by the various offices not just CEQ's, most of them either echoed nearly verbatim, were appropriately reflective of the substance of the 2001 National Academies of Science report on climate science.

Now this is a fact that even a cursory direct comparison or even a Google search revealed, and I did it. I Googled one of the edits just to see what turned up an expression. The edit recommended showed up in numerous science documents, including the National Academy of Sciences.

Finally, the committee's focus on my former Chief of Staff, Mr. Philip Cooney, who you saw here today is misguided. And actually I find it a little bit ironic. It was Mr. Cooney who is responsible for inviting Dr. James Hansen to the White House in 2003 to brief me and other senior officials on advances in climate change science. It

was a remarkable and important presentation. It was Mr. Cooney who is the driving force behind working to ensure that Federal Government documents and our budgets were actually responsive to the priority research areas that Dr. Hansen himself identified along with his colleagues at the National Academy of Sciences.

Now, it is also Mr. Cooney who, precisely because he is an expert in the energy sector, who zeroed in on Dr. Hansen's very useful policy recommendation about the substantial climate change benefits of aggressively attacking methane emissions and black soot now, something we can do now. And therefore it was Mr. Cooney who became the driving force in creating this international methane-to-market partnership, a 19-nation effort that is going to remove more than 180 million metric tons of CO2 equivalent emissions from the atmosphere by 2015. Now this is going to come from oil and gas operations, something Mr. Cooney knows something about, and mining, something he also knows something about, landfills and agriculture.

And then it was Mr. Cooney in terms of proactive climate policy to actually make a difference who helped established the Climate Vision Partnership and who for the first time secured industry emission reduction commitments from 14 major energy intensive industrial sectors, including the Business Round Table.

I just have to say, I live in two worlds, the world of reality and the experience on my job and what I have been hearing a little bit here today. Mr. Cooney is among the most proactive supporters of both the science enterprise and advancing it, but more importantly he was one of the most proactive creators of sensible policies built on the science that are actually going to help us cut our emissions.

The totality of this administration's record is one of unparalleled funding, openness and inclusiveness in confronting the serious challenge of global climate change.

I think the sum of this is I fear that we are sort of losing the forest for the twigs in this discussion. The forest is this massive science enterprise. The forest is the massive technology investments in which the United States is leading the way in attacking global emissions, not just here but abroad. And I hope as the committee continues its inquiry we can begin to lay that information out on the table.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Prepared statement of Mr. Connaughton follows:]

\*\*\*\*\*\* INSERT 4-1 \*\*\*\*\*\*

Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Connaughton. Let me go right to this memo. It was a memo written from Mr. Cooney to Kevin O'Donovan in the Vice President's office. We don't have a copy of that memo because it is being withheld from the committee. But we did have a chance to review that memo. And it obviously stirred some concern when we had Mr. Yarmuth, and Mr. Yarmuth pursued a question about it. The memo refers to a paper by Soon Baliunas that was funded in part by the American Petroleum Institute. The paper purports to show that the past century was not the warmest in the last 1,000 years.

My understanding is that the conclusions of the paper had been heavily criticized by the scientific community. The memo to the Vice President's office says, I quote, we plan to begin to refer to this study in administration communications on the science of global climate change. In fact, CEQ just inserted a reference to it in the final draft chapter on global climate change contained in EPA's first state of the environment report.

That is the memo to the Vice President's office from Mr. Cooney. The memo also states that the paper, and I quote, represents an opening to potentially reinvigorate debate on the actual climate history of the past 1,000 years, end quote.

My concern is that the documents suggest that there was

a concerted White House effort to inject uncertainty into the climate change debate. This communication between Mr. Cooney and the Vice President's office seems to reflect exactly this kind of effort.

Did CEQ communicate with the Vice President's office about how to inject the Soon Baliunas report into the Federal climate change reports?

Mr. CONNAUGHTON. Mr. Chairman, I leave aside for the moment the issues related to potential executive privilege which we are still working on with the committee. I will limit my remarks to commentary on the Soon--

Chairman WAXMAN. Why don't you limit your remarks to my question? Did the CEQ communicate with the Vice President's office about how to inject this report into the climate changes reports?

Mr. CONNAUGHTON. It is my understanding that CEQ did suggest that the report should be referenced in the new draft environment, state of the environment report, because in fact it was a new and major piece of science. At the same time Dr. Hansen was also introducing some of his new research that was also high interest.

At the same time we were looking at issues related to the difference between surface temperatures and ground level temperatures. So at that time there was a lot of very interesting development to the science and the Soon Baliunas

report was very important as well. I found it fascinating. 3519 3520 I am not a scientist, so I can't find a conclusive. But I 3521 liken the debate over that report -- Mr. Chairman, I just want 3522 to give an example--3523 Chairman WAXMAN. No. Excuse me, Mr. Connaughton. 3524 only have a little time. So you thought it was really 3525 interesting and worthwhile bringing it in, that was your 3526 thought as well as Mr. Cooney's, is that right? 3527 Mr. CONNAUGHTON. I am not speaking to the 3528 recommendation it be included. I was made aware of this 3529 report and I found it very interesting. I actually did not 3530 have a role at that time in anything having to do with the 3531 edits on the documents. 3532 Chairman WAXMAN. And you did later? 3533 Mr. CONNAUGHTON. I did later, yes. 3534 Chairman WAXMAN. And tell us what you did later. were the circumstances? 3535 3536 Mr. CONNAUGHTON. When the process was not leading to a reconciliation of the comments by the various offices in the 3537 White House and from other agencies, I did get on the 3538 3539 phone--actually Governor Whitman called me, EPA Administrator 3540 Whitman called me. We were talking about a range of things 3541 but this is one of the issues that we talked about on how to reconcile the comments. 3542 3543 Chairman WAXMAN. Okay, now this memo that was sent to

the Vice President's office said this will reinvigorage debate about whether the planet is warming. This sounds to me like a play directly out of the Petroleum Institute playbook. Do you have a comment on that?

Mr. CONNAUGHTON. Actually, sir, it strikes me as a statement of fact. When that report did come out, it actually did receive, as you indicated, a lot of interest by the scientific community as to the essentials of the solar based research that was being conducted and particularly by Dr. Baliunas, who is actually an internationally renowned solar scientist.

Chairman WAXMAN. But that report has since then been strongly criticized by the scientific community and its conclusions have been rejected.

Mr. CONNAUGHTON. That--actually I do not understand that is correct. What I do understand--

Chairman WAXMAN. So is it the position of you and CEQ that that is a fairer statement of what we know about climate change than what Dr. Hansen and others were suggesting?

Mr. CONNAUGHTON. No, it is not my position. What I was going to indicate, Mr. Chairman, the debate that surrounded that report is very similar to the active one undergoing right now about the relative contribution of global warming to hurricane and storm intensity and frequency, very active points of scientific debate.

3569 Chairman WAXMAN. Excuse me--3570 Mr. CONNAUGHTON. And that is part of the variety of 3571 viewpoints which we must be incorporating into our process. 3572 Chairman WAXMAN. This memo suggests as well it was 3573 active coordination between CEQ and the Vice President's office about how to inject debate and uncertainty into 3574 3575 discussions of climate change science. Will you provide this 3576 memorandum to our committee? 3577 Mr. CONNAUGHTON. I think that is something for our 3578 lawyers to work out, Mr. Chairman. 3579 Chairman WAXMAN. And unless the White House asserts 3580 executive privilege it should be provided to our committee. 3581 Mr. CONNAUGHTON. Again that is something I would defer to the counsel for the committee and the Council and the 3582 3583 White House. 3584 Chairman WAXMAN. I am requesting--3585 Mr. CONNAUGHTON. I am not in a position to make 3586 that -- to take that position personally. 3587 Chairman WAXMAN. I am requesting that CEQ turn over that memo and also to provide other communications between 3588 3589 CEQ and the Vice President's office. 3590 Were there other communications? 3591 Mr. CONNAUGHTON. I am not aware of other written 3592 communications of this type. They could exist. I do not 3593 know.

Chairman WAXMAN. And we would like to see the e-mail communications as well.

Mr. Issa.

Mr. ISSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Connaughton, I am going to ask a question, and it is probably unfair, but it is just an impression and I want to get it on the record somehow. A number of years ago before I was in Congress, there was a flack under then President Clinton about Speaker Gingrich being forced to go out of the back of Air Force One, and Speaker Gingrich seemed to have a real problem with that.

Dr. Hansen is still here. I am not trying to do this behind his back. But isn't to a certain extent somebody who appears 1,400 times in clips, who is regularly sort of the toast of the town as the Speaker, who is asked to consult to almost anything, including Vice President Gore's movie, isn't the complaint that you are being muzzled a little bit like Newt Gingrich complaining about going out of the back of Air Force One, a plane most of us will never see much less be on?

Mr. CONNAUGHTON. I want to start, as I indicated, having the highest personal regard and professional regard for Dr. Hansen and his work. My son and I were just watching him on TV last night on the History Channel. Congressmen, senior administration officials, highly accomplished senior scientists, we all chafe at having to talk to our public affairs people. But the public affairs people are there for

a reason. They are there to organize and be sure that what we are saying is official government policy, is understood, and that the people who might have to then respond to those statements can effectively do so.

This is a process that has been with us for a long, long time, and it works well. Now we all chafe from it. I can understand Dr. Hansen especially chafing if it comes from someone relatively young and inexperienced, but the policy of public affairs is a very important one.

Now I would note that I am not aware of any instance where any scientists in pursuing their science, of any scientist seeking peer review of their science, is in any way controlled, handled or otherwise managed in their scientific work. I mean from what I see all over the world and what people, scientists come and speak their mind, to me they come and speak their mind to you. What we are talking about is a science-policy interface and that has significant implication that requires some level of management.

Mr. ISSA. And if I could follow up on that, in the previous panel I think there was a lot of discussion about certainty versus uncertainty. And certainly, your Chief of Staff was drawn and quartered pretty well for the statement that he was--or a statement claiming that he was creating uncertainty.

Is there any uncertainty about man's influence on the

environment at this point from the body of science that you have been part of putting together? In other words, not the the nuances but isn't it—and I will lead you for a second. Isn't it true that this administration has made it very clear that pollutants, whether we call it that or not, including CO2, reflect a clear danger to our environment?

Mr. CONNAUGHTON. Well, I will put it in the President's words. The Earth is warming. Humans are part of the problem. We need to get on with the solutions, and I need to stick to layman's terms. I am not a scientist. And that was clearly reflected in the National Academy of Sciences report.

Mr. ISSA. So since it is settled science, at least settled presidential policy as stated by the President, that we are--we do have this problem and we need to be part of the solution, but this question of settled science--and I am just going to ask you one question--isn't it true that it was only this last year that the 2001 understanding of the rise in our oceans has been revised downward, less dramatic than it was thought to be? Isn't there always new information coming in that affects one side or the other of speed and so on?

Mr. CONNAUGHTON. Well, actually I think Dr. Hansen was trying to get to this level of complexity in the answer as well. The top line, there is a lot of agreement around warming and around the fact that humans play a role. A lot of agreement. But as you then delve down into the science,

in the National Academy of Sciences report, including the edits recommended by CEQ and others, as well as subsequent documents, the most recent being the IPCC report, which is the international report updating the science, there is a wide range of uncertainties to which we are dedicating nearly 2 billion a year to attempting to resolve. So there is still a lot of science to be done.

As I indicated in my written testimony, if all the science were settled we wouldn't be spending \$2 billion of taxpayer resources every year on it. This is very important work. One reason for one of the comments is to make sure we are emphasizing the need to go after some of this research because that is what the National Academy of Science has told us we should do.

Mr. ISSA. So I guess I will just finish with one sort of series of questions, there are thousands of scientists that work for the Federal Government at all levels and hundreds, if not thousands of them worked on the Shuttle program over the years. What would have happened if Dr. Hansen's policy that every scientist gets to say anything to the camera any time they want, as long as it is supported by, quote, their science, that you know what they do, that they should be able to have an interview any time, anywhere, what would have happened each time a Shuttle went down? Can you just give us a little conjecture that, a thousand scientists

working at the various launch facilities, what would have happened if all of them had responded without checking with public affairs just done their on camera interviews those days?

Mr. CONNAUGHTON. You would see the kind of chaos and confusion that this entire discussion is about trying to avoid. So chaos and confusion--in public affairs.

Mr. ISSA. In closing, isn't it clear that when you have dozens or hundreds or thousands of scientists as much as we want to make sure scientists can argue with each other and have that freedom of expression, that first amendment, so to speak, right that there has to be some reasonable limitation and has been for decades on how many different scientists can talk at a given time and what they can talk about?

Mr. CONNAUGHTON. Clearly scientists are free to pursue their research. They are free to publish and talk about their research. Taxpayer funds that all over the world, that is great. It is when we get into expressions of government policy or the science policy interface where you need some level of management. Otherwise you can fall prey to lots of misinterpretation and misunderstanding about what represents official government policy.

Mr. ISSA. I hope all our scientists all get a ride on Air Force One. Thank you, I yield back.

Mr. YARMUTH. [presiding.] Mr. Connaughton, I want to

ask about the EPA's draft report on the environment. We talked about it already today. EPA professional staff was deeply concerned about the way the White House handled this report. And if I may, I would like to refer you to Exhibit F, which is a memo about the draft report on the environment from the staff of EPA to Administrator Whitman of the EPA. It says that as a result of Mr. Cooney's edits the text, quote, no longer accurately reflects scientific consensus on climate change. And I read a number of other statements and there are examples of what they meant. The EPA memo say that the White House told the EPA that no further changes may be made.

Did you make the decision that no further changes were to be made?

Mr. CONNAUGHTON. No, I did not. And I would observe, Congressman, that the--I only saw this document for the first time over the weekend. It was not something I saw in my conversation years ago with Governor Whitman. But I would observe a number of the items being complained of were verbatim language from the National Academy of Sciences report. That told me something else is going on. There is a pride of authorship going on between EPA and the other agencies. At the time, by the way, it seemed to me that to the extent there were editorial differences they should be reconciled. They weren't being reconciled. That suggested

some back and forth. That is really what Governor Whitman and I ended up talking about, and the solution she came up with I thought was perfection.

Mr. YARMUTH. Is it not true that someone advised Administrator Whitman that no further changes were to be made?

Mr. CONNAUGHTON. The document I saw--again I only saw it for the first time over the weekend--was the handwritten note that says these changes must be made.

Mr. YARMUTH. These changes must be made.

Mr. CONNAUGHTON. But I would note the context of that, Congressman, was important. What was happening is we have a process where agencies provide their input to these documents, and there is a reconciliation process. It doesn't mean all the comments have to be accepted. You just have to have a process where you say I accept it or I reject it and here is why. That wasn't happening on this particular set of issues. Remember, this document was 600 pages long. I showed you just a fraction of it. We are talking about a small number of edits to a two-page passage in an otherwise massive document. We are just down to the end on this.

So really what was going on--and I thought it was reasonable at the time--was the notion that we needed some reconciliation. It was an issue of whether the comments were in or out. As it happened, by the way, none of the comments

being raised to the committee--none of the comments could have possibly confused the public because they didn't make it into the report.

Mr. YARMUTH. That is because EPA found the report to be so inaccurate that it said that if they released it, it would cause great confusion in the public, isn't that correct? At least that is what that memo says.

Mr. CONNAUGHTON. I saw the memo. My personal reflection is it seemed to be a little bit melodramatic. We have a process for reconciling these kind of returns. That wasn't happening, which is why it got elevated. Most of what you are talking about today never got elevated because Dr. Mahoney on these science documents—these science documents include expressions of science—Dr. Mahoney had a very effective process of reconciling comments. Some of them are included. Some are changed. And some of them are excluded. And that process wasn't being applied in this particular instance on the draft environment report. And so we worked it out.

Mr. YARMUTH. Now you mentioned before that some of these, all of these changes were based on NRC but in the EPA--again this memo says that conclusions of the NRC report were deleted. That is one of their complaints, wasn't it?

Mr. CONNAUGHTON. That is--again, we can get into lots

I included

of back and forth about the particularized edits.

that in my written testimony. Others were being asked to be included.

I think one of the things, Congressman, that went to your line of questioning earlier, you had these massive documents, and you have CEQ and other agencies agreeing to 99 percent of them. These have some of the strongest expressions of why we need to take action on climate, the effects of global warming on ecological systems, the research questions on relations of public health. These documents are full of that. And we didn't have any objections to any of that.

What these comments went to were certain expressions of key uncertainties identified by the Academy that were a qualifier to some absolute--more absolute statements that appeared to be in the text. Now the National Academy chose to include those qualifications. It was at least reasonable for reviewers to suggest that some of those qualifications be included as well.

Now ultimately the scientists decided which ones were appropriate, what tone, what weight to give to those. But I do want to underline what was missing in all of the questioning before I came up here was the fact that there was actually massive agreement on, you know, more than 99 percent of these massive documents.

That is where all the positive heavy duty stuff was on

climate change. These qualifiers were a little teeny piece of the discussion. So much ado about a very small amount of qualification.

Mr. YARMUTH. Now thank you. You said that earlier you did not make the decision that the White House wasn't going to make any changes, but in your conversations with Ms. Whitman did she explain to you why she made the decision not to--that she did not make those changes?

Mr. CONNAUGHTON. As you might expect this was an executive level conversation. We don't--we weren't into parsing all the back and forth between the various staffs. But you asked, I just want to be clear, I was perfectly content to just get them in a room, especially get the scientists with them and just reconcile the comments.

She had what I thought was a much better solution. And that was, we had just spent over a year developing this document with 1,300 scientists from around the world. Why not refer the public to that rather than try to collapse this down to a two-page passage on climate in a document that otherwise sort of had a rich abundance of detail on a whole bunch of other issues that were not getting the attention they deserved? So I thought it was a perfect solution. We didn't need to talk a lot. I said, that sounds great to me. Let's just go that way.

Mr. YARMUTH. My time has expired. Mr. Cannon.

Mr. CANNON. Thank you very much. I am having a hard time trying to figure out what this hearing is all about. I think, Mr. Connaughton, your term of "melodramatic" probably fits pretty darn well. You have a 23-year-old young man who was put on the hot seat, and I think acquitted himself quite well. Your former Chief of Staff--or the Chief of Staff of the CEQ--I thought did a remarkable job. I don't think there was a single question left unanswered very directly by him. So I am not sure why we had him up and were grilling him to the degree that we did.

And then of course the third person on the panel is the guy who had the real questions. And those questions come down to what I think involved his views were as to good and evil, people in the administration representing something akin to Nazi Germany and people who believe as he believes being good.

I would like to read you a quote by Dr. Hansen from 1998: Injection of environmental and political perspectives in midstream of the science discussion cannot help the process of inquiry. I believe that persons with relevant, scientific expertise should concentrate with pride on cool, objective analysis, providing information to the public and decision makers when it is found, but leaving the moral implications—this is again the person who raised the issue of the morality of this administration and comparing it to

Nazi Germany--leaving the moral implications for later, common consideration or, at most, for summary inferential discussion.

I am not implying bias on the part of any particular scientist, but the global warming debate has plentiful examples to illustrate my thesis, especially, at least a per capita basis among the most vociferous greenhouse skeptics; i.e., those who challenge the reality or interpretation of global warming. Many of the participants in this debate have ceased to act as scientists as defined above but rather act as if they were lawyers hired to defend a particular perspective. New evidence has no effect on their preordained conclusions this is abhorrent to science and spoils the fun of it.

Now we are not talking about the underlying facts of global warming or climate change here. We are talking about the process by which the administration has operated and the environment in which it has made decisions about how to get a message out. And with all the claims of big oil and drilling in ANWR and all the other things that will actually make America a much better place, with cheaper energy for the poor, I fail to see where we have made any progress. What we have really done is tied ourselves up with the beliefs of an individual who has been very critical of the administration.

Would you like to comment on that or would you just let

my statement stand if you want?

Mr. CONNAUGHTON. I would just like to remark. An important facet of all of this is we need to continue to encourage a wide diversity of viewpoints. The science enterprise is to constantly test the received wisdom, and that goes back and forth.

Now there is a lot of strong agreement on climate change, on the fact it is occurring and that humans are part of it. But there are still many, many lines of inquiry that the scientists are in fact pursuing and they are testing each other on.

The same is true, by the way, in the policy perspective. We take the advice of economists. We take advice of lawyers. We take the advice of policy people. We take the advice of politicians and communications people. This is an extremely complicated issue. It is not the province of any particular professional class.

I actually am pleased at the direction of the National Academy. They pushed us to create a more integrated process for linking science with the technology development process. That did not happen before. We are doing that now.

Those two processes are then working their way much better, really with the urging of Congress as well, into the policy development exercise. It requires a lot of people, providing lots of viewpoints. And then we work to sort it

out. That is what our role is, your role and the senior administration officials roles.

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Mr. CANNON. I would just point out that probably the most hardest figure in the history of America on environmental issues was the Moses of the West, Brigham Young, who took Mormons to Utah which I represent. And he was very concerned about the environment. And by the way slightly in a religious context, but it seems to me dogma ought to be left to the area of religion, and what we ought to do is look at the science and try to figure out where we are going, because the decisions are huge. The implications of eliminating CO2, I think Mr. Issa said earlier, 35 trillion--oh, \$350 trillion, roughly more than about 10 times as much as the total net worth of all of America. numbers are astounding. So the question is what do we do as humans to adapt to deal with that situation. And you have been leading the fight on this. You have been dealing with this. You have been in the vortex. Do you have other things you want to say in comment about that?

Mr. CONNAUGHTON. Well, I think we are going back 5 years history looking at individual edits, individual documents that never made it into most of the reports, at least the ones of concern. So I much prefer the hearing we had last summer, which is actually trying to dig into the detailed solutions to tackling this problem which, by the

3944 way, there is strong bipartisan support, whether it is the 3945 advancement of way out there technologies like fusion, near-term technologies like hydrogen. The Energy Policy Act 3946 3947 passed bipartisan in both Houses of Congress going after renewable fuels, going after vehicle fuel--actually the 3948 energy bill didn't include vehicle fuel efficiency. But we 3949 3950 would like the Congress to consider that, as well as billions of dollars in tax incentives to advance a new generation of 3951 3952 coal that would ultimately be zero emission. 3953 These are the solutions. This is what we should be 3954 working on. I call this, what is it about yes you don't 3955 understand? We have this strong commitment to get on with 3956 the solutions. Let's do that. Mr. CANNON. Sounds to me--I am sorry, Mr. Chairman, my 3957 3958 time is up. Thank you. I yield back.

3959 Chairman WAXMAN. [Presiding.] Thank you.

3960 Chair yields himself time to pursue a second round.

3961 Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Chairman, I haven't had a first round 3962 yet.

3963 Chairman WAXMAN. Oh, Mr. Shays.

Mr. SHAYS. No problem.

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When Kyoto was negotiated, Senate voted 100 to 1 and if there was someone absent it was unanimous, don't come back if you leave out India and China. So the Clinton administration comes back having left out India and China. Whereupon there

were only about three to five Members of the Senate who said they supported the treaty.

But given that the President said he was against it and people are finally facing up to the reality of global warming, even though Kyoto left out two of the potentially biggest contributors, every Senator acts like they would have voted for it.

I wish to God this administration had submitted to the Senate the Kyoto Treaty without prejudice. There would have been five members who would have actually voted for it. It is not unlike the two-thirds of the Congress and three-quarters of the Senate. Some Members now act like they never voted for the war in Iraq.

So, now but the sad thing is, Mr. Connaughton, and we have talked about it more than once, because this administration wanted to appeal to a narrow base that didn't believe in global warming, and so therefore was silent about the need to deal with it early on, you are having to deal with what you are having to deal with, and that is the tragedy of this in my judgment. You have done some amazing bilateral agreements to reduce the impact of global warming. You will get no credit for it because this administration early on wanted to give the impression that they didn't believe in global warming. That is the way I look at it.

And I am sorry that -- and then we hire someone who is

very capable, did a nice job in his performance before us but represented before the petroleum industry, which is not kind of what you would expect in the position that he was holding.

Wouldn't you agree that, you know, some of what you are having to deal with is just a bad start?

Mr. CONNAUGHTON. Sure. I mean I think, you know, it is also, though, the challenge of leadership. The prior administration did not make explicit the fact that the treaty was not going to work. President Bush did. As indicated in my written testimony, that did earn the--undeservedly earn all the ill will that has been directed at the President and our strategy since then.

That--and it is ironic because actually where I depart from you when you align the President with some of the constituencies, it was the President in June of 2001 following the National Academy of Sciences report said, this is what we know, the Academy has told us about some key uncertainties. But notwithstanding that, we need to take action now to begin to address this important problem. And he set in place a process that I inherited when I came in in June of 2001 after that of running the policy that led to the 2002 climate policy strategic plan. It is all the more ironic because the President himself actually--as he should have--took the advice of the Academy and led probably the single most aggressive--

Mr. SHAYS. Other ironies. Al Gore is right about global warming. It is a very real inconvenient truth and it needs to be dealt with. I would love to compare his house with President Bush's house. I would love to compare it.

So you have one who advocates dealing with global warming but doesn't practice it. And you have another, President, who has been frankly quiet about global warming in my judgment and practices dealing with it in his own personal life. That is one of the other huge ironies.

Mr. CONNAUGHTON. There is a wonderful USA Today story about the President's house down in Texas. It is a model of green building and environmental conservation.

Mr. SHAYS. Or when we hear the actors and actresses who complain about Humvees, driving up in long stretch limousines, flying in airplanes that make Humvees look like they get tremendous mileage. The irony in this debate, I hope once we get beyond all this we will start to deal with the reality of what we need to deal with. And I just say to you, I think it hasn't happened because of how we stepped into this debate.

And I am afraid frankly there is some on the religious right--whatever party--that have denied global warming and when it finally happens they are going to say, well, this is the fulfillment of the Bible and the destruction of humanity. I mean, it is just like I hope we wake up, and I hope we act

soon. And I encourage you to keep doing the good work you are doing. But I just wish you were more vocal about the good work you are doing.

Mr. ISSA. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. Shays. Yes.

Mr. ISSA. You mentioned everything except nuclear. Wouldn't you say it was notable that Dr. Hansen was very supportive of nuclear in every round of questioning and yet, to be honest, Al Gore and his movie and all of the activities is a pushback from nuclear pretty consistently? Have you seen that interesting dichotomy that those who want us to deal with global warming have a tendency to be extremely anti-nuclear even though it is zero emissions?

Mr. CONNAUGHTON. There is no question that if you were serious about climate change you have to be serious about nuclear, at least for the next many decades. It is the only baseload zero emissions source we have got. It has the smallest environmental footprint of any source we have got, and we know how to do it right. We have been doing it right in America for a long time. And the modern plants are even better than the old ones. So I use that as a gauge actually when I deal with people on climate change. If they are not open to a serious discussion of nuclear, I tend to find that their interest in the issue is more rhetorical than real.

Chairman WAXMAN. Gentleman's time has expired, and now

the Chair will recognize himself for a second round.

When this administration came in, they rejected Kyoto. Maybe it couldn't have passed. The Senate probably couldn't have. But I didn't hear the administration go back and ask the countries admitting Kyoto to reconvene and see if they could renegotiate a treaty. Fact number one.

Secondly, you pointed out with pride all of the things that this administration has done and is doing. But all the scientists tell us that the emissions of carbon are going up and not down, which means the planet is going to get in a more difficult situation in the direction we are moving.

Now, what appears to some of us is that it looks like the administration's policy was pretty much the petroleum industry's policy, which is let's sort of, let's try to confuse things and suggest that there's not such a big problem of global warming. We'll try to sow some doubt about it. That is what it appears to many of us.

Now I want to find out whether this was a deliberate White House strategy to sow doubt, or if I am incorrect about it. Did you ever have any communications with anybody in the White House outside of CEQ about the value of emphasizing uncertainty and climate change?

Mr. CONNAUGHTON. I had conversations with people outside of CEQ about the broad range of science, which included uncertainties related to issues such as aerosols,

4094 some of the other factors that were in the National Academy 4095 of Sciences report. And the answer to that is yes, with 4096 scientists as well nonscientists. 4097 Chairman WAXMAN. Who are those people in the White 4098 House outside of CEQ? 4099 Mr. CONNAUGHTON. Especially the budgeteers. We were 4100 working on the 10-year strategic plan because a lot of--4101 Chairman WAXMAN. Budgeteers were OMB--exclusively OMB 4102 people? Mr. CONNAUGHTON. As well as the Office of Science and 4103 Technology people, including Jack Marburger, because 10-year 4104 4105 strategic plan, Mr. Chairman, was all about how are we going 4106 to direct our resources toward these key areas of uncertainty 4107 that the National Academy of Science has identified. So we 4108 had an extensive set of conversations all the way up to the 4109 cabinet level on how to get this 10-year research plan going. 4110 The National Academy of Sciences hailed this plan as having 4111 ambition and vision. 4112 Chairman WAXMAN. Mr. Connaughton, I have only a limited 4113 period of time so I want to ask you some very specific 4114 questions. 4115 When the White House appeared to edit the climate change 4116 science reports, that was highly controversial. And several 4117 of the changes made front page headlines. Did you have 4118 communications with others in the White House outside of CEQ

4119	about the reaction to CEQ's edits and how to manage that
4120	reaction?
4121	Mr. CONNAUGHTON. First of all, the controversy was
4122	created by media stories, which I think grossly distorted the
4123	actual record of our process and the final documents to which
4124	scientist
4125	Chairman WAXMAN. You are not answering my question. I
4126	asked you a specific question, and I really want an answer.
4127	Mr. CONNAUGHTON. I need to start with disagreeing
4128	Chairman WAXMAN. Did you have any conversations with
4129	anybody about how to handle the public relations once these
4130	reports were
4131	Mr. CONNAUGHTON. I certainly did. I talked to the
4132	White House communicators because this had achieved national
4133	and actually international stature
4134	Chairman WAXMAN. Would you tell us who the
4135	communicators were?
4136	Mr. CONNAUGHTON. At the timeI would have to get back
4137	to you on that because I don't know exactly when people moved
4138	in and out.
4139	Chairman WAXMAN. Did you have any communications with
4140	White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card?
4141	Mr. CONNAUGHTON. About?
4142	Chairman WAXMAN. About the global warming reports.
4143	Mr. CONNAUGHTON. I only had a conversation with him

4144 after the reports came out. 4145 Chairman WAXMAN. Did you have any conversations with 4146 him as you took your job as to how you were going to handle 4147 your job? 4148 Mr. CONNAUGHTON. Yes, I did. 4149 Chairman WAXMAN. And when were they? 4150 Mr. CONNAUGHTON. That would have been in the middle of 4151 June. 4152 Chairman WAXMAN. June, what year. 4153 Mr. CONNAUGHTON. 2001. 4154 Chairman WAXMAN. Okay. 4155 Mr. CONNAUGHTON. That is when I was assigned the 4156 portfolio on climate change, on air pollution and a whole 4157 range of issues, fuel economy and a whole range of issues on 4158 the National Energy Plan. 4159 Chairman WAXMAN. And did he suggest to you some

Chairman WAXMAN. And did he suggest to you some policies you might pursue or what--tell us about the conversation as it relates to global warming, climate change.

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Mr. CONNAUGHTON. Mr. Card was happy to have me on board. He said there were specific areas we should get into and we wanted to really focus on the technology. We had been given this strong advice from the National Academy of Sciences. And we wanted to make sure also we were advancing the science in the way the President directed. Mr. Card was reinforcing for me the agenda that the President had already

4169 clearly laid out in his policy address. 4170 Chairman WAXMAN. Now after the reports were put out you 4171 said you had some communications with him? 4172 Mr. CONNAUGHTON. Yes. He wanted to know because what 4173 we had regarded--4174 Chairman WAXMAN. Could you tell us when that was 4175 approximately? Mr. CONNAUGHTON. I can't recall the specific date. 4176 Chairman WAXMAN. And tell us about that communication. 4177 4178 Mr. CONNAUGHTON. The report--we had scientific sign-off on the report so when it came out and the media began to 4179 4180 nit-pick--I guess it leaked. The report had been out for 4181 some time. Then someone in the media got ahold of leaked 4182 versions of some of these early edits without even, by the 4183 way, comparing to see if it made it into the final document. 4184 That is what created the media flap. And so there were 4185 questions what was in the report, what was it about. We 4186 actually treated this as a routine publication. It was only 4187 later sensationalized. Chairman WAXMAN. This was a direct conversation with 4188 4189 Andrew Card? 4190 Mr. CONNAUGHTON. I had one direct conversation with 4191 him. 4192 Chairman WAXMAN. On this issue. 4193 Mr. CONNAUGHTON. Yes.

4194 Chairman WAXMAN. The reaction to the report. 4195 Right. This was much later after it Mr. CONNAUGHTON. 4196 came out and the leaked edits, the leaked edits emerged. 4197 Chairman WAXMAN. And you don't recall the date of that? 4198 Mr. CONNAUGHTON. No, I don't, sir. 4199 Chairman WAXMAN. Okay, did he suggest you do something other than what you were doing? 4200 4201 Mr. CONNAUGHTON. No. We were actually--4202 Chairman WAXMAN. Or was he just asking questions about 4203 what you did? 4204 Mr. CONNAUGHTON. He wanted to know what the report, 4205 what the process was, was the process followed. I assured 4206 him it had been followed. I assured him the scientists at 4207 the end of the process had ultimately reconciled all comments 4208 and he was actually--well, I don't want to speak for him. Chairman WAXMAN. Well, we know that some of the 4209 documents we have seen came from the -- related to 4210 4211 communications with the Vice President's office. Did you 4212 talk to anybody in the Vice President's office, including the 4213 Vice President or any of his staff, such as Kevin O'Donovan 4214 or anyone else in that office? 4215 Mr. CONNAUGHTON. About? 4216 Chairman WAXMAN. About global warming, climate change, 4217 the report. 4218 Mr. CONNAUGHTON. Sure. I talked with all of the office

4219 of the White House about climate change. It is an issue that 4220 has been with us for 6 years. I can't think of a single 4221 office, including Office of Public Liaison, in which there 4222 hasn't been some interface of one kind or another about 4223 climate change, but really focused on the technology 4224 initiatives of the President much less so on the science. 4225 Chairman WAXMAN. So you had frequent communications 4226 with, was it, Kevin O'Donovan or others in the Vice 4227 President's office? 4228 Mr. CONNAUGHTON. We have a very vigorous interagency 4229 process that includes participation by the various White 4230 House offices as they see fit, as well as all the various 4231 agencies. So you can lump in a dozen agencies and six or 4232 seven White House offices. 4233 Chairman WAXMAN. We look forward to learning more about 4234 those. 4235 Mr. Issa. 4236 Mr. ISSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Where are your 4237 offices. 4238 Mr. CONNAUGHTON. On Jackson Place, sir, right in front 4239 of the White House, right on Lafayette Square. 4240 Mr. ISSA. Which is really part of now the White House 4241 complex area? 4242 Mr. CONNAUGHTON. That's correct, sir.

Mr. ISSA. And when did essentially the oversight of

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4244 global climate change -- when did it move to the White House 4245 area? In other words, how long have the offices that are 4246 overseeing this part of science, how long have they been 4247 within, you know, what we always think of as the White House, Treasury, Old Executive Office, the various townhouses and of 4248 4249 course the White House itself? 4250 Mr. CONNAUGHTON. My office, the, Council on 4251 Environmental Quality, was created in 1969, so it has been 4252 there for almost 30--40 years. The Office of Science and 4253 Technology Policy I believe was created a few years later 4254 than that. And those are the two primary sort of policy 4255 offices as it relates to energy and environment and natural 4256 resources and some of those matters. 4257 And then there was the Domestic Policy Council of 4258 course, the National Economic Council was created under the 4259 Clinton administration and then during the Clinton 4260 administration they actually had a sub office specifically 4261 focused on climate change where they coordinated all of the climate change efforts across the Clinton administration. 4262 4263 decided to consolidate that within CEQ. 4264 Mr. ISSA. Which is also in the White House complex? 4265 Mr. CONNAUGHTON. Correct. 4266 Mr. ISSA. So it is fair to say that administration

after administration, this has been something which

has--although it has evolved and it's grown, every

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administration has thought it important enough to take up this very small amount of space available in and around the White House rather than sending it off to Crystal City or any number of other large Federal buildings a few miles away that certainly other things have been pushed out of.

Mr. CONNAUGHTON. Well, there has been a Catch-22 to the discussion we are having today. This issue is very important. It is presidentially level important. But that said, we also make clear to do some assignments. So at NOAA, the head of the Climate Science Program that was housed at NOAA, so all of our input went to them and they had the final call on the science documents.

Mr. ISSA. I just want to understand that this is something where you get to say you are coming from the White House, because effectively these buildings are--everyone, everyone except people maybe inside the Beltway, we don't--we know the difference between the Old Executive Office and whether or not you have got something in the Roosevelt Room, wing or whatever, but bottom line is you are right there in the White House complex, and this administration has kept it that important.

Let me just follow up on a couple of things. When this administration--and I realize you weren't with it in the first days--but you were pretty close. This administration inherited Kyoto. It was dead on arrival at the Senate, is

4294 that right?

4295 Mr. CONNAUGHTON. That's correct. It was dead 3 years 4296 before that.

Mr. ISSA. So it just hadn't been buried.

Mr. CONNAUGHTON. Actually it had effectively because the prior administration never sent the treaty to the Senate.

Mr. ISSA. So we also--thank you. And we also, this administration also inherited methyl bromide, the Montreal Protocol, which exempted all of the third world, is that right?

Mr. CONNAUGHTON. It actually put them on a delayed compliance schedule, which they are now beginning to implement.

Mr. ISSA. This is the year in which they are going to actually have to cut down their use. But basically they have been unrestricted and, correct me if I'm wrong, methyl bromide basically moved from the United States and Europe to Africa and developing countries in South America who are unrestricted. The flower industry of Holland mostly moved to other countries. So this is something that was done in previous administrations. It sounded good but the bottom line is it didn't change the emissions of this terrible ozone depleting material one bit, did it, outside the U.S.?

Mr. CONNAUGHTON. Yes, I believe that is--I believe that is true. The issue you always face in these international

agreements with global emissions is what is called leakage.

If you squeeze the balloon too tight in one place and the other country is not constrained, you actually get an increase in those emissions. That is a fundamental issue in the climate policy debates.

Mr. ISSA. So some of this is what I call unilateral disarmament on emissions. We stopped, but it didn't change one bit the amount of emissions.

Mr. CONNAUGHTON. And Congressman, there is a place for leadership which the U.S. is demonstrating, but you don't want your leadership to sacrifice your economic objectives to greater emissions somewhere else.

Mr. ISSA. The United States is leading the world. This Congress has funded leading the world in cleaning up coal and other carbon emitters, recognizing without sequestration you are not getting there, that that has to be part of it. But isn't it true that China builds basically one coal fired plant every week, week in and week out, for the last couple years and plans to continue doing so and that those tend to be among the dirtiest electric production facilities in the world?

Mr. CONNAUGHTON. Yes. They will build, I am told, 140 in the next 3 years and they are massively industrializing and picking up a lot of the manufacturing and industrial output that would otherwise be occurring in places like the

United States and Europe for a variety of reasons.

Mr. ISSA. Then as I yield back, I will simply make the point that this administration has a bigger problem than just good research. We have to get it applied around the world or it won't make a bit of difference in global warming.

Mr. CONNAUGHTON. Mr. Issa, to the point that was raised by the chairman I would sharply disagree. We did reconvene internationally. We just didn't reconvene in Kyoto. We have dozens of bilateral partnerships now. And we have many, many multinational agreements on advancing hydrogen, on advancing global fuels, on advancing methane capture, as I indicated. The list is quite lengthy of real international agreement, the most recent of which is the Asian Pacific Partnership on Clean Development Climate, which includes India and China and South Korea, which comes in third in new emissions for the first time.

So we found a different way to have the international conversation, and this is a foundation we can build on and, by the way, Mr. Chairman, California is going to be a huge beneficiary of that because we are all about opening up markets for good old-fashioned green technologies from California and really getting them into these marketplaces in Asia. That is where the solution lies.

Mr. ISSA. Thank you. I yield back.

Chairman WAXMAN. Mr. Welch.

4369 Mr. WELCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Connaughton. 4370 Mr. CONNAUGHTON. Connaughton, please. 4371 Mr. WELCH. Mr. Connaughton. Welcome. 4372 Mr. CONNAUGHTON. Thank you. Mr. WELCH. I would like to ask, but your decision to 4373 hire Phil Cooney as your Chief of Staff. As you know, Mr. 4374 4375 Cooney was a very successful oil industry lobbyist. He had 4376 worked for the Petroleum Institute in his job there. Among 4377 other things was to stop or delay governmental actions on 4378 climate change. They weren't shy about their point of view 4379 on that, but that obviously is an agenda inconsistent with 4380 the mission of the Environmental Protection Agency. 4381 My question is this, who made the decision to hire Mr. 4382 Cooney? 4383 Mr. CONNAUGHTON. I did. 4384 Mr. WELCH. And I assume you were aware of the work he 4385 did at the American Petroleum Institute? 4386 Mr. CONNAUGHTON. Yes, I was. Mr. WELCH. Did you have any concerns about that work 4387 4388 and how it would affect the work that he was to do at the 4389 environmental agency or was that a reason why he was hired? 4390 Mr. CONNAUGHTON. In my many years in Washington, I have 4391 come across a lot of people in the professional world, 4392 lawyers, people from the environmental community and other 4393 places. Of the many people I intersected with in my

professional life, Mr. Cooney is one of the people of highest integrity that I have run across. He is also an outstanding manager. And actually I saw it as a great benefit that he had experience in the energy sector because one of the major tasks I knew I was going to be taking on was the CEQ portion of implementing the National Energy Policy.

So it was actually something Mr. Cooney knew something about. But first and foremost was his commitment to public service, and actually it was an honor for me to have him join me. And I have to say, you know, as much as the tone of this hearing has been what it is, Mr. Cooney is the best in class individual when it comes to integrity, honesty and ethics. And I do greatly regret some of the insinuations that I have heard from some members of this committee about the fact that Mr. Cooney might have been unable to divorce himself from one client and take on the role of public servant. I certainly did. Mr. Welch, I would submit you certainly did when you—at some point in your life when you became elected. We are all capable of serving the institutions in which we are employed.

4414	RPTS THOMAS
4415	DCMN NORMAN
4416	[2:00 p.m.]
4417	Mr. WELCH. I haven't heard anybody raise questions
4418	about Mr. Cooney or anybody else's integrity. What I
4419	understood and I have heard is a fair amount of evidence that
4420	the American Petroleum Institute had a clear point of view on
4421	climate change and a fair amount of evidence that many of
4422	those views on climate change, for one reason or
4423	anotherconviction or politics, I am not going to make a
4424	conclusionfound their way into reports through editing; 181
4425	different edits.
4426	Did you have any concern about what signal would be sent
4427	to the American people, really, in hiring a person whose job
4428	it was before taking on the new position to basically
4429	advocate the American Petroleum Institute's position that
4430	climate change was not a problem and that the right approach
4431	on energy policy was to drill in ANWR, to drill more
4432	extensively in the coastal waters, and basically to erase,
4433	and so doubt, about the urgency of addressing global warming
4434	as a problem?
4435	Mr. CONNAUGHTON. You are making some insinuations in
4436	that litany. So let me ask youthis plays against the type
4437	that you are suggesting. Mr. Cooney was involved in the
4438	National Energy Policy that was advancing mandates for

renewable fuels against the interest of the oil companies.

Mr. Cooney was involved in some of the energy policy in which the Bush administration, for the first time in over a decade, was implementing new fuel economy standards for vehicles.

Mr. Cooney was involved in the National Energy Policy that did not support tax breaks for oil and gas. In fact, the President and his administration were opposed to them and made that very clear in the run-up to the energy bill in 2005.

I could give you any of a number of additional examples where Mr. Cooney was actually working against the interest of the oil and gas industry, and he did it with the highest integrity in the service of the policy agenda that he was being directed to implement by the President of the United States.

Mr. WELCH. Mr. Connaughton, I admire your energy but not your misstatement of the facts.

The White House opposed the fuel standards that you are referring to.

Mr. CONNAUGHTON. Mr. Welch, you couldn't be more wrong. In 2001, in the National Energy Plan, it called for increases in fuel economy standards. It was then that we initiated a process with the National Academy of Sciences to get their recommendation on how we could move forward with new mandatory regulations on fuel economy in the light truck

fleet that would not create the safety hazard the National Academy of Science had identified.

We subsequently implemented two regulations covering 7 years of light truck manufacturing for the first time in a decade. During the same period, the President and his administration called on the Congress to legislate, give us the authority to do the same thing with respect to passenger cars, a call on Congress the President most recently reinitiated in his State of the Union address in which he committed the Nation to save 8.5 billion gallons of fuel through new mandatory fuel economy standards if this Congress will give us the authority to do it right rather than do it the way it was provided back to us in the 1970s, which creates a safety penalty and harms drivers.

Mr. WELCH. Were you involved in any one of the 181 changes that were made, the edits that were made, under the supervision of Mr. Cooney?

Mr. CONNAUGHTON. I only had general oversight as that was working its way through the staff progress. What typically happens if there's an irreconcilable--

Mr. WELCH. So is the answer yes or no? You have given a few speeches here but not answered too many questions.

Mr. CONNAUGHTON. I think I am doing fine answering questions.

Mr. WELCH. There were 181 different provisions that

4489 were edited on the global warming report. Were you 4490 involved -- that were made under the supervision of Mr. Cooney. Were you involved in approving those or making those? 4491 4492 Mr. CONNAUGHTON. It was possible that some of those may 4493 have been called to my attention. I don't have a specific recollection because it was almost 5 years ago. 4494 4495 Nevertheless, I was confident that Dr. James Mahoney, who was 4496 the one leading this process, would do a perfectly great job 4497 reconciling any comments that he thought might be of concern. 4498 Chairman WAXMAN. Mr. Welch, your time has expired. 4499 Mr. Shays. 4500 Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. I am happy people don't talk about how many times I edited a simple letter, but thank God 4501 for a computer. 4502 4503 Is there anything that you would like to put on the 4504 record before we get to our next witness? 4505 Mr. CONNAUGHTON. I want to go back to the basics. 4506 Thank you, Mr. Shays. 4507 These reports are of worldwide significance, and when they were published they received worldwide acceptance and 4508 4509 praise. The 10-Year Strategic Plan, our annual climate 4510 action reports, these are full policy and budget documents that contain expressions of the science that the scientific 4511 community itself found worthwhile. If there was something 4512 fundamentally wrong with any of the edits to the extent they 4513

made it into the document, one would have thought that some scientist somewhere would have said, "Hey, on page 85 you got it wrong." that didn't happen.

We are looking in this inquiry at early edits to documents—and documents, you know, before they got into their final stages. And, again, it is—we are all very busy people. This inquiry is a bit odd in that we are not looking at what was in the documents. This is where the real information to the public is being provided. We are looking at internal deliberations and contacts and what makes it all the more ironic is the whole point of the deliberative process is to encourage the diversity of viewpoints whether they are wrong or whether they are completely right. And maybe some of them are wrong and maybe some of them are right. Maybe Mr. Cooney's edits he made, I maybe had a question of. I didn't have to, because the context sorted it out.

So these documents are going to stand the test of time. This is where we should be concentrating our focus, in my view, on the budgets we need to answer these key science questions and the budgets and policies we need to make meaningful, sensible progress attacking greenhouse gas emissions in a way that grows our economy and adds American jobs.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the hearings we

are having, and I think they are interesting, and I know we are going to have a lot more. But I hope we start to get beyond the issues of who said what, when, and that this new majority will start to lead and deal with the issues of where we go from here.

I know they are attempting to do that by a special committee under Mr. Markey, because they are concerned that the very chairman of that committee, candidly, has been deleting the opponent—the Dean of the House has been deleting the opponent against the increasing CAFE standards. And while I may have some disappointment with this administration not taking charge and, you know, picking up the sword and leading us through this, I wish they had—I am sure if they had, I am sure you would have had a nice job doing that, Mr. Connaughton.

I do know this: This is a bipartisan problem. It needs a bipartisan solution, and we need to get beyond the attacks of this administration. And if we start to work in a bipartisan way, we might get some things done.

Mr. CONNAUGHTON. Dr. Jack Marburger was very interested in joining, although the committee at this point in time is not ready to speak with them. I think it would be highly useful, if we are going to get to more e-mails, science statements--I am not aware that the committee has assigned any scientist to actually look at any of this. But I think

it would be much more helpful if you had a scientist from the committee sitting down with a scientist with the Office of Science and Technology Policy, and the scientists could find a Science Office to sort through some of this to see how it all shaped up. Again, I think it shaped up right but it is-Mr. ISSA. So, just asking you quick, for emphasis, two things. I guess we know the culprit here.

Mr. SHAYS. May I say the culprit is that this is sometimes on even when it's off. So if the committee would note this has got a problem.

Mr. ISSA. Two things. One, I think you made a good point that I would hope you would reiterate, that in fact your final report has never been questioned today. The output of this process, including Dr. Hansen's complaints, bears no--no one complained in the final document, including Dr. Hansen, one; and, two, that up until now, the President's attempt to modernize the CAFE standards to dramatically increase the fuel economy that our fleet gets without penalizing safety has not been answered by this Congress yet.

Would you repeat those two for--clarify them for the committee?

Mr. CONNAUGHTON. The 10-Year Strategic Plan that has been of highest interest to this committee so far was roundly praised by the National Academy of Sciences after two independent reviews, after they provided it, and it's

4589 actually being used as a basis for research priorities, not 4590 just in America but around the world.

And, secondly, the President in his State of the Union declared very specifically he wants to end our addiction to oil. He wants to do it by dramatic increase in mandatory renewable and alternative fuels, and he wants to do it with a significant—I would also call it a dramatic—increase in fuel economy of vehicles across all of the fleet, not just the big ones. All of them, small ones to big.

And we are prepared to work with the Congress to see that legislation turned into law.

I would note, by the way, that it has huge greenhouse benefits, too, and it reduces air toxins substantially at the same time.

Chairman WAXMAN. Before I recognize Mr. Yarmuth, I want to state a couple of facts. One, that suggested changes from C02 were not just early draft, they were continuously pushed until the final draft, and, in fact, until the final day of the final draft. And all of those edits were not by scientists. You say you would like scientists to sit down with scientists. Let's see who would have preferred your scientists to have more of a say than your representative from the oil industry, pushing his view of science over your scientists.

And then I do want to point out that the administration

has authority to raise CAFE standards for passenger cars today, and you haven't chosen to do so.

Mr. CONNAUGHTON. The National Academy of Sciences said if we do so, we will create a safety penalty that causes more fatalities and more traffic injuries. Certainly we can agree that is not an outcome we want.

Chairman WAXMAN. I think that is a red herring. I don't think the National Academy of Sciences has that view, but certainly the auto industry does.

Mr. CONNAUGHTON. That is not the case at all. The auto industry is not happy about these standards, Mr. Waxman. In fact, I would refer this committee and actually ask, if you would, the committee enter into the record the 2002 National Academy of Science Report on Fuel Economy Standards. You should read for yourself what that says.

Chairman WAXMAN. Mr. Yarmuth.

Mr. YARMUTH. Mr. Connaughton, the reason we are here today is not because we are concerned what came out on the final report. Fortunately because of Christine Todd Whitman, we understand that the edits that were made--that many, both here on this committee and also many in the scientific community, represented cherry-picking of the evidence, that she decided that that painted an inaccurate portrait of the situation with regard to climate change.

And I know you called it in your testimony, your

prepared testimony, an intramural editorial exchange, but we are concerned here with the process and whether the process is actually fair to science or not.

And we have heard a lot of evidence about cherry-picking. You disagree with some of it, but in fact your own testimony represents, in my opinion--gives an example of where evidence was cherry-picked. You defended in White House edits to delete a discussion of the human health and ecological effects of climate change. In defending that edit, you cited a 2001 National Academy of Sciences report.

"Health outcomes in response to climate change are the subject of intense debate." clearly they are. But you omitted from that reference the sentence that immediately follows it and that sentence reads, quote, "Climate change has the potential to influence the frequency and transmission of infectious disease, alter heat and cold-related mortality and morbidity, and influence air and water quality. And that same section of the Academy report also says, quote, "Increased tendency towards drought, as projected by some models, is an important concern in every region of the United States. Decreased snow pack and/or earlier season melting are expected in response to warming because the freeze line will be moving to higher elevations." and, finally, "The noted increased rainfall rates have implications for

pollution runoff, flood control and changes to plant and animal habitat. Any significant climate change is likely to result in increased costs because the Nation's investment in water supply infrastructure is largely tuned to the current climate."

Would you not concede that a--the sentence that you included as evidence of using the National Academy of Sciences report paints a slightly different picture than if you included all of that material after that?

Mr. CONNAUGHTON. Actually, Congressman, I became a big fan of including all of the material, which was why the decision was made to go ahead and reference all of it.

What I find in these science debates, especially among nonscientists, is the dangers always come when we try to summarize, when in fact this is a much more complex issue. That is where people end up fighting. They fight over little amounts of space. That's why this was the best solution. I was inspired by Ms. Whitman. I immediately agreed with it. This is a great document. I really recommend you to read it.

I would also recommend you to read the entire NAS report before you reach final judgment. I appreciate the Chairman in his opening remarks saying there were suspicions but they're trying to sort out the facts.

I would really appreciate it if you would commit to read the NAS report, because that is what I did in preparing for

this hearing, because I wanted to see if these edits were in the realm of the reasonable. You could agree or disagree with them, but were they within the realm of the reasonable to be sorted out by the ultimate scientific reviewer? My judgment is maybe they were. Maybe you will come to a different one. You seem like a reasonable man. But if you will look at the whole report you will see what was trying to happen here.

In addition, again, 99.5 percent already contained all of what you just described. The issue, what was missing by some reviewers--it wasn't just Mr. Cooney--it was the Office of Science and Technology Policy, too. There was missing some qualification to some of these absolute statements that justifies beyond these ongoing science investment we're making.

Reasonable minds could differ over that, but that is what we should be after. But are we in the realm of the reasonable in the deliberative process that's there to call out these different viewpoints? I think so. I am hopeful that the committee will ultimately find that as well.

Mr. YARMUTH. Do you understand why there is some suspicion on this committee when virtually every edit that was suggested tends to minimize the severity of the threat of global warming?

Mr. CONNAUGHTON. I completely understand that, and the

dilemma was because the rest of it, all of the affirmative stuff, wasn't objectionable. So you have this issue of--there was a concern that something was being left out, and so the nature of the edits was to reflect on that which was left out, without recognizing that Mr. Cooney and many others read the rest of this and said wow, this is good stuff. It's so important about the temperature trends, and all of the different impacts and the polar area, lots of good stuff in here, without any negative comment by CEQ or anything else. That's really what was going on.

Mr. YARMUTH. I yield back.

Chairman WAXMAN. Mr. Cannon.

Mr. CANNON. Your last answer was really good.

Recasting it, you were asked why it was obvious that you raised suspicions with edits, and your answer was that there was so much positive that there was a tendency to focus on just those things where the certainty wasn't the case. And frankly, in my last round of questioning, I raised the issue of why we are actually having this hearing. And now that we've been through most of it, I've got to say it has been really interesting.

The gentleman just asked you or just suggested that, fortunately, Christine Todd Whitman had intervened, that we came out with a sound report. That is like a vindication of the process. I don't know what more you could say that is

more vindicating of what you all did. People can disagree with your beliefs and the policy and a lot of other things, but it seems to me if the point of this hearing was to talk about policy, that it has worked pretty well and I--if you want to comment on that, you have done a pretty good job thus far.

Mr. CONNAUGHTON. The only thing I would add to that is by doing a really smart thing, it ended up being portrayed publicly as an omission from the draft you put in of the environment and, fortunately, pieces of the draft you put in of the environment is great. It deals with all kinds of issues. So the benefit of this report was diminished. And then the benefit of this report was diminished, and it really had nothing to do with the merits of the document. It really had to do with the sensation caused that always happens when people pull back and get a look at some of the deliberative processes without focusing on the final product. We like to focus on the results. The Congress does. We do. Where the results are on a sale--

Mr. CANNON. Let me talk about--Mr. Issa talked earlier about all of the power plants, the coal-fired power plants that are being built in China. And, of course, if we do coal to liquid here in America, the nice thing about that technology is you can actually take the CO2 stream and sequester it, not only inexpensively, but maybe at a high

profit because you can use it to enhance oil production and in other activities or just get rid of it in ways that we are learning are scientifically sound right now.

So it seems to me that the net of this hearing, if anything comes out of it, ought to be to shift away from process and there ought to be a congratulations to the process used and a shift toward what you have been suggesting back and forth through your whole testimony, which is what can we do to actually mitigate the problems that may happen if man-made gasses are actually affecting the temperature of the climate as a whole.

And if you just want to take a few minutes to wrap up on the things we can do, I'd very much appreciate that, because I think that is what we found in this hearing.

Mr. CONNAUGHTON. Clearly we had an opportunity on renewables, especially renewable fuels; that is, the potential that has not been tapped to the extent it can. And that's why, again, we are pleased by the broad bipartisan interest in the State of the Union address as well as the advancement of renewable power.

But coal remains a very important issue. Anything we do short term to mitigate greenhouse gasses is of relatively little consequence unless we figure out the zero emission coal solution. And we have to be very careful about our policies to be sure we keep an investment towards zero

emission coal, because if we don't, China--and India in particular--and some other countries, their missions will far exceed ours starting in about 2008-2009 and it just runs away from us.

So if we are focusing on climate policy, to me, we have got to advance this highly efficient zero emission coal agenda which, again, the Congress, working with the administration on a bipartisan basis, is doing. And we have got to bring more nuclear on-line as a hedge while we fill in with renewable fuels and we fill in even more with renewable power.

We can get there. It takes some time, but we have got to sequence this right. And we can't drive our investment away from coal in America, because if we don't figure it out, it will be decades before China and India and other countries figure it out. So we have an imperative to get it right here first.

Mr. CANNON. And if we get it right here first, and other nations can copy the technology that we produced and have the kinds of wonderful things in life that we have in America without the effect on the environment--

Mr. CONNAUGHTON. And also, again by the way, we are competing less on the world stage for energy resources. So countries like Japan, emerging economies, that don't have access to the same natural resources we do, when we are using

our own smarts, that makes other resources available to other countries that don't have it. It is good for the global economies of all, and it will lift billions of people out of poverty over time.

Mr. CANNON. Poverty is the big polluter. If you don't believe that, go to Haiti and take a look at the landscape.

You said something about the Federal opaque and this new chip that has come out that is 40 percent positive, I believe it is funded in large part by DOE. I think that is one of the great stories that is ready to happen. We don't know what it's going to cost yet. It's not commercial—or it is actually commercial, but not really commercial—and of the price that will really make sense. But isn't that a direct result of DOE funding and this administration's initiatives to do those things?

Mr. CONNAUGHTON. In last year's State of the Union address, the President called for significant ramp-up in the research dollars towards some of these advanced solar and wind technologies. My son dragged me to NexTechs in New York, sponsored by Wired Magazine. And they had this nanosolar technology that creates little pyramids on the same panel. That's a great one.

And then DOE is also looking at lower efficiency but much cheaper solar panels, so you could actually make a whole roof out of it but it doesn't cost you very much. So it

might not be as efficient as the glass panels, but you get more energy from it because you can spread it out on a bigger surface. Now, that could make it more affordable for the consumer, and we can get to these zero energy or energy gives back home.

Mr. CANNON. I recognize my time is almost gone.

The breakthrough you already have on the table is a chip that will deliver over 40 percent efficiency as opposed to the 15 or 16 percent that we had historically. That is a tripling, almost, of efficiency, which means that the possibility of really using this wildly throughout the world, not in all uses, but supplementing our uses is close.

Mr. CONNAUGHTON. These things come in waves, and I think that is a renaissance in that area and that is very exciting.

Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Connaughton. Thank you for being with us.

We are going to continue this investigation. We expect cooperation from your office in giving us all of the information and documents that we feel we are entitled to.

Mr. CONNAUGHTON. You will have our continued cooperation, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you very much. Thank you for being here.

Our last witness is Dr. Roy Spencer. He is the

Principal Resident Scientist at the University of Alabama in Huntsville. He worked at NASA for more than a decade.

I want to welcome you to the committee. Your prepared statement will be in the record in full. We would like to ask, if you would, to keep your oral statement to no more than 5 minutes.

It's the policy of this committee that we put all witnesses under oath. And so if you would please rise and raise your right hand.

The record will indicate the witness answered in the affirmative. And we look forward to hearing from you.

STATEMENT OF ROY SPENCER, UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA, HUNTSVILLE

Mr. SPENCER. I am sorry I wasn't here for--

Chairman WAXMAN. There is a button on the base of the mike.

Mr. SPENCER. I am sorry I wasn't here for Jim's testimony. As you can tell, I am not an expert on this. It has been a few years since I have done this. So I am going to read my oral testimony verbatim if you don't mind.

I would like to thank the Chairman and members of this committee for the opportunity to provide my perspective on political interference on government-funded science.

I have been performing NASA-funded science research for the last 22 years. Prior to my current position as a principal research scientist at the University of Alabama in Huntsville, I was senior scientist for climate studies at NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center and was an employee of NASA from 1987 until 2001.

During the period of my government employment, NASA had a rule that any interaction between its scientists and the press was to be coordinated through NASA management and Public Affairs. Understandably, NASA managers do not appreciate first learning of their scientists' findings and opinions in the morning newspapers.

There was no secret within NASA at that time that I was skeptical of the size of the human influence on global climate. My views were diametrically opposed to those of Vice President Gore, and I believe that they were considered to be a possible hindrance to NASA getting full congressional funding for Mission to Planet Earth.

So while Dr. Hansen was freely sounding the alarm over what he believed to be dangerous levels of human influence on the climate, I tried to follow the rules. On many occasions, I avoided questioning from the media on the subject and instead directed reporters' questions to my director John Christie, who was my coworker, still is, and a university employee.

Through the management chain, in fact, I was told what I was allowed to say in congressional testimony. My dodging of committee questions regarding my personal opinions on the subject of global warming was considered to be quite humorous by one committee, an exchange which is now part of the Congressional Record.

I want to make it very clear that I am not complaining. I am only relating these things because I was asked to. I was, and still am, totally supportive of NASA's Earth satellite missions, but I understood that my position as a NASA employee was a privilege, not a right, and there were rules that I was expected to abide by.

Partly because of those limits on what I could and couldn't say to the press and Congress, I voluntarily resigned from NASA in the fall of 2001. Even though my research responsibilities to NASA have not changed since resigning, being a university employee gives me much more freedom than government employees have in expressing opinions.

So while you might think that political influence in our climate research program started with the Bush administration, that simply isn't true. It is--it has always existed. You just never heard about it because NASA's climate science program was aligned with Vice President Gore's objectives.

The bias started when the U.S. Climate Research Program was first initiated. The emphasis on studying the problem of global warming presumes that a problem exists. As a result, the funding has always favored the finding of evidence for climate catastrophe rather than for climate stability. This biased approach to the funding of science serves several goals which favor specific political ideology.

First, it grows government science, environmental, and policy programs, which depend upon global warming, remaining as much of a threat as possible. It favors climate researchers who quite naturally have vested interests and careers, theories, and personal incomes, myself included. And it provides justification for environmental lobbying groups whose very existence depends on sustaining public fears of environmental problems.

I am not claiming that global warming science--that the global warming science program isn't needed. It is. We do need to find out how much of our current warmth is human induced and how much of it we might expect in the future.

I am just pointing out that the political interference flows both ways, but not everyone has felt compelled to complain about it.

This concludes my oral testimony.

4959 Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you.

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4962 Chairman WAXMAN. Mr. Issa. 4963 Mr. ISSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Spencer, your qualifications -- you are a climate 4964 4965 scientist; is that correct? 4966 Mr. SPENCER. Well, at my age, none of us were trained as climate scientists. We were trained as meteorologists or 4967 4968 atmospheric scientists. 4969 Mr. ISSA. But you are a Ph.D. 4970 Mr. SPENCER. Ph.D. In meteorology. 4971 Mr. ISSA. And if I heard you correctly, what you said, 4972 you chafed at the Clinton administration's tendency to like Dr. Hansen's ability to get out and say what he thought and 4973 4974 not like what you wanted to say. 4975 Mr. SPENCER. I specifically remember after my 4976 congressional testimony where I was asked to not say anything beyond something specific about my work, I asked my 4977 4978 management how is it that Jim Hansen gets to say these things 4979 to the press and I don't. And they just shrugged their 4980 shoulders and said he is not supposed to be able to. 4981 Mr. ISSA. So there was a double standard under the 4982 Clinton administration. 4983 Mr. SPENCER. Sure.

Mr. ISSA. Is there a double standard under this administration?

4986 Mr. SPENCER. Double standard in what way?

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4987 Mr. ISSA. If you were still here under this 4988 administration, do you think you would be more free to talk about things which, let's say, were more aligned with the oil 4989 4990 industry? 4991 Mr. SPENCER. No. I don't think so, because there is 4992 too much pressure to keep the global warming thing going. I 4993 don't want to make it sound like there is no such thing as global warming. You realize from reading my testimony that 4994 4995 that is not the case. I'm just saying there is a bias that 4996 exists. The bias is pervasive, and in Jim Hansen's case he has a lot more political capital than I ever had, since he is 4997 4998 Mr. Global Warming. And he--4999 Mr. ISSA. And before that, he was Mr. Global Cooling. 5000 Mr. SPENCER. Oh, well, I don't know. That goes back 5001 before my time, probably. 5002 Mr. ISSA. So what you're saying, there is politics at

Mr. ISSA. So what you're saying, there is politics at work. There were politics at work in the last administration, and it's very difficult for scientists to deal with that, both from the administration but also from their peer group when one side or the other is sort of ganging up on the minority.

Mr. SPENCER. That is right.

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Mr. ISSA. And this committee is a committee of jurisdiction over a lot of things in government. We can't mandate that people get along and play pretty, but we

certainly can set a lot of the rules.

Do you believe this committee should pass legislation that would change any aspect, and if so, what aspect of how the Clinton administration, and, I guess, the Reagan administration, the first President Bush administration, and the second President Bush administration, has had these policies since 1987. What would you change or advise us to change?

Mr. SPENCER. Okay, well, I believe in what Roger Pielke Junior said in his testimony. I believe it was to this committee on January 30th or 31st. It was pretty flowery and maybe a little difficult to follow, but he basically said you cannot separate politics from science. I agree with that.

[The information follows:]

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Mr. SPENCER. I would say if I changed anything, I would make sure that when science is funded, it does not favor any particular political or policy outcomes. That is what I would like to see changed.

Mr. ISSA. I hope we can do that.

Let me ask one more question.

The analogy I used earlier of former Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich complaining about being put on the back of the plane of Air Force One in the Clinton administration, a plane that most people never get to ride on at all, isn't Dr. Hansen's complaint essentially that he is the most covered environmental person on the planet and yet he feels stifled because he can't do more freely?

Mr. SPENCER. I basically agree. He has gotten to say whatever he has wanted to say about climate change, and the public can rest assured that they have already heard about every potential catastrophic climate scenario that anybody can dream up 10 times over in the media. They haven't missed a darn thing. So when Jim Hansen finally complained about some pressure, my first thinking was well, they finally started asking him to follow the rules.

Mr. ISSA. And last but not least, unfortunately the 600-page findings are no longer here, but you saw them being referred to by Mr. Connaughton. How do you feel about the final product on climate change?

Mr. SPENCER. Which final product? That big thick thing? I didn't read it.

Mr. ISSA. And why not?

I know you are under oath, but honesty is unusual here.

Mr. SPENCER. I spent all of my time trying to go after what I believe to be the largest uncertainty in global climate change, because I think it is important especially for the poor in humanity and I don't--I basically don't spend much of my time trying to understand all different aspects of what the administration is currently interested in in terms of the--

Mr. ISSA. The Chairman is helping with the question, but it is the right one to ask. What is the greatest uncertainty right now that you are working on?

Mr. SPENCER. I think the greatest uncertainty, which I am not alone in this but we are in the minority, is that we don't understand the way in which the climate system is naturally controlled by precipitation systems. All the air that you are breathing, all of the air out there in the sky, within a few days it all gets cycled through precipitation systems. Those are the systems that impart upon the air its greenhouse effect, which is mostly water vaporing clouds.

Everyone admits we really don't understand them very well, but when you have people that don't have meteorological training--and I love Jim Hansen, I think he is a fantastic

scientist, but he doesn't have formal meteorological training--you'll find that meteorologists are very skeptical about global warming because they understand the complexity of the atmosphere, the almost biological complexity of the atmosphere.

And yet modelers come along and say well, we put some equations in and we put in all the different components and we think this is--that it's telling us the way the atmosphere works. Well, there are a lot of us, possibly a silent majority of meteorologists, that don't believe we know enough. And I think ultimately getting back to your original question, it all comes down to precipitation sites.

Mr. ISSA. Isn't it true that we also don't understand the ocean and its effects? Recently we learned that every 80 miles you have unique DNA in organisms?

Mr. SPENCER. That's true. But also I want to point out that if global warming is indeed a problem, even though we don't understand it, we should do something about it to the extent it makes sense economically. I like to think I am a pretty good student of basic economics, which I never learned about until about age 35. I am a student of Thomas Sowell and Walter Williams, and I think the part of this whole issue I love more than the science is the economics.

Chairman WAXMAN. The gentleman's time has expired. The Chair recognizes himself.

So it is your view, Dr. Spencer, that this consensus 5102 5103 that the view we have heard from the National Academy of 5104 Sciences and the international group that has come up with 5105 recent conclusions, that they are incorrect. You have a 5106 dissenting opinion on this. 5107 Mr. SPENCER. Well, I hear a lot about consensus. You 5108 are going to have to tell me which consensus this is. 5109 Chairman WAXMAN. How about the National Academy of Sciences, They have a consensus point of view. Do you 5110 5111 disagree with that point of view? 5112 Mr. SPENCER. I don't recall what their consensus 5113 happens to be. The consensus I agree with is mankind does 5114 have an influence on climate. To me that is pretty obvious. 5115 Chairman WAXMAN. Is the climate getting warmer? 5116 Mr. SPENCER. Yes. 5117 Chairman WAXMAN. Is that caused by man-made pollutants? Mr. SPENCER. I don't think we have any quantitative 5118 5119 idea how much of that warming is due to mankind. 5120 Chairman WAXMAN. Do you think that people that disagree with you are acting more on faith than on science? 5121 5122 Mr. SPENCER. Yes. 5123 Chairman WAXMAN. And what do you mean by that? 5124 Mr. SPENCER. Well, I learned many years ago that there are some things in science which are difficult to answer, 5125 5126 some questions that are difficult to answer. And some

people--some scientists don't realize to what extent they are 5127 5128 going on faith when they make certain pronouncements. And 5129 it's only human nature. I mean, I don't fault us for it all. 5130 I am saying there is more faith involved in science than most people are led to believe. So those are not keepers of 5131 5132 the truth. 5133 Chairman WAXMAN. There is such a thing as a scientific 5134 method where they evaluate the evidence and test hypotheses. 5135 Do you think those people who try to follow the scientific 5136 methods and reach the conclusion that we--5137 Mr. SPENCER. They haven't followed the scientific 5138 method. 5139 Chairman WAXMAN. They have not? Mr. SPENCER. You cannot put the climate system in the 5140 5141 laboratory. There is only one experiment going on. Mankind 5142 is carrying it out. And there is no way to know how much of 5143 the effect of the warming we have seen is due to radiated 5144 forcing from something like low-level clouds versus mankind. 5145 Chairman WAXMAN. You are definitely outside of the 5146 mainstream of these views on global warming and climate 5147 change. Would you acknowledge that? 5148 Mr. SPENCER. If there was a vote taken, yeah, I would

Mr. SPENCER. If there was a vote taken, yeah, I would probably be outside the mainstream. Yes.

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Chairman WAXMAN. Now, I want to read something that you wrote.

"Twenty years ago as a Ph.D. Scientist, I intentionally studied the evolution versus intelligent design controversy for about 2 years and finally, despite my previous acceptance of evolutionary theory as fact, I came to the realization that intelligent design as a theory of origins is no more religious and no less scientific than evolutionism."

Is that a correct statement?

Mr. SPENCER. Yes. I still believe that.

Chairman WAXMAN. So as a scientist, you believe that intelligent design is equal to the doctrine of evolution?

Mr. SPENCER. I consider it to be a better explanation of origins, and origins are something that science basically cannot address. There are no naturalistic explanations yet for the information content of DNA or RNA. There is no explanation for the Big Bang that doesn't have to invoke new physics we've never heard of before, we have never seen. To me, that is as much faith as it is science.

Chairman WAXMAN. And the whole Darwin explanation of evolution, survival of the fittest--

Mr. SPENCER. Even the evolutionists are having big problems with neo-Darwinism. They realize it's not explaining what is going on biologically.

Now, of course, I have got a sister that will beat me over the head because she disagrees with me on that. But I still believe that, and there are a lot of scientists that

5177 believe that, including evolutionists.

Chairman WAXMAN. So as a scientist, you are out of the mainstream on global warming, and would you say you are out of the mainstream on evolution?

Mr. SPENCER. Yeah, among scientists, sure. I would also like to point out that there were two medical researchers from Australia that were out of the mainstream. They were laughed at for 10 years for believing that stomach ulcers were due to bacteria. In 2005, they were awarded the Nobel Prize. So I don't mind being out of the mainstream.

Chairman WAXMAN. There is no question in scientific history that people who are out of the mainstream later are proved to be correct, but that was based on scientific evidence.

Mr. SPENCER. And statistically I probably agree with you that consensus among scientists usually is more right than wrong.

Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you.

The gentleman from Utah, Mr. Cannon.

Mr. CANNON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

You know, I am wondering how we got to the point of discussing intelligent design here except to somehow cast a shadow on the witness' integrity. I think that he has made casual references to very deep studies, and I would suggest that the majority look at those studies and deal with that

issue on its own merits, because I think what we are dealing 5202 5203 with here really comes down to the question of should we be asking questions, especially in an environment so complex as 5204 5205 the Earth's atmosphere, or should we say there is a mainstream and if you are outside the mainstream, you are not 5206 5207 accepting? 5208 The whole point of the scientific method is to ask, yes, 5209 and the key is to come up with a good question to ask. 5210 And I think, Dr. Spencer, when you talk about there is 5211 only one experiment, that is what is happening around us. 5212 There are things we can measure in that environment, right? 5213 Mr. SPENCER. Yes. 5214 Mr. CANNON. And are we doing some of that measuring? Mr. SPENCER. I am sorry. You are asking about the 5215 5216 measurements? We do the satellite temperatures. John Christie and I 5217 were not the only ones, as the Chairman is well aware. There 5218 5219 is another group in California that is also doing that now, 5220 and they get answers very close to us. They get somewhat warmer global temperatures. There is Jim Hansen and others 5221 5222 that have a global --5223 Mr. CANNON. And they are measurements, right? Mr. SPENCER. All of these measurements have errors. 5224 don't know how big the errors are, but we think we are all in 5225 agreement that all of these measurements do show warming. 5226

There is still some argument about how much warming there is.

Mr. CANNON. There's an argument about how much warming, about how much that is going to affect the sea level. There are arguments about everything in the whole system, including how good the model is that you use to predict.

You said earlier there is only one experiment, and the model, I think you were going to say, the model is woefully inadequate in dealing with the reality which we are still trying to figure out.

Mr. SPENCER. That is my belief, and here's where we hit faith again. Jim Hansen has faith that he has the important physics that is necessary to show that you--the climate system is going to react from addition of man-made greenhouse gasses. Okay.

Now the climate modelers will tell you that the climate models do replicate the basic behavior of the climate system. That is true. I agree with them. They do. The question is, though, how the atmosphere will change from this very small amount of rate enforcing that mankind is causing, less than 1 percent, of the natural greenhouse effect, which weather has control over. We are putting in our own extra 1 percent. How is the system going to respond?

Jim Hansen and some other modelers think the system is going to respond by punishing us, that its going to amplify the little bit of warming from that.

5252 Mr. CANNON. That is a belief you are saying. That is Jim Hansen's belief.

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Mr. SPENCER. It's a belief based on the physics that he put in his model, that the physics he put in his model are sufficient to describe how the system is going to react to our addition of greenhouse gasses.

Mr. CANNON. I think it would have been fascinating to have a longer discussion with Dr. Hansen, because I believe you are correct that a large part of what he is doing is justifying his longstanding view that catastrophic bad things are going to happen based upon--what do you call them--the inertia, the massive inertia and these slight changes.

Mr. SPENCER. And I don't mind going on the record saying he may well be right. As a scientist, he may well be right.

Mr. CANNON. Isn't that the point? We have to ask the question, is he right? He has posited an idea and now he has tried to quash the questions because he's drawn a conclusion, and that conclusion has become a conclusion of faith instead of a conclusion of inquiry of science.

Mr. SPENCER. I am sure he doesn't look at that it way, but I do.

Mr. CANNON. I think he was pretty clear about it and what is evil and what is good.

5276 Mr. SPENCER. He has done a good job of showing

quantitatively one possible explanation for the warming in the last century, and that increases his confidence because he claims if he combines the effects of volcanoes and aerosols and CO2 and he tinkers around enough with the model, he can actually get something that looks like the temperature changes over the last century.

So what he has done is come up with one potential explanation for the current global temperatures and how they evolved over the last century.

Mr. CANNON. And that becomes an augmentor of his faith, is what you are saying.

Mr. SPENCER. I wish I could remember the name. There was a lady who worked at NCAR who did some research, some sociological research at NCAR about climate modelers, and what she learned was that they only tend to discuss the big uncertainties among themselves, but when it comes to public consumption the uncertainties are greatly--

Mr. CANNON. Mr. Hansen talked about that when he talked about trying to overcome the gap between what the public understands about the catastrophic possibilities and the science. What he meant there is not that they want people to understand the complexities of the discussion, but he wants them to understand the conclusion that he believes is imminent.

Mr. SPENCER. Yeah. From the people I talked to in the

public, I think everyone knows what the consensus view is. 5302 5303 Mr. CANNON. The consensus is out there very loud, and 5304 promoted by people who want a conclusion. 5305 I have some technical questions about what is going on with global warming, but I do want to ask one other thing. 5306 5307 Mr. Issa, I think, used the expression "gang up." And when 5308 scientists come to a conclusion and gang up, that is some of a "thugocracy," you know, when thugs have control. 5309 5310 Chairman WAXMAN. The gentleman's time has expired. 5311 Mr. CANNON. This is the end of the question. 5312 In the first place, it means bad science when people get 5313 together and decide who's inside and who is out. And secondly, it means those who are on the inside continue to 5314 5315 get the money. Isn't that the case? 5316 Mr. SPENCER. Generally, yes. But I don't think you are going to change scientists. Scientists are human, too, and 5317 5318 they have their own biases and political opinions, as do I. 5319 And you are not going to change that, I think, getting back 5320 to the original suggestion maybe the committee can try to make sure that different political and policy outcomes are 5321 5322 respected, you know, in funding the science. 5323 Mr. CANNON. Thank you. I yield back. 5324 Chairman WAXMAN. Yes. 5325 Mr. Yarmuth.

Mr. YARMUTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

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Dr. Spencer, I would like you to either tell me whether you agree or disagree with this statement: When the government speaks on science, it should present an accurate and honest view of the current state of the science.

Mr. SPENCER. That would make sense, yes.

Mr. YARMUTH. And it should, to all extents possible, prevent ideology, dogma, and corporate considerations from influencing its description of the current state of the science?

Mr. SPENCER. I guess, in an ideal world.

Mr. YARMUTH. And while you have some evidence, claim to have some evidence, that such activity took place or such influence on undesirable influence took place under the Clinton administration, you don't have a judgment as to whether it has taken place or has not taken place under the current administration.

Mr. SPENCER. No. I don't really have any judgment, but I wouldn't be surprised. I mean, I don't know whether it has been mentioned in this hearing, but NASA is an executive branch agency, and ultimately our boss is the President. And if something is not agreeing with the President's policy direction, I can see pressure being made. I mean, as a scientist, I wouldn't like it. But then I don't have to be a government employee, do I? So I resigned.

Mr. YARMUTH. I would ask you whether you would consider

it a legitimate role for the Congress to--when it suspects 5352 5353 that such influence has taken place, that it inquire, 5354 investigate whether that is the fact and whether the public 5355 is, in fact, getting a fair and honest and accurate 5356 description of the state of the science. Mr. SPENCER. Yeah, as long as the Congress does that 5357 5358 fairly. 5359 Mr. YARMUTH. Thank you. Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you very much, Dr. Spencer. 5360 5361 appreciate your testimony. That concludes the hearing for today, and we stand 5362 5363 adjourned. 5364 [Whereupon, at 2:50 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

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